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The study examined the relationship between financial intermediation and poverty in 
selected developing countries. In particular the study sought to examine the 
deterministic relationship, cointegration and the causality between financial 
intermediation and poverty. Panel data spanning the period 2004-2016 for 35 
developing countries was employed. Substantial empirical research proposed that 
financial development expands economic prospects and reduces poverty and 
inequality. Hitherto, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the potential effects of 
formal financial dimensions of financial access, financial efficiency and financial 
stability in reducing poverty. There is also a lack of empirical work on the joint effect 
of the other financial dimensions in a financial intermediation setting in poverty 
reduction. The present study contributed to literature by including these financial 
dimensions in examining cointegration and causality between financial dimensions 
and poverty. The study employed a number of econometric methodologies to address 
the objectives of the research such as the GMM, panel ARDL and panel ECM. The 
GMM was employed to examine the determinants of poverty that were selected for 
this study. To examine the long run, short run and the causal relationship, the panel 
ARDL and the error correction model were used. In addition the study deployed PCA 
to develop the composite index for institutional quality. Panel heterogenous estimation 
methods such as the pooled mean group to infer the cointegration and causal effect 
between the financial dimensions and poverty were employed. The Hausman test was 
used to determine the most appropriate estimator and the PMG estimator was 
selected as the most appropriate since the p-value of the Hausman test was 
insignificant. The results from panel ARDL, cointegration test showed the existence of 
a long run relationship between financial intermediation, financial access, financial 
efficiency, financial access and poverty. Furthermore, the study noted that the 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty differ depending on how 
poverty is measured. Therefore, the distortions in understanding and definition of 
poverty may consequently lead to distorted policies that yield little or no results for the 
effectiveness of the financial sector in poverty reduction.The study found strong 
causality in the long run for all the poverty proxies and the selected financial variables. 
Additionally the results from the panel causality tests indicate the bidirectional 




of the variables in the short run. There is strong joint causality among the variables in 
the panel as the results of the error correction term is negative and significant 
indicating that there is dynamic stability between the financial variables and poverty. 
The study further included the domestic public debt and remittances as determinants 
of poverty in a financial intermediation setting. Since domestic public debt can crowd 
out private credit, this study included domestic public debt for the panel of the 
developing countries and the study found that domestic public debt has a poverty 
reducing effect. Additionally the study found that remittances reduce the share of 
population living in poverty whilst increasing inequality as indicated in the findings of 
the study.  
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The present chapter foregrounds the study by delineating the background, context and 
setting of the research. Notably, according to the World Bank (2017) about two billion 
people don’t use formal financial services with above 50% of unbanked adults in the 
poorest families. Access and use of sustainable finance is understood to be an 
approach to poverty reduction. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015) 
do not explicitly list formal financial access as a target to be achieved nor is access to 
finance listed as a development goal (CGAP, 2012). However, it remains a puzzle for 
example, on how there is going to be a reduction of extreme poverty if the poor people 
are inadequately served with financial vehicles that improve their savings, 
consumption and risk management options. Financial intermediation should be of 
social value in that its direct significance to the ordinary individual is to provide 
sustainable financial products services (Gurley and Shaw, 1955). 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The direct significance of financial intermediation to the average person is to efficiently 
mobilise and allocate resources including risk management. The expectation of 
meeting the SDGs by mobilising domestic resources and private finance seems to be 
inadequate for the developing countries (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), 2012). The empirical literature has ample assertions that the improvements 
in finance expands the economic opportunities to the poor and reduce poverty, yet, 
there is a scarcity of empirical research on the presumed effect of formal financial 
dimensions on persistent poverty. Furthermore, there is a deficiency of an empirical 
research in considering the joint evolution and effect of financial dimensions to poverty 
reduction. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) argue that well-functioning formal 
financial sectors assist the poor in improving their livelihood and enabling them to 





The argument on the role of finance in the real economy is mainly centred on its effects 
on economic growth (Ravallion and Datt 2002; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Sehrawat and 
Giri, 2016). Deaton (2013), however, assert that irrespective of having progressive 
economic growth, some countries have escaped poverty but others were left behind. 
It is therefore the aim of this study to examine the aspects of finance that act as a 
catalyst to poverty reduction than the ones working through economic growth. This 
study acknowledges the link between finance and growth in poverty reduction that has 
been comprehensively covered in literature (see Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Demirguc-
Kunt, Klapper and Singer; 2017). 
 
The finance-growth channel in poverty reduction is not going to be discussed in further 
detail as the study seek to examine other channels of influence in which financial 
intermediation can reduce poverty. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) argue that the 
persistence of inequality across generations is shaped by finance and the financial 
effects in the real sector have ramifications to income distribution and poverty. 
Previous studies on the role of finance in poverty reduction have either focused on the 
indirect relationship via economic growth or have mainly looked at the financial 
development aspects such as the depth of the banking sector and the size of the stock 
market (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine; 2007). Recent data has shown that the size 
of the financial market which is mainly represented by financial development does not 
necessarily mean access, efficiency or stability of the financial services (Cihák et al., 
2013). Furthermore questions have been raised if financial intermediation is really 
beneficial to the poor or the advocacy for inclusive intermediation is merely an 
introduction of innovative providers with new product to a different target market (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2013: 1; Mader, 2018). In some instances an increase 
in the depth of the financial sector is accompanied by increased financial instability 
which affects the poor more than the rich as they lack hedging instruments against 
financial shocks (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). 
 
The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey listed access to finance as among the constraints 
by the small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). Honohan and King (2013) argue 
that in Africa access to formal financial services varies significantly with eight percent 
in Mozambique and fifty four percent in South Africa. Increased lending to the public 




(European Investment Bank (EIB), 2018). The European Investment Bank observed 
an increase in issuance of public debt between the period 2014-2018 by some banks 
in Africa, particularly in Ghana, Niger, Zambia and Tanzania. The increase in 
alternative investment through the issuance of public debt has caused significant 
crowding out as lending rates increases in a number of African countries has 
constrained the access to credit by small enterprises (EIB, 2018). 
 
According to Cruz, Foster, Quillin and Schellekens (2015) the past decades have 
realised shifts in the composition of poverty among the poor regions of the world. For 
the past decades ninety five percent of the global poverty was concentrated in East 
Asia and Pacific, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Cruz et al., 2015). In the 1990s 
fifty percent of the global poverty was concentrated in East Asia with fifteen percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015). However, by 2015 there was a shift in poverty 
concentration with more than half of global poverty concentrated in Sub-Saharan 
Africa whilst twelve percent is in East Asia (World Bank, 2015). 
 
Poverty affects the majority of the world’s population and denies the poor of meeting 
their basic needs which includes financial services, education, healthcare and 
sanitation among others (see Kandachar and Halme, 2017:10; Calder, 2007; Cheema, 
2005:5). Prahalad and Hart (2002) argue that serving the poor in a way that is 
responsive to their needs is an effective poverty reduction mechanism. Formal finance 
is regarded as the link to achieve the SDGs (Klapper, El-Zoghbi and Hess, 2016). The 
formal financial services act as an enabler to achieving SDGs if the poor people are 
actively and successfully using formal financial products and services sustainably such 
as deposits and savings accounts, payment services, credit and insurance to meet 
their specific needs (CGAP, 2011). 
 
Use of these formal financial services has a direct social value to the average 
individual (Honohan, 2008). The payments systems provided by the financial sector 
should be able to transfer money between people or firms in different places with 
minute inconveniences at minimum costs (Aguero, 2015). In the absence of efficient 
formal financial intermediation, use of informal services by the poor results in ‘poverty 
penalty’ that is the poor ends up paying more for financial services than their richer 




Wright and Muteesassira (2001) that 99% of the poor reported loss incidences of 
savings in the informal sector compared to 15% reports for the formal sector. Limited 
access to formal financial services forces poor households to rely on risky and 
expensive options and this has stifled economic progress of poor households 
(Nayaran, 2000; Hammond et al., 2007). Risk-return considerations by formal financial 
intermediaries discriminates the poor and low income households from access and 
use of formal financial services (Baradaran, 2012). Access to formal financial services 
can help people safeguard their earnings, manage risks, payments transactions and 
entrepreneurial activities (World Bank, 2017). 
 
The penetration rate of formal finance is very low in the poor households as the 
distribution models of the formal financial systems do not cater for the needs of this 
market (see Deloitte, 2017; World Bank, 2017). Formal financial intermediaries have 
one-size-fits-all type of products and services which are easier to implement at lower 
costs for the financial institutions (Honohan and King, 2013). However, this does not 
necessarily offer the flexibility that poor consumers need to manage inconsistent cash 
flows. Active participation in the formal financial system enables people to pay for large 
expenses such as education; they are able to manage risk and entrepreneurial 
ventures (Hung, Yoong and Brown, 2012). According to the World Bank (2016), there 
are disparities in the access and use of formal financial services which varies with and 
across countries. China, India and Korea are examples of once poor countries which 
have made great inroads in poverty reduction whilst most African and Caribbean 
countries are left behind (see Deaton, 2013). 
 
Most of the existing formal financial products and services are not working any better 
for the the low income earners (FinMark Trust, 2018). People have to evolve around 
the offered financial products, taking products as given than the products evolving to 
the needs of the people (Honohan and King, 2013; Hung et al., 2012). Bending et al., 
(2015) asserted that most banks in developing and emerging markets focus their 
lending activity to corporate financing and governments. This has largely discriminated 
SMEs, poor households with a larger population remaining unbanked (Bending et al., 
2015). There is ample research that has been done on the finance-growth nexus, but 
most focused on finance and poverty reduction as an indirect relationship via the 




Economic growth is muted to be further hampered by inequality, hence in economies 
with high inequalities economic growth might be essential but not adequate for poverty 
reduction (Fosu, 2017). 
 
Dabla-Norris et al (2015) found that a percentage point increase in income of the rich 
slows economic growth by 0.08 percentage points. A corresponding rise in income of 
the poorest 20 percent increases the economic growth by 0.38 percentage points. It 
is therefore noteworthy in this study to look at the other channels in that finance can 
be a catalyst for poverty reduction. Little has been done to interrogate the direct 
relationship between finance and poverty reduction and the channels in which finance 
has a direct role in poverty reduction. Fanta and Makina (2017) concur that the study 
on the role of finance in the real economy remains incomplete citing endogeneity 
problems and use of weak proxies among other reasons. 
 
Irrespective of progress in poverty reduction, why does poverty persist and is there 
anything that can be done? Can there be other channels besides the economic growth 
channel in which formal finance can be an epitome for poverty reduction? In this study 
we will examine the other characteristic of finance such as the efficiency, access and 
the stability in the financial intermediation setting. Rewilak (2013) argues that full 
benefits of the financial sector depend on the location of the poor people. Furthermore, 
there are limited studies which have included the impact of other financial dimension 
such as financial efficiency, financial access, financial stability and institutional quality 
(from a developed index using principal component analysis) in studying how financial 
intermediation affects poverty reduction.  
 
Following the studies by Zhang and Naceur (2018) and Rewilak (2017) this study will 
look at four dimensions of financial intermediation (depth, access, efficiency and 
stability) in poverty reduction. The four dimensions have been included in the study 
because examining only one dimension of the role of finance in poverty reduction such 
as financial depth misses the other aspects as the financial systems are 
multidimensional. This study examines the effect of financial intermediation on poverty 
reduction without focusing specifically on the growth impact. For easy reading the term 
developing countries will be used in reference to both developing countries and 




1.2 Problem statement 
 
This study notes that poverty is a social and political challenge that most developing 
countries of the world are burdened with. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) cited concerns of inequalities in income distribution in countries 
that have progressively succeeded in reducing poverty such as China and India 
(UNDP, 2017). Active use of formal financial products and services in most transition 
and developing economies is mainly by the middle-upper class. Use of formal financial 
products by the poor and low income earners is faced by several challenges that range 
from cost, lack of suitable products and unavailability of an intermediary in the close 
proximity of where people live (World Bank, 2016). In most developing economies the 
formal financial sector is underdeveloped and underserving the poor with little or no 
use of formal financial services by the poor (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, no 
date). According to the Global Financial Index (2017) thirty-one percent of the global 
population remains unbanked. Of this unbanked population only three percent listed 
that they do not have an account with a financial institution because they do not need 
one as the only reason for not having a formal bank account (World Bank, 2017). 
Klapper, El-Zoghbi and Hess (2016) questioned the efficacy of SDGs short of getting 
more people to participate in formal financial services. Access and use of sustainable 
finance by the poor and low income households has been muted as a tool or an 
enabler for poverty reduction (World Bank, 2016; Finmark Trust, 2018). However, the 
use of the formal financial products by the poor and the low income households is 
dependent on understanding the complexity of the available products and the trust on 
the formal financial system (Nanziri, 2016). 
 
The World Bank (2019) lamented the uneven progress in poverty reduction across the 
regions of the world. Significant poverty was reduced in East Asia and the Pacific (47 
million extreme poor), South Asia (7 million) whilst Sub-Saharan Africa made little 
progress in reducing extreme poverty. The Sub-Saharan Africa region only managed 
to reduce poverty by four million. By 2015 Sub-Sahara Africa had 413 million people 
living on less than US$1.90 which is more than all the other regions combined (World 
Bank, 2019) The International Monetary Fund (IMF), (2017) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (2017), singled out economic 





However, even with stable economic growth countries have failed to significantly 
reduce poverty (see Fosu, 2017). Can there be other channels, which policy makers 
can look for, to enable a fair distribution of formal financial services for poverty 
reduction than the finance-growth channel that to date has ample empirical evidence 
available? Why would other countries irrespective of economic growth be able to make 
progress in poverty reduction than others? This study tackles the role of financial 
intermediation, financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability to bring to 
light if there are other channels in which formal finance affects poverty. The renewed 
interest in finance for all by development agencies, governments and the private sector 
requires a better understanding of the relationship between financial intermediation, 
the other financial dimension of finance and poverty. This understanding is crucial as 
to avoid policy distortion in addressing poverty in developing countries. This study 
seeks to examine potential channels in which formal finance can enhance the efforts 
to reduce poverty in selected developing countries. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
• To examine the deterministic relationship between financial intermediation 
and poverty among selected developing countries over the period from 2004 
to 2016. 
• To examine the cointegrating relationship between financial intermediation and 
poverty among selected developing countries over the period from 2004 to 
2016.  
• To examine the causality effects between poverty and financial intermediation 
among selected developing countries over the period from 2004 to 2016. 
 
1.4 Overview of poverty in emerging economies 
 
There are disparities in poverty reduction in developing economies; some countries 
have made significant reduction in poverty yet in others the poverty rate is declining 
with an increasing number of people who are living below the poverty line of $1.90 a 
day (World Bank, 2019). Developing economies that have significantly lifted a sizeable 




economic size, gross domestic product per capita and population the developing 
countries is comprised of a heterogeneous group (OECD, 2010). According to the 
World Bank (2019) the majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas, have low 
education literacy levels, mainly employed in the agricultural sectors and are under 18 
years of age. Comparing with other regions Sub-Sahara Africa is lagging in reducing 
poverty as the region has realised a 9 million increase of number of people living in 
poverty from approximately 404 million in 2013 to about 413 million in 2015 
(PovCalNet, 2019). Figure 1.1 provides a trend of the population of people living in 
poverty for the regional aggregates as provided by the PovCalNet of the World Bank. 
The latest data available from the World Bank is for the year 2015 hence the study 
couldn’t provide the trends for the latest years the survey is done in intervals.  
 
Figure 1.1: Trends in poverty (population) by region, 1990–2015 
 
Source: PovcalNet, 2019 
Poverty in the East Asia and the Pacific has been gradually decreasing from an 
estimate of 983.88 million in 1990 to about 47 million in 2015. Additionally, gradual 
decrease in the share of individuals living in poverty is observed for Europe and 
Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) had more poor people in the year 2015 than 
they had in 1990. The number of poor people living below the poverty line of $1.90 in 
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The United Nations estimated that the World has 736 million poor people of which 
about 56% (413 million) are in Africa (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2019) The World Bank (2019) opined that the number of 
people living in poverty is increasing for fragile states. Extreme poverty in the 
developing areas is now concentrated in hard to reach areas such as the rural areas 
and in fragile states (World Bank, 2019).The developing economies faces the risk of 
temporarily lifting out people out of poverty as other factors such as economic shocks 
and the climate change wipes out the gains and force people back into poverty. 
Poverty at birth often implies being the recipient of less investment in human 
development which is more often a precursor of the standard of living in the future 
(Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen and Gaddis, 2016). The poverty trends in population 
in Table 1 can be summarised in a trend in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.2: Regional aggregation poverty headcount ratio 
 
Source: PovcalNet, 2019 
 
The data from the PolvCalnet shows that the headcount ratio is decreasing for all the 
regions using the poverty headcount ratio of $1.90 at the 2011 purchasing power 
parity. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest share of the population of people living in 
poverty as compared with the other regions. East Asia and Pacific is the region that is 
realising a continuous sharp fall in the share of the population that is leaving below the 
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decreasing trend in poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap whilst the number of 
people living in poverty has an uptrend. The figures from the World Bank, estimates 
that the share of the population from 54,69 in 1990 to 41,05 in 2015. In the same 
period the number of people living in poverty has increased from 280,15 in 1990 to 
412,99 in 2015. The latest figures from the World Bank (2019) have attributed this 
growth in number of people living in poverty to rapid population growth. Figure 1.3 
alternatively shows poverty as measured by the poverty gap and the poverty trends 
are not significantly different from Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.3: Regional aggregation of poverty gap 
 
Source: PovcalNet, 2019 
 
Poverty gap is an alternative measure of poverty and the trend in the poverty gap for 
the regions. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the highest poverty gap 
although it has been decreasing since 1990. East Asia and the Pacific has the sharpest 
decline in poverty gap from a high of 22,42% in 1990 to 0,46 in 2015.region The 
financial sector has been opined to be instrumental in reducing poverty and section 5 
discusses the trends in the financial sector development in developing economies. 
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In developing economies the efficiency of the financial system is crucial to unlock the 
expansion of economic opportunities and reduce poverty and inequality. Poverty and 
inequality are abridged as the breadth of finance to the poor and the marginalised 
areas such as rural areas is increased. To date there is no explicit definition of financial 
sector development but it broadly refers to better efficiency and effectiveness of the 
sector; with a wide range of financial products and services, sustainably inclusive with 
varied institutions functioning in the sector, improved financial intermediation; and 
expansion in the regulation and stability of the sector. Furthermore financial 
development reduces vulnerability to shock by facilitating risk management and 
promote generation of higher income through facilitation of capital accumulation 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Beck et al., 2007 and Naceur and Zhang, 2018). 
The World Bank (2019) summarised that financial sector development arises as the 
financial markets eases the ‘costs’ of finance and efficiently deliver the key functions 
of finance (discussed further in Chapter 2 and 3) sustainably.  
 
According to Bill and Melinda Gates (no date) the poor mainly transact in cash and 
more often find the services for the formal financial services expensive as the products 
are not designed to suit the needs of the population living in poverty. Access to formal 
finance without the financial histories among the poor has hindered them from 
potentially using the formal finance which has the capacity of lifting them out of poverty 
(Levine, 2008). Levine (2000) argued that the imperfections in the financial markets 
help in the maintaining persistence poverty. The supply side perspective on why the 
population living in poverty lacks access and use of formal financial services is making 
inroads in finding solutions for developing economies. However the demand side is 
under researched how poverty in developing economies affects the formal financial 
sector development.  
 
There is dearth of empirical studies on the effect of poverty on the financial sector but 
intuitively there seem to be a correlation between poverty and the financial sector 
dimensions of financial intermediation, financial access, financial efficiency and 
financial stability. For most countries that have high poverty rates the financial sector 
is not well developed. More often poor countries have high market volatility and low 
institutional stability which can potentially increase the instability of the financial sector 




that the poor mainly save in physical assets, such as livestock or jewellery. This results 
in the lack of liquid assets which are crucial for effective and efficient intermediation of 
financial resources. The behavioural finance theory in section 2.3 further discusses 
cognitive functions of individuals and inappropriate economic decision-making which 
in turn can directly influence how the poor use the financial services which might affect 
the provision of services by the financial sector  
 
The financial system is comprised of the bank and non-bank financial sector, the stock 
market and the bond market. For most developing countries the financial systems are 
still in their infancy with little or no formal financial access by the majority of the 
population especially the poor households, small businesses and in rural areas (World 
Bank, 2016). The development of the financial sector in emerging economies can be 
described in the three tiers banking sector, financial markets and the bond markets. 
Financial liberalisation as from the 1980 brought the relative growth in the size of the 
financial markets of developing economies (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). In 
most developing economies particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa the banking sector is the 
major source of external finance for companies (Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks, 2009; 
Samargandi, Fidrmuc, and Ghosh, 2015; Svirydzenka, 2016). In the early 1990 there 
were improvements in the bank balance sheet and the increasing demand for loans 
such that the bank credit to the private sector has been on the increase for most 





Figure 1.4: Credit to the Private Sector by Groups of Countries from the selected  
 developing countries (1970-2016). 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on World Development Indicators data 
 
There is an uptrend in domestic credit to the private sector for the sample of the 
developing countries in our study. The expansion of credit to the private sector implies 
development in the financial sector (Beck et al., 2007; De Haan and Sturm, 2017). The 
private credit to the private sector as a share of the gross domestic product has an 
ascending trend. The credit extended to the baking sector is the developing countries 
vary with other countries having very shallow bank credit to the private sector whilst in 
other countries banking sectors is deep (Beck and Cull, 2013). As from 2004 on 
average the credit extended to the private sector was on the increase from an average 
of 19.08% of GDP in 2004 to an average of 27.25% GDP for the developing countries 
in our study. The expansion of credit to the private sector implies development in the 
financial sector (Beck et al., 2007; De Haan and Sturm, 2017).  
 
Figure 1.2 gives the trend of the other characteristics of finance namely financial 
stability and financial efficiency. Figure 1.2 illustrates the interest rate spread and the 
bank z score. The banking sector in the developing countries is largely oligopolistic in 
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Figure 1.5: Trend in the bank Z-score and the interest rate spread of the selected  
 developing countries 
 
Source: Authors own calculations from the World Bank data  
 
On average the highest spread was 14% in 2007 and has slowed to an average of 6 
percent in 2016 (Figure 1.2). There was a sharp decline of the interest rate spread 
between 2005/8 with an increasing trend as from 2011. The interest rate spread 
captures the efficiency of the banking sector in the selected developing economies 
under this study. The bank z-score had a stable increasing between 2000 and 2012. 
Although the banking sector in the developing countries is the major source of external 
finance other developing countries also have an active stock market although. In 
developing countries the development of the stock market is heterogeneous across 
countries. The stock market for the developing countries under analysis is still in its 
infancy and very small, not all countries have active stock market. Since the 2007 (see 
Figure 1.3) the capitalisation of the stock market has been on the decline casting doubt 
on the deepening of the stock market of the developing countries Some countries such 
as South Africa have a very well developed stock market whilst other countries such 
as Angola will launch its stock exchange in 2019. Some countries still do not have their 
own stock exchange or they are served by a single bourse for a group of countries. 
For example, the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières SA (BRVM) in Côte 



















































































d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The BRVM have 72 listing as of 2016 whilst 
South Africa had 388 listings (European Investment Bank, 2018). 
 
Figure 1.6: Stock market trends in selected developing countries  
 
Source: Authors own calculation from the World Bank data 
 
The trend from the stock market is obtained by averaging the data from the World 
Bank Indicators using the sample of countries in our study. There is a sharp increase 
on the capitalisation of the stock market between 2005-2009 where the capitalisation 
of the stock market hard a sharp decline. The stock market capitalisation as a 
percentage to the gross domestic product estimates the depth of the stock market in 
the developing countries. Although there is an increase in the capitalisation of the 
stock market few countries in the sample have active stock market. The stock market 
turnover ratio increased sharply in 2010/2011 with a sharp decline in 2011/2012. The 
stock prices volatility was on an increasing trend in 2005-2009 with a sharp decline in 
2009-2011. For the stock market data from the World Bank data was available for a 
panel of between 7 and 23 depending on the year. The bond market development in 
most developing countries is very shallow except for a few exceptions. 


























































































There still exists development and financial stability challenges such that the financial 
system hasn’t maximised its effect on the real economy of these economies relative 
to the developed economies. Innovation, consolidation, privatisation and the entry of 
foreign banks in emerging markets are some of the improvements experienced in the 
developing economies banking systems (Mihaljek, 2006). Within the last decade the 
banking industry has come up with creating ways of customer services and improving 
access to finance. In Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) has launched a ‘floating’ 
bank branch to provide ordinary banking services for people who live on remote 
islands (Gulf Times, 2016). To improve financial access for the people who live on 
islands, the state owned bank has transformed a shipping vessel into a fully-fledged 
banking branch (Gulf Times, 2016). In Poland, a mobile Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM) was introduced and customers can book banking services such as deposits 
and cash withdrawals using a mobile application at a place and time of their 
convenience (Ernst and Young, 2016). In Kenya, banks partnered with providers of 
mobile for credit risk assessment of first time bank customers (Ernst and Young, 
2016). These are some of the innovative ways that the banking industry has come up 
with to improve financial intermediation to the previously unbanked population. Africa 
mobile money has come up with innovative ways of banking the previously unbanked.  
 
The emergence of financial technology (Fintech) is changing the global banking 
landscape but it remains to be empirically tested whether banks in developing 
economies should embrace more fintech in place of relationship banking given the 
infrastructure challenges of the already marginalised rural areas. The financial 
systems in the developing markets particularly the banking sector has been facing 
innovation threats from fintech companies (KPMG, 2016). As a result the sector faces 
a challenge of finding a balance between the traditionalists’ customer (those who 
prefer using the traditional banking systems) and the online embracers (customers 
who frequently use the digital channels) (Deloitte, 2018). According to the Deloitte 
Centre for Financial Services (2018) report, the bank branch gratification has higher 
effect on the whole customer satisfaction than the digital influence for all of these 
groups of customers. Financial technology (Fintech) in developing economies 
promises to increase competition and unlock access to formal financial service relative 
to the developed economies (International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2017). There 




low permeation of formal financial services, inadequate income, low financial literacy 
levels and underdeveloped infrastructure in developing economies (IFC, 2017).  
 
Globalisation has increased the presence of foreign banks in the developing countries’ 
financial markets. This has brought with it cross border banking opportunities and 
challenges in the financial systems of the developing countries (World Bank, 2017). 
The presence of foreign banks in the developing economies is not a guarantee to 
financial development and stability. The 2008 financial crisis reduced trust in financial 
institutions, and the regulatory response to the crisis, including increased capital 
requirements and compliance costs, and made it more difficult and expensive for 
banks to lend. In most developing countries there are challenges of expanding the 
financial services to the larger segment of the populace (Beck and Maimbo, 2013) 
Given the opportunities and the challenges that the financial sector faces in the 
developing countries, finance can overcome the challenges deliver the financial 
products and services to reduce poverty and inequality in developing countries.  
 
1.6 Chapter overview 
 
The study comprises of six chapters, which are organised as follows:  
Chapter 1: This chapter presents the introduction and background of the study, the 
research objective, hypotheses and significance of the study are also fleshed out. The 
chapter also maps the outlook of the rest of the study. 
Chapter 2: This chapter conducts a review of the theoretical literature. In addition the 
chapter also highlights the poverty and inequality in the developing economies and 
briefly outlines the challenges that the poor face in accessing financial products and 
services.  
Chapter 3: This chapter provides comprehensive engagement with empirical literature 
on financial intermediation and poverty. 
Chapter 4: The chapter develops the hypotheses of the study. The research problem 
is logically developed into a measurable hypothesis using the objectives of the study. 




Chapter 5: This chapter discusses the methodology that is deployed in the study, 
namely the research design, empirical model specification and the estimation 
techniques. Also discussed are the identified sample and data analysis. The General 
Method of Moments (GMM) is discussed as the method used to determine the 
relationship between poverty and financial intermediation including the other selected 
control variables. The diagnostic tests that were performed before performing the 
GMM and the cointegration tests such as, descriptive statistics, correlation, unit root 
tests are also discussed. For the cointegration short run and the causality effects 
between financial poverty and the financial variables the study uses the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL). The model specification for the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lags and the Error Correction Model (ECM) are discussed 
this chapter. 
Chapter 6: The chapter presents and discusses the empirical results of the study. The 
Chapter tests the hypothesis developed in chapter 4 using the econometric methods 
discussed in Chapter 5. The determinants of poverty are empirically tested by 
regressing them against the determinants of the study.  
Chapter 7: This chapter completes the study by summarising the study and outlining 
policy implications and recommendations. The limitations of the study are explained 
and areas of further research suggested. The chapter also provides an explication of 
how this study contributes to the body of knowledge in light of how financial 






THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2. Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to explore the theoretical literature that is relevant to the objectives 
of the present study. Fleshed out in this chapter are a number of theories which explain 
how the process of financial intermediation can influence individual welfare thereby 
improving their economic well-being? This chapter, therefore, delves a review of the 
theoretical literature on the role of financial intermediation in poverty reduction. Section 
2.1 defines and summarises financial intermediation. Sub-sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 
define and summarise the key terms of the study that are financial intermediation and 
poverty respectively. Subsection 2.2 discusses the financial intermediation theories. 
Additionally, section discusses theories on the determinants of poverty, the 
determinants of poverty are identified in subsection 2.4 whilst theories that link 
financial intermediation and the gross domestic product per capita or economic growth 
are discussed in subsection 2.5. In that way, this chapter combines both the theoretical 
framework and literature review of the study. 
 
2.1 Definition of key terms 
 
2.1.1 Financial intermediation 
 
Financial intermediation is a value creation process in which an institutional entity 
(intermediary) incurs liabilities on its own account by engaging in financial transactions 
for the purpose of acquiring financial assets (OECD, 2007). Intermediaries for the 
purpose of this study will focus on deposit taking institutions (banks) who hold financial 
claims as assets and channel funds to firms and individuals for a profit (see Allen and 
Santomero, 1997; Mitchell, 2016). The role of financial intermediaries is to channel 
funds from savers to borrowers by intermediating between them (Lehr, 1999; Gorton 




The role of financial intermediation in the real economy builds on the existence of the 
ability of financial intermediation in liquidity provision and risk transformation (Claus 
and Grimes, 2003). According to Claus and Grimes (2003), intermediaries can 
enhance risk sharing and welfare by providing better risk sharing among agents who 
need to consume at random times thereby enhancing risk sharing and welfare. The 
role of financial intermediaries in poverty reduction is mainly centred on the role 
intermediaries play in the real economy (see Rother, 1999). The resource pooling 
ability of financial intermediaries from savers and the redistribution of the pooled 
resource for productive activity further explains the existence of financial 
intermediaries (Pagano, 1993).  
 
Financial intermediation is vital in raising economic wellbeing and factor productivity 
as the financial sector mobilises savings which they reallocate to the productive sector 
of the economy at low cost (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990; King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; 
Schumpeter, 2017; Rewilak, 2017). The ability of the financial intermediaries in 
resource mobilisation is not only beneficial for capital accumulation but it has also a 
poverty reducing effect if the pooled resources are available to the poor (Shaw, 1973 
and Pagano, 1993). Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argues that the high costs of 
participation in the formal finance system limits the poor from using the financial 
services. The financial sector can be instrumental in reducing need and vulnerability 
profitably among the poor, be it access to credit, access to disaster insurance, savings 
and consumption smoothing (Burgess and Pande, 2005). Direct lending in the financial 
markets with information asymmetry is not possible and therefore, individuals with 
surplus finance use financial intermediaries as they have information and monitoring 
advantage (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Allen, 1990). The Sustainable 
Development Goals 2015-2030 stresses eradication of extreme poverty among other 
goals and the formal finance is widely accepted as a catalyst in rolling out the SDGs 
(United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2017). 
 
2.1.2 Poverty  
 
Historically there has been an attempt to define poverty. Smith (1776) defined poverty 




many definitions of poverty since it is multidimensional (World Bank, 2005; Room, 
1995; Whelan and Whelan 1995; Dewilde, 2008). Narayan et al. (2000) defined 
poverty as absence of material wellbeing, the presence of self-doubt, social isolation, 
shortage of long term planning horizon and psychological distress. Sengupta (2003) 
defined poverty as the deficiency of elementary ability to live in dignity including lack 
of income to buy a basket of basic commodities and services. Having many 
dimensions has posed a challenge in the measurement of poverty as there is no single 
generic measurement of poverty (Drewnowski, 1977; Kanbur and Squire, 2001: 187; 
Sumner, 2007). Poverty can therefore be defined in either absolute or relative terms 
(see Townsend, 1979; Sen, 1982; 1985) these terms are explained in chapter five 
under the subsection on the measurement of poverty. Poverty is defined in absolute 
terms if people fall below an established standard level of needs such as the poverty 
line (see Drewnowski, 1977) that is delineated in many economies and polities of the 
world.  
 
The relative term definition of poverty accepts that inequality can also be defined as 
poverty as the persons’ comparative wellbeing with others in the society (Drewnowski, 
1977; Iceland, 2005). This is concurrent with (Galbraith 1958: 252) who posited that 
people are regarded as poor if their income significantly falls below that of the 
community. Poverty is said to be dynamic as it varies across region as well as time 
(Drewnowski, 1977; Ravallion, 2010). Townsend (1979) argues that poverty can not 
only be defined in income terms but also in terms of exclusion of people’s participation 
in the activities which make them feel as part of the society. In 2010 the United Nations 
came up with a multidimensional poverty index (MPI) as a measure of poverty. Health, 
education and standard of living are the three vital targets as dimension indicators and 
the intensity of poverty and the headcount ratio are the poverty measures (see UN, 
2010). Given these diverse definitions of poverty, then, there is no universal definition 
and measurement of poverty (Drewnowski, 1977). This study clearly spells out its 
elected definition of poverty Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Imperfect markets  
 
This section seeks to explain the existence of financial intermediation and how the 




benefit from the existence of financial intermediaries. In a perfect market setting there 
is no need for financial intermediaries as economic agents directly finance there deficit 
for investing in entrepreneurial projects. However market failures have given rise to 
the interrelated problem of information asymmetry and transaction cost which justifies 
the existence of financial intermediaries as well as why the financial services and 
products aren’t universally provided. Financial intermediaries have the ability of the 
financial intermediation process in overcoming the market frictions and are able to 
channel financial resources from surplus to deficit units in the economy (Levine, 1999). 
The imperfect financial markets determine the extent to which the poor can borrow or 
save for investment in capital or education (Levine 1997). The existence of the market 
frictions such as information asymmetry and transaction costs affect the provision of 
the financial intermediary services that are discussed in detail in section 2.2.1 and 
section 2.2.2 below.  
 
2.2.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
The foundation of the theory of financial intermediaries is based on information 
asymmetries. Information asymmetry is present when a party to an economic 
transaction possesses greater material knowledge than the other party (Akerlof, 1970; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Merton, 1995). Information asymmetry is among the 
market failures that severely affect the low income and poor households. However, 
beside the ability to process information, intermediaries face the challenge of adverse 
selection in selecting their potential clients (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). In such cases, 
financial market frictions such as information asymmetry and transaction costs can 
create persistent poverty traps (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 
1997; Rajan and Zingales, 2004). 
 
The information problems in the credit market result in exclusion and credit rationing 
even during equilibrium in the financial market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Agents’ 
problems in the financial markets results in adverse selection (borrowers who might 
be seeking credit might not have the intention of repaying and moral hazard (after the 
credit has been granted the debtors can use the fund in projects with negative returns 
or where the lender has no interest in the project (World Bank, no date). As the 




risk profile of the borrowers increases (Sharpe, 1990). Loan supply at an interest rate 
that is above the bank optimal rate will be backward bending.  In the presence of 
information asymmetry, adverse selection will result in credit denial to borrowers who 
are tentatively indistinct from those who receive loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
 
As the information asymmetry results in adverse selection and moral hazard credit is 
denied even if the borrower is willing to pay a higher interest rate at any terms of the 
loan (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969). This results in involuntary exclusion to the financial 
market as access to the financial products is denied even to individuals who can be 
bankable (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008). As access to finance is denied 
the benefits of financial access such as consumption smoothing and investment in 
human capital are limited to the few that have access to the financial markets (Zeller 
and Sharma, 2000).  
 
Financial intermediaries have information advantage in the distribution of funds from 
surplus to deficit units (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Jaffee and Russell, 1976). In perfect 
markets with no information asymmetries there is no role for financial intermediation 
(Allen and Santomero, 1997; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000). Intermediation 
overcomes market frictions and lowers information costs or wealth between 
households and firms. The capacity of financial intermediaries to reduce transaction 
costs and improvements in screening and monitoring borrowers mitigate the 
challenges of asymmetric information in the financial markets (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993). This enables access to financial services for starting entrepreneurial 
ventures thereby increasing household wealth. Financial market imperfections, limit 
individuals’ borrowing capacity to the level of their initial wealth, alienating the poor 
from investing in investment ventures with higher returns (Banerjee and Newman 
1993). In this case information asymmetries generate poverty traps and income 
inequalities in that the poor are denied use of external finance due to lack of collateral 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
 
Even though financial intermediation is said to improve the allocative efficiency of 
capital, Honohan (2004) argued that finance in rather neutral as it is neither 
progressive nor regressive to the plight of the poor households. According to 




participating in intermediary coalitions in the initial stages of development. However, 
the ability of financial intermediation to ameliorate market imperfections in the long 
run, converges the income of the rich and the poor reducing relative income 
inequalities (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Initial wealth distribution plays a role 
in determining the long run convergence of the incomes of the rich and poor through 
participating in financial intermediation services (Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor 
and Zeira 1993). Only individuals who have the capacity to borrow can invest in the 
human and capital investments improving their livelihood concurrently creating income 
inequalities (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Information asymmetry has credit constraints that 
are predominantly binding on the poor (see Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor and 
Zeira 1993; Aghion and Bolton 1997; Levine 2005). Initially unequal societies maintain 
this inequality due to market imperfections than the economies that didn’t have initial 
inequalities (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Levine (2005) further argues that that this is the 
case because the poor do not have the resources to fund their own projects, nor the 
collateral (nor the political connections) to access most formal market credit. The credit 
constraints therefore restrict the poor from exploiting investment opportunities, 
creating income inequalities (Levine, 2005, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2007). 
Thus countries with higher level of market imperfections also have higher levels of 
inequality (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Clarke, Zou and Xu, 2003). Barnejee and Newman, 
1993; McKinnon (1973) suggest that financial intermediaries can still be beneficial to 
the poor by offering them profitable savings even if they may fail to offer credit 
opportunities. These savings opportunities reduce poverty through consumption 
smoothing and human capital investments (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). 
 
According to Davis and Sanchez-Martinez (2015) information asymmetries worsens 
the level of poverty among the poor households as the poor have limited access to 
formal financial services. Financial intermediaries as information providers can 
alleviate poverty in reducing the information costs and facilitate the access to financial 
services and products by the poor (Dercon, Bold and Calvo, 2008, Beck, Demirguc‐
Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2008). Adverse selection and moral hazard due to 
information asymmetries are constraints to access to mainly credit and insurance 
services by small firms and poor individuals (Diamond, 1991). Although Peterson and 
Rajan (1994) argued that this can be overcome by having relationships with the lender 




inequalities between the rich and the poor. Alternatively, lack of information deprives 
the poor of formal financial services limiting the potential of improved livelihoods as 
they lack the access to credit and savings to smooth consumption, and risk 
management options to absorbed unanticipated shock (Claessens and Feijen, 2007; 
Levine, 2008). 
 
Miller (2015) states that correct information play a crucial role in the financial markets. 
Intermediaries have an information advantage which they use in creating contracts in 
the asset transformation process (Hester, 1994). Lack of information creates 
disequilibrium in the equitable allocation of financial services and products (Doblas-
Madrid and Minetti, 2013). The role of financial intermediaries in the financial market 
faces challenges of accurately screening agents in terms of private information 
because of the information reliability problem (Ramakrishna and Thakor, 1984; 
Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1985; Williamson, 1986; Saunders and Allen, 2010). The 
ability of the financial intermediaries to overcome information problem and offer 
financial services to the poor enables them to accumulate capital, save and manage 
their risks. 
 
2.2.2 Transaction costs  
 
The need for financial intermediaries is propelled by the role played by these 
institutions in solving different informational problems (see Mitchell, 2016: 27). 
Financial intermediaries therefore reduce the cost of acquiring and processing 
information thereby improving allocation of resources (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; 
Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). The ability of 
financial intermediaries to lower transaction costs promotes specialisation, 
technological innovation, and growth (Smith, 1776: 9; Levine, 1997). According to 
Calomiris (1995; 17) in lowering the transaction costs and allowing easy exchange the 
financial system enables the productive efficiency which spurs economic growth 
(section 2.6 discusses the links between financial intermediation and growth).  
 
Intermediaries allow consumers to vary their consumption patterns according to the 
influence of shocks whereby the intermediaries’ charges a fee for the service rendered 




either households or intermediaries for making strategic decisions (Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor, 1984). Insignificant imperfections of costly information dramatically changes 
market outcomes (Stiglitz, 2000). Transaction costs endogenously produce adverse 
selection and moral hazard that inhibit efficient financial contracting (Becker and 
Tomes, 1995). Gertler (1988) and Levine (1997) argued that financial intermediaries 
ease the cost of attaining information and conducting transactions thereby improving 
allocative efficiency of financial resources. 
 
Formal financial intermediaries have imperfect information on the saving behaviours 
of the low income and poor people such that they underestimate the provision of such 
services to this group. Lack of affordable and accessible formal savings channels in 
the presence of information asymmetry affects the saving behaviour of many low 
income earners this contributes to income inequalities (Galor and Zeira, 1993, Becker 
and Tomes, 1986). The financial market consists of agents that have diverse 
fragments of information, which they use to their benefit (Tirole, 1982; Plaut, 1985; 
Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990). Hence the financial intermediaries are able to form 
information coalitions reducing the cost of information (Brealey, Leland and Pyle, 
1977). However, there are possibilities of adverse selection before a transaction is 
closed and a moral hazard after closing of a transaction in the financial market (Plaut, 
1985; Semmler, 2011:35). Opaque information on the characteristics of consumers’ 
profiles often constraints efficient provision of financial products and services (Jappelli 
and Pagano, 2002; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Triki and Gajigo, 2014; Asongu, 
Nwachukwu and Tchamyou, 2016). Financial intermediaries can improve resource 
allocation by overcoming adverse selection and moral hazards. Alternatively the cost 
of intermediation especially the credit channel is reflected in the interest rate charged 
(Shaw, 1973).  
Information asymmetries have given rise to the existence of financial intermediaries. 
However, the same information asymmetries can limit the outreach of financial 
institutions in the provision of financial services and products to highly opaque clients. 
Market failure brought by information asymmetries result in financial barriers such as 
costs, distance of the intermediary and lack of appropriate products. Under economic 
distress, Rajan and Zingales (2004) argued that the institutions most likely focus on 




poor household access to intermediary services due to high costs. In this regard, the 
information asymmetry can result in the distortion of optimal allocation of resources. 
As the markets are distorted financial intermediaries ration credit and the credit is not 
easily accessible by consumers with opaque profiles (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The 
requirement of collateral and documents such as proof of residence sometimes 
explain the inequalities to access financial services (Aguera, 2015). Situations that are 
beyond the individuals control such as the free market financial system can cause 
people to remain in poverty as they fail to access basic services due to market failures 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2014). However, the financial system is crucial to spread the 
opportunities that are created by the free markets (capitalism) (Rajan and Zingales, 
2014). Thus the free markets are generally accompanied by inequalities (Yaron, 
Benjamin and Charitonenko, 1998; Pieterse, 2002).  
 
According to Gurley and Shaw (1955) households with balanced income preserve 
consumption spending, investment, or government goods and services precisely in 
balance with income. If they save, they invest a like amount, so that their financial 
assets do not change relative to outstanding debt including equity claims other than 
earned surplus (Salant, 1939; Gurley and Shaw, 1955). Consumers with surplus funds 
have an excess of income above what they can spend on good and services. The 
ability of these households who already have excess funds to save means their saving 
surpasses their own investment improving their financial position (income) (Gurley and 
Shaw, 1955). This increase in income more than their liabilities renders them to be 
suppliers of loanable funds with financial institutions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Moreover there are consumers with deficit budgets and the financial intermediation 
allows these individuals spending to exceed income by offering credit at a cost (Shaw, 
1973; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In this regard the deficit units’ demand for credit 
enables the financial intermediaries to release loanable fund or issue debt, relative to 
their liabilities and equity (Gurley and Shaw, 1955). The facilitation of lending and 
borrowing by financial institutions enables changes in the financial position between 
surplus units and deficit units (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Shaw, 1973).  
 
Interest rate is then regarded as the pricing instruments between the surplus and the 
deficits units of the economy (Shaw, 1973). Real interest rates positively correlated 




in the economy (Shaw, 1973). The mobilisation of savings by the financial sector 
propels financial deepening which further facilitates access to credit, with a possible 
direct effect on the poor individuals (Shaw, 1973). Hence interest rate as a cost of 
investment can be detrimental to the poor in that  
• Capital flight of funds from the financial institutions in search of higher returns 
limits credit available to the poor household for example lack of the financial 
resources results in rationing of bank credit (Stiglitz, 1981)  
• An artificially low real interest rates facilitates direct financing than 
intermediated finance which Gurley and Shaw (1955) argued that it retards 
growth.  
•  In low interest environments there are tendencies of labour substitution by 
capital resulting in (unemployment), 
• are forced to finance themselves on informal financial markets that are only 
imperfect substitutes for formal financial markets and more often the informal 
finance charges higher interests on credit than the formal finance further 
worsening the plight of the poor.   
 
Thus if lenders lack good information on the borrowers, the contracts are costly to 
enforce excluding the poor and low income earners from effective use of financial 
intermediary services. Despite this, the information asymmetry is still crucial for the 
existence of financial intermediaries. The intermediaries have expertise in managing 
risks involved in borrowing and lending which individual households may lack. 
Financial intermediation is then instrumental in poverty reduction in that their ability in 
resource pooling and diversify risks reduces the cost of risk management for 
individuals and firms (Stiglitz, 1974; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980 and Townsend, 1982). 
If the financial intermediation process is efficient and vibrant it is able mitigate default 
risk by having better screening and monitoring of borrowers (Greenwood, 1990 and 
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). As the financial intermediaries improve the screening 
and monitoring activities they are able to increase the issue of credit to borrowers even 
if they do not have collateral. Poverty is reduced as the low income earners who might 
not have the collateral to have access to credit are able to access the credit for 





2.2.3 Monitoring  
 
The monitoring ability of financial intermediaries enhances economies of scale by 
individuals and entities and this improves efficiency and income (Gurley and Shaw, 
1955). As an aspect of financial intermediation monitoring with respect to 
distinguishing good investment project from the bad investment project influence the 
effect of financial intermediaries on the poor (Schneider and Tornell, 2004; Aghion, 
Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2004). 
 
2.3. Behavioural Finance Theory  
 
The theory combines psychology and cognitive science in explaining people’s 
irrational and illogical decision on spending, borrowing, saving and investing money 
(Belsky and Gilovich, 1999). The behavioural finance theory is centred on the 
pedagogical goal that individuals need to make rational choices but they are restricted 
by constraints on their ability and resources (Shefrin, 2002; Baker and Nofsinger, 
2010). Thus the theory of behavioural finance considers human behaviour in how 
individuals process information to reach decisions and their preferences (Statman, 
1998: 2014). Some choices that people make do not always enhance their welfare 
and these are driven by behavioural biases such as limited attention or loss aversion 
(Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009). The structure of financial products affects the 
decision making of people with respect to bank account ownership as both the person 
and the situation are functions of human behaviour (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013) 
 
Tanzi (1998) argues that social norms and attitudes have a strong influence on the 
income and wealth distribution. According to Levine (1997) the main roles of financial 
intermediation that as an effect to poverty reduction are  
• Savings mobilisation. 
• Risk management.  
• Facilitation of transactions (payments) 
These functional roles of financial intermediaries and how they reduce poverty are 
further discussed in Chapter 3. Low income earners are typically faced with limited 




Self-stereotyping and the habits of the mind affects the adoption and/ acceptance of 
services in which people previously feel discriminated (Hoff and Walsh, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, behavioural finance is based on irrationality and that psychology plays a 
role in financial decisions (Shiller, 2003). The theory assumes that the financial 
markets are informationally inefficient (see Ritter 2003). Additionally, decision making 
amidst scarcity influence the cognitive and susceptive competencies of individuals 
(Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir, 2012; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao, 2013; 
Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Loibl, 2018: 430). The 
behavioural finance theory opines that households and entrepreneurs exhibit 
heuristics and biases in their interpretation of financial decision-making choices 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Shefrin, 2002; Shiller, 2003; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016). 
Stressful situations result in myopic and risk-averse decision-making, conceivably 
restraining attention and desiring characteristic traits at the expense of goal-directed 
ones (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014, Thaler, 2016; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016; Loibl, 2018: 
434). 
 
There are challenges in the financial environment in which low-income individuals and 
families live which influence behaviours and financial choices (Shah et al., 2012; Mani 
et al., 2013, Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). Instead of being served by mainstream 
financial intermediaries, low-income neighbourhoods have a larger number of 
alternative financial services which are mainly informal such as payday lenders, and 
pawnshops (Barr, 2004; 2012; Mani et al., 2013). This means the poor usually borrow 
at higher interest rates and this has larger restrictions on the amount of money that 
can be borrowed (Barr, 2012). This result in constrained liquidity of low-income 
households compared to those households above the poverty threshold (Haushofer 
and Fehr, 2014). More often the poor people are preoccupied by circumstances that 
do not enhance their welfare blurring their cognitive system such that they err in 
processing useful information to improve their livelihood (Mullainathan and Shafir, 
2013). Karlan, Ratan and Zinman (2014) asserts that these behavioural biases are 
also financial market frictions together with transaction cost and information 





This theory can explain the provision of financial products and services by financial 
intermediaries which is usually based on their business models rather than the 
financial needs of the larger population. The strategic decisions on what products to 
offer by financial intermediaries and accepted products by consumers are based on 
the cognitive biases explained in behavioural finance theory. Most formal financial 
products and services are designed and distributed under the perception that poor 
households cannot afford these products. This has resulted in the view that the low-
income markets are regarded as a nonessential market for long-term growth by most 
formal finance entities (Barr, 2004). Misunderstandings on the needs of the majority 
of the poor end users with regard to financial services have resulted in involuntary 
exclusion in adoption and use of certain financial products and services. 
 
The strategic decisions are made in an environment with information gaps catapulting 
the cognitive biases in decision making. The rational decisions by the poor that the 
trivial available savings is not worth the cost of a savings account with a formal 
financial institution can explain the non-participation of low income earners. 
Furthermore the access and use of financial services to an extent depends on the 
products that suits individual needs.  Human behaviours such as trust in certain 
circumstances have influenced the provision, adoption and use of financial services 
by different economic units. Hence behavioural traits by financial intermediaries and 
consumers explain the provision, adoption and use of financial services. There is a 
common affirmation among behavioural theorists that it is difficult to make good 
financial decisions when you are poor. 
 
The theories have similarities in that they help to explain how economic units interact. 
The imperfect information theory explains why financial intermediaries exist and how 
having information advantage enables the provision of financial services and products. 
Furthermore, the theory provides an argument on how the information asymmetries 
can reduce the ineffectiveness of financial intermediaries in allocation of financial 
resources which leads to the exclusion of poor households in participating in formal 
financial markets. This limits the capability of the poor as lack of financial capability 
prohibits effective risk management and consumption smoothing. Low income earners 
have highly opaque information which explains why they are regarded as high risk 




are misunderstood because less information of their characteristics is available. 
Institutional and behavioural frictions can sometimes inhibit optimal resource 
allocation for economic growth which is indirectly is necessary for reducing poverty. 
 
2.4 Theories on the determinants of poverty  
 
According to the World Bank (2005) discrepancies in vital assets such as social 
capital, human capital and physical assets are correlated with poverty. Understanding 
the determinants of poverty is crucial for coming up with effective and efficient poverty 
reduction strategies (FAO, 2018). Poverty is prevalent in areas with inadequate public 
services, weak infrastructure, poor governance, prone to natural disasters and 
underdeveloped markets for goods and services among others (White, 2002). Poverty 
status is determined by various household characteristics which are discussed in 
section 2.4. Section 2.3.1, and 2.3.2 discusses the theories on the determinants of 
poverty. 
 
2.4.1 The Culture of poverty theory  
 
In the culture of poverty theory Lewis (1959, 2017) argues that living in poverty 
generates a way of living that develop into a culture. As the poverty becomes a culture 
it is then transmitted down to future generations as a trait of a societal collection 
(Lewis, 1959:150; 1998). This concurs with the Marxist theory of poverty and inequality 
to be discussed in section 2.4.2 in that poverty can be generational through the 
environmental opportunities. When this culture has been developed there is low 
participation in institutions such as banks and hospitals by people living in poverty 
(Lewis, 1998). That is the poor are generally left out of the mainstream social and 
economic order. The culture of poverty then perpetuates to be a life cycle as argued 
by (Rowntree, 1903; Lewis, 1998). In the culture of poverty Lewis (1998) postulates 
that there are dimensions to poverty namely  
• the individual,  
• the family 
• the slum community and  




The culture of poverty theory affirms the behavioural finance theory in section 2.2.2 in 
that poor people are trapped in some individual characteristics. However, there are 
situational factors which exonerate this mind-set that the poor have only themselves 
to blame for living in poverty. Poverty is regarded as situational the poor are confined 
to poverty because of their state or the environment in which they find themselves in 
(Rowntree, 1903). 
 
The theory explains the exclusion of the poor people in participating in the economic 
activity. This relates to this study in explaining the non-participation of poor households 
in the formal financial sector. The state and the environmental circumstance in which 
the poor people are exposed to limits their access to essential resources which can 
change their livelihoods (Lewis, 1998).  
 
2.4.2 Marxian theory  
 
The Marxian or the radical theory of poverty postulates that economic growth alone is 
inadequate in reducing poverty (Peet, 1975). Marxist theorists suggest that inequality 
in wealth and income are the major causes of poverty. Poverty thus is a result of a 
direct inequality that is inherent in a class structure (Kincaid, 1973).  Economic and 
social exclusion of certain group of people prohibits them from effectively realising the 
welfare benefits of the overall economic growth (Sen, 1983; 1985). This supports the 
assertions by Adam Smith (1776) for the quest for an inclusive society by stating that   
“What improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded 
as inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, 
of which by far the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable”.  
Implicitly this means substantive economic growth unaccompanied with poverty 
reducing strategies is not enough for advancing the welfare of the whole economy.  
Hence the non-participation of the poor household in the adoption and use of financial 
products emanates from social exclusion (Sen, 1983). This social exclusion means 
the poor do not have access and privileges to use certain services and products which 
are usually available in affluent areas. Financial intermediaries have the capacity for 
product and geographical outreach to eliminate the exclusion of poor households. 




characteristics and it is influenced by the socio-economic environment in which the 
poor people live (Townsend, 1979).  
 
The capitalist society renders the market dysfunctional such that a class divide due to 
social and political factors causes’ poverty (Rajan and Zinagales, 2004). Despite 
blaming the capitalist society as the major environment that propels poverty, the 
Marxists converge with other theorist in that poverty is the lack of material wellbeing.as 
result of inadequate income (Parthasarathy, 2015). Furthermore under the Marxian 
theory poverty is not only regarded as an individual factor. Poverty is as a result of 
uneven distribution of income and wealth (inequality) (Peet, 1975). However, 
O’Donnell, (1998) disagreed that poverty and inequality are the same as poverty mean 
insufficiency in material resources whilst inequality is a situation where certain groups 
in the society have more material resources than others.  
 
However, irrespective of this highlighted disagreement the definition of inequality is 
not different from the definition of relative poverty (see Chapter 4). Furthermore in the 
Marxist theory, poverty is regarded as a structural phenomenon due to prejudice, 
corruption and a stratified labour market (Gans, 1972, Blank, 2010). It is possible for 
inequality to be generational due to the environmental opportunities and services in 
which one is born (Peet, 1975). Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) argue that financial 
intermediation has the capacity of changing the income distribution across generations 
by efficiently distributing the economic resources. Furthermore, the utility maximisation 
of consumption and investment opportunities across generations has affected how the 
income is distributed in the economy (Schumpeter, 1951; Becker and Tomes, 1986). 
Loury (1981) reiterated that income correlates positively across generations as the 
income of parents determines the investment in human capital such as education of 
their offspring. In this regard the discussion highlights that inequality is presented as 
the earnings distribution, income and prosperity amongst individuals and families 
(Becker and Tomes, 1986). This has been blamed on the dysfunctional free financial 
markets as they lack the efficient distributional; role of resources (Smith, 1776). On 
the contrary Rajan and Zingales (2004) argues that the reliance of the financial system 
on political goodwill for its infrastructure has affected the operating efficiency of these 





In this regard, there is a social divide such that the rich in the society lacks the 
motivation to eradicate poverty as this entails changes in the societal income 
distribution (Peet, 1975, Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Bureaucracies affects how 
polices are implemented and the effectiveness of such policies in poverty reduction 
(Deininger, 2003). This explains the importance of institutional quality in effecting 
lowering poverty and inequality. It is therefore detrimental to promote policies that 
discourse the indicators of poverty without altering the poverty generating factors 
(Peet, 1975). 
 
2.5 Determinants of Poverty   
 
Poverty has patterns and causes, briefly described in this section possibly it will help 
in explaining why some individuals and/ or regions are poor than others. Implicitly 
finance can be instrumental in tackling some of these poverty determinants (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2009). According to the World Bank (2005), understanding causes 
of poverty remains a ‘missing middle’ in poverty studies and this has affected the 
success of most poverty reduction policy strategies. Stark (2009) argues that how 
poverty is conceptualised affects how it is defined and the strategies designed to 
reduce it. This suggests that poverty is complex in definition as well as in the strategies 
that are designed to alleviate it (World Bank 1990; United Nations, 1995). The World 
Bank (2005) classifies poverty characteristics as macro, sector-specific, community, 
household and individual. There are different aspects that correlate to or cause poverty 
which can be regional (such as natural disasters, governance and property rights 
among others) (see World Bank, 2005). Alternatively there are also community 
level/social characteristics as determinants of poverty such as the availability of 
infrastructure and services (for example roads, water, electricity and health, education, 
shelter) (Davis and Sanchez-Martinez (2015)).  
 
The other characteristic of poverty determinant can be demographic (gender, age 
structure and gender of the head of the family). Education attainment has also been 
regarded as vital as a determinant of poverty. Households whose head of the 
household has attained a certain level of education are most probably non-poor than 
their uneducated counterparts (Mukherjee and Benson, 2003; Datt and Jolliffe, 2005; 




argued that educational attainment not complemented by other factors such as social, 
political and economic factors is insufficient to lift people out of poverty. Economic 
determinants of poverty include employment status, hours worked, property owned 
and the ability of the poor to participate in the formal economy. Poverty reduction 
strategies therefore aim at changing the circumstance of these poverty characteristics 
to improve the living standards of the people who are living in poverty (Mukherjee and 
Benson, 2003). According to Marxian theorists inequality is the major cause of poverty. 
Addressing the indicators of inequality without changing its elementary causing forces 
is therefore useless as argued by Peet (1975).  
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 2018) states that poverty is a socio-
economic phenomenon hence the characteristics of poverty are very broad. Dewilde 
(2008) argued that the institutional arrangements in an economy correlate with the 
level of poverty. More often institutional settings are affected by the political and the 
cultural at the neglect of the economic dimensions (Castles, 2000; Dewilde, 2008). 
Formal financial services that are available to the poor are mainly credit related than 
savings opportunities (Barr and Sherraden, 2005; 2012; Stegman, 2010). This has 
limited the capacity of the poor to accumulate wealth for starting-up entrepreneurial 
ventures, consumption smoothing or for risk management. Economic theories have 
not been explicit on the direct/indirect financial determinants of poverty (Levine, 2004; 
Ravillan, 2004; Beck et al., 2008). The financial sector via its effects on economic 
growth indirectly determines the level of poverty in many developing economies and 
alternatively the financial sector has direct impact on poverty through the direct access 
to financial services by the poor.  
 
2.6 Theories that links (GDP per capita and financial intermediation) 
 
Savings and credit are the main channels of financial intermediation which drives the 
income growth in the economy (Akhter and Daly, 2009). The main theories of financial 
intermediation and growth/ income growth are hypothesised on the concept of ‘supply 
leading’ and ‘demand following’ correlation between the financial sector and the 
economy (Barnejee and Ghosh, 1998). Patrick (1966) argues that as the real sector 
grows there is an increased demand for the financial sector services inducing growth 




hypothesis theorises that the formation of financial sector increases supply of financial 
services; this in turn increases growth in the real economy (Patrick, 1966; Bhatt, 1993; 
King and Levine; 1993; Calderón and Liu, 2003). According to Gurley and Shaw (1955) 
institutionalisation of savings and debts improves economic growth rather than direct 
financing which tends to retard economic growth as it is inefficient in directing the 
resources to the productive sectors of the economy. Beck and Rahman (2006) opined 
that the efficiency of the financial system has ramification to the growth of the 
economy. Hence the financial intermediation is crucial as it facilitates the exchange of 
resources between surplus and deficit units allowing for growth through specialisation 
and innovation (Levine, 1997; Beck and Levine, 2004). 
 
In lowering transaction costs (discussed in section 2.2.2) the financial system 
facilitates borrowing for skills accumulation thereby promoting human capital 
accumulation. Financial systems can also promote the accumulation of human capital 
by lowering the costs of intertemporal trade, i.e., by facilitating borrowing for the 
accumulation of skills (De Gregorio 1996). If human capital accumulation is not subject 
to diminishing returns on a social level, financial arrangements that ease human 
capital creation help accelerate economic growth. The direct and indirect influence of 
the financial sector on economic growth has poverty reduce effect (Ravallion, 2005; 
Levine, 2004). Economic growth is propelled by financial intermediation through 
capital accumulation and growth productivity (Calderón and Liu, 2003). Goldsmith 
(1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) argued that the financial intermediation is 
correlated to the rate of capital accumulation per worker through the exogenous 
factors such as technology, income distribution, institutional arrangements and 
preferences (Solow, 1956).  
 
The McKinnon (1973) conduit effect focused on the role of saving in creating liquidity 
in the economy that is for economic growth. On the other hand Shaw (19730 focused 
on the distributional role of the financial sector in propelling economic growth. In this 
regard the growth is regarded to be a linear function of capital stock with gross savings 
equalling gross investment in equilibrium (Pagano, 1993). The ability of financial 
intermediaries’ to collect information and evaluate alternative investment projects and 
risk sharing which allows individuals and corporates to invest in high yield risky 




1993). The efficient allocation of the accumulated savings to productive investments 
by the intermediation process induces growth which in turn is beneficial to the poor 
(Levine, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1992). Furthermore, financial intermediation spurs growth 
by its risk pooling function which reduces preventable termination of investments by 
economic agents to absorb economic shock (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; 
Pagano, 1993). However, Devereux and Smith (1994) argue that the insurance 
opportunities can reduce growth as it discourages precautionary savings by 
households.  
 
Theory argues that financial intermediaries affect capital accumulation either by 
varying the savings rate or by differential reallocation of saving among capital 
producing technologies (Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw; 1973, Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983; Levine, 1997). Sustained economic growth is beefed up by capital 
investments and savings mobilisation (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Rostow, 1960). 
However, Seven, and Yetkiner (2016) observe that the effect of financial 
intermediation on growth depend on the level of income in the economy. In low income 
countries finance has a role in the growth of the economy whilst it plays no role in high 
income countries (Seven and Yetkiner, 2016). Information amelioration and the 
reduction of transaction costs enable financial intermediaries to have an impact of 
growth (King and Levine, 1993; Bencivenga, Smith and Starr, 1995; Beck and Levine, 
2004). McKinnon (1973) argues that the instability of financial intermediaries affects 
the level of economic growth indirectly affecting the transmission of the growth benefit 
to the poor people.  
This affirms the absolute income hypothesis (AIH) of Keynes (1936) which previously 
argued that income determines the poverty reducing effect of the financial sector via 
economic growth. As the level of aggregate income in the economy increases the 
households sector increases consumption and savings improving their wellbeing 
(Keynes, 1936; Modigliani, 1949; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Katona, 1975; 
Nyhus and Pons, 2012; Nyhus, 2018). Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) opines that 
individual’s wellbeing is contingent to attainable consumption, which is reliant on 
permanent income than to current income. Pagano (1993) argues that for liquidity 
constrained individuals household consumption is determined by current income 




process of credit allocation has an effect to the overall growth in the economy (Levine, 
1997).  
 
The ability of financial intermediaries such as banks to create more income from the 
deposits by issuing credit increases the level of consumption effecting an increase in 
the wellbeing of the general population. Therefore, the role of financial intermediation 
and gross domestic product per capita explains mainly the income poverty. Castles 
(2000) opines that economic growth is necessary but not adequate for welfare 
improvement. However economic growth provides the households with the needed 
purchasing power increasing the households’ income and consumption (Sen, 1982). 
Levine (1997), summarised the theoretical framework of the relationship between 
finance and growth and it’s illustrated and summarised in Figure 2.1 below. The 
financial sector affects economic growth via the functions of finance which channels 
the financial resources in the economy (Cole and Slade, 1991; Merton and Bodie, 
1995). The highlighted functional approach in Figure 2.1 illustrates the value addition 
role of intermediation to the economy as it leads to economic growth. The ability of the 
financial system to research firms, managers and individuals, enforce corporate 
control, and facilitating risk management, exchange and resource mobilization is can 
















Market frictions  
- information costs 
- transaction costs 
Financial markets and  
intermediaries 
Financial functions 
- mobilise savings 
- allocate resources (credit 
channel 
- exert corporate control 
(monitoring). 
- facilitate risk management 
-ease trading of goods, services, 
 














     Source: Adapted from Levine (1997). 
 
Financial intermediation enhances the improvements in the gross domestic product 
per capita by enhancing technological progress and capital accumulation (both human 
and physical capital (Schumpeter, 1911; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Beck et al., 2000; 
Claessens and Feijen, 2007). According to Schumpeter (1961) the ability of financial 
intermediaries to mobilise savings and transmit capital to innovative ventures 
stimulates income growth. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) concurred that the banking 
sectors’ primary role is the liquidity provision which facilitates investments in 
productive assets enhancing efficiency of capital build-up and economic growth. This 
highlights the primary role of financial intermediation of issuing liabilities using funds 
solicited from surplus units, and allocates the funds among the deficit units 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).  
 
In arguing the link between GDP per capita and financial intermediation there are two 
main schools of thought namely the supply leading and the demand following 
argument. Gurley and Shaw (1955) propose that an income grows with an increase in 
the demand for money. Asset accumulation and an increase in income by surplus units 
increase the demand of financial services such that the financial sectors broaden the 
services and products offered by the financial intermediaries (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973). Furthermore, demand for financial services and products stimulates 
competition and more entries in the financial intermediation market improving the 
services offered by these intermediaries (Becker, 1957; Merton, 1995; Claessens, 




competition in the real sector by reducing entry barriers by new firms. This competition 
results in the availability of expanded opportunities for the previously disadvantaged 
in the form of labour or funds available for entrepreneurial activities (Kpodar and Singh, 
2011) Gurley and Shaw (1955) reiterate that the equilibrium of income per capita is 
determined by financial institutions and usage of financial products, that is the quantity 
of money is reliant on the extend of intermediation.  
 
The income growth of any economy is said to be slow if only direct finance and self-
finance are available without financial intermediation (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Beck 
et al., 2000). Arguably this implies that financial intermediaries drives the income, 
however the distribution of that income can be skewed resulting in inequalities. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), opines that financial intermediation leads output which 
do not directly feed back into financial intermediation. Although growth is necessary 
for poverty reduction it is not sufficient (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 
2002; Beck et al., 2004). Kuznets (1955) argues that the effect of the financial sector 
in the distribution of income appears to happen in phases, such that in early phases 
growth increases with an increase in inequality. This however gets to a maximum 
threshold where per capita income increases with a decrease in equality (Kuznets, 
1955; Paukert, 1973; Lindert and Williamson; 1985; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990,). There are arguments that state that institutional structures or frameworks are 
essential for an effective influence of finance to economic growth (see Cole, Mailath 
and Postlewaite, 1992; Kirkpatrick, Sirageldin and Aftab, 2000). 
 
2.7 Crowding out effect theory  
 
Under the crowding out effect theory the channels of influence of the public sector debt 
to the private sector investments are discussed. Buiter (1977) defines crowding out as 
when the sovereign (government) economic activity displaces the economic activity of 
the private sector. The crowding out effect that is of interest in this study is the financial 
crowding out, this occurs when debt financing in the financial markets by the public 
sector inhibits private capital formation due to shortage of capital in the financial 
market (see Munduch, 1991 for a discussion of dimensions of crowding out). As the 




debt market pool resulting in higher costs of capital for private borrowers (Diamond, 
1965, Barro, 1974). Furthermore, the interest payments on domestic debt absorbs 
government revenue that could have been otherwise used on pro poor , reducing 
private investment demand, and hence capital accumulation, growth and welfare (IMF, 
2018). Domestic debt supported government spending crowds out the private capital 
formation as the demand for investments is interest elastic (Friedman, 1970; Carlson 
and Spencer, 1975). However, Keynes (1936) says crowding out is only stronger if the 
economy is close to full capacity. 
 
2.8 Conceptual framework  
 
According to Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), the role of finance in poverty reduction 
can be direct through the distributional effect of financial intermediaries or indirectly 
via economic growth. In theory the role of finance in poverty reduction is mainly 
captured as a trickledown effect via economic growth rather than a direct effect 
(Aghion and Bolton, 1997). The role of finance in in the real economy advances capital 
accumulation and human development which in turn fosters economic growth 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). The economic growth is then transferred to the 
population where the poor people can also benefit from improved livelihood through 
raising the incomes of the poor (OECD, 2006). This was further supported by Beck et 
al. (2009), Giné and Townsend (2004) and Townsend and Ueda (2006) who noted 
that the benefits of financial intermediaries cannot only be ascertained by the use on 
financial services by the poor. There are feedback loops in the financial sector and the 
real sector in that as financial markets deepen, the  economy grows increasing the 
labour demand and creating job opportunities for the poor (Beck et al. 2009; Giné and 
Townsend 2004; Townsend and Ueda, 2006; Kpodar and Singh, 2011). As the 
incomes of the poor improves they are able to pay for goods and services that 
improves their education and health which in turn has a multiplier effect on their 
wellbeing (Glewwe and Jacoby, 2004; OECD, 2006). However, growth is necessary 
but not sufficient condition for poverty reduction (Soubbotina, 2004; OECD; 2006). 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2006) identify financial intermediation as a necessary 
condition for effective performance of economic growth in sufficiently distributing the 




high income inequalities; overconsumption of natural resources more often it is not 
sustainable growth (Soubbotina, 2004). 
 
For finance to be effective in poverty reduction access to the services of financial 
intermediaries by the poor are a prerequisite (Scholtens, 2003). Finance is more 
beneficial if the poor have access to other financial services such as savings and 
insurance other than only credit (see Pande et al., 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; 
Kast and Pomeranz, 2014; Karlan et al., 2014). Figure 2.2 below gives a summary of 
the conceptual framework of the study. As has been discussed in the literature the 
effect of financial intermediation to poverty reduction can either be direct or indirect via 
economic growth. The role of other variables such as inflation, institutions and 
remittances cannot be ignored in fostering the effectiveness of financial intermediation 
in poverty reduction. These variables are discussed in detail in the empirical literature 
on how each of the variables affects poverty. Figure 2.2 summarises the conceptual 
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2.9 Chapter Summary  
 
In summation, this chapter has discussed the theories for this study. The imperfect 
information theory explains the existence of financial intermediaries centred on 
information asymmetries in the financial market. The chapter elucidates that 
information asymmetries gave rise to the need of financial intermediation. 
Alternatively, the presence of information asymmetries results in the inadequacy of 
financial intermediaries in adequately evaluating the economic agents leading to 
access constraints where other economic agents have access to the products and 
services offered by financial intermediaries. This worsens the level of poverty as the 
poor households lack the capacity to participate in the financial sector in capital 
accumulation, credit and payments which improves their poverty incidences. 
 
However, the ability of financial intermediation to ameliorate the effects of imperfect 
markets by reducing information asymmetry, reducing transaction cost and delegated 
monitoring allows the participation of the previously disadvantaged groups. As the 
poor participate in the intermediary services they are able to alleviate their poverty as 
they are able to save, smoothen consumption and manage their risks. The behavioural 
finance theory on the other hand illuminates how economic agents have biases in their 
financial decision making. The issue of trust which is further enforced by the role of 
institutions are the behavioural biases that exist in formal financial intermediation and 
the adoption and use of the services of these intermediaries. As there is no single 
theory that adequately explains the role intermediation in poverty reduction all the 
theories discussed in this chapter are considered in determining the relationship 
between poverty and financial intermediation. The theories discussed augment each 
other in that as imperfect markets exist the behaviour of the economic agents in 
responding to its effects plays a role in provision and use of the financial services. 
 
The decision making of economic agents is influenced by their behavioural 
connotations. The participation of the central government in the financial market can 




investment constraining private sector investments and the credit availability in the 
market. Furthermore, the crowding out can further result in credit rationing constraining 
the access of credit by the poor households and firms. This rationing of credit can 
further dampen income inequalities. Poverty has been classified as complex hence no 
single theory can fully account for the determinants of poverty. Poverty is persistence 
and this can the culture of poverty captures this as it outlines that poverty can be 
generational as lack of finance by parents can subsequently determine the capital 
accumulation and the investments in education, health and risk management. The 
reviewed theories are not exhaustive on all the determinants and poverty dynamics 
but it is assumed that the major theories discussed above form the basis of the 
conceptual framework of the study. The mixing of different theories in the study gives 











EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3 Introduction  
 
The present chapter undertakes a critical engagement with the theoretical literature 
related to the study. Notably, there are multiple previous studies that have examined, 
as part of their objectives, the role of financial intermediation in poverty reduction which 
is the subject of this study. In this study the financial intermediation is regarded as a 
dimension of financial development. Financial intermediaries are able to reduce 
poverty through the functions of financial intermediation which will be extensively 
discussed in this chapter. The discussion on the financial products and services covers 
all intermediation aspects such as transaction, credit, payments, savings and risk 
management. Section 3.1 discusses the landscape of financial intermediation in 
developing countries. By reviewing the relevant literature and examining postulations 
of other scholars on the subject, this chapter locates this study as a contribution 
amongst the contributions of other experts in the discipline.  
 
3.1 Definition of key variables  
 
3.1.1 Poverty  
 
The World Bank Report (2000) defined poverty as the unacceptable physiological and 
social deprivation in human wellbeing consisting of low incomes and the incapacity to 
attain the basic goods and services essential for survival with dignity. The bank further 
asserted that poverty also includes low levels of health and education, poor access to 
clean water and sanitation, insufficient physical safety, dearth of voice, and inadequate 
ability and prospects to improve one’s life (World Bank, 2000). Alternatively, the United 
Nations (UN) (1998) noted that: 
 
“Poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human dignity. 
It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not 




to, not having the land on which to grow one’s food or a job to earn one’s living, 
not having access to credit. It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion 
of individuals, households and communities. It means susceptibility to violence, 
and it often implies living on marginal or fragile environments, without access 
to clean water or sanitation”. 
 
The headcount ratio is used as a proxy for poverty. According to the World Bank (2000) 
headcount ratio is defined as the share of the population with income below the 
national poverty line. This is the definition that has been accepted in the SDGs. The 
World Bank reiterated that poverty lines are anchored to the cost of a food bundle 
based on the predominant general diet of the poor. The World Bank definition of 
poverty will be adopted for this study as used in other previous studies (see Beck, 
2007; Rewilak, 2017). Poverty is multidimensional and it has broad definitions and 
measurements, Drewnowski (1977) argued that meaning and measurement of poverty 
is significant only when it is embraced as a background for policy action. Chapter 5 
further discusses on the measurement of poverty. Since the study is a panel study the 
World Bank (2000) definition of poverty is adopted to make it easy for the uniformity 
on the definition of poverty across countries and analyse the data for the countries that 
are covered in the study. 
 
3.1.2 Financial Intermediation 
 
Financial intermediation is a productive activity in which an institutional unit acquires 
financial assets by engaging in financial transactions on the market and incurs 
liabilities on its own account (OECD, 2007). In this study the ratio of private credit to 
GDP will be used as a proxy for financial intermediation (see Rother, 1999; Levine, et 
al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004, Naceur Blotevogel, Fischer and Shi, 2017). Private 
credit is a preferred measure for this study since it is the closest measure to the 
definition of financial intermediation (see Levine, 2008; Beck, Colciago and Pfajfar, 
2014; Rewilak, 2017). In other studies the financial intermediation has been measured 
by the ratio of money to gross domestic product (see Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; 
King and Levine, 2012, Sehrawat and Giri, 2016; Cepparulo, Cuestas and Intartaglia, 
2017; Naceur et al., 2017). It is important to note that most of these studies in the 




focus is on financial intermediation which is regarded as a component of financial 
development. A panel cointegration approach has been conducive given the context 
of their studies. n the conxet of our study the ratio of private credit to GDP is the closest 
measure that reflects financial intermediation. Furthermore, the objectives of the study 
guid the choice of the credit based measure as it is the closest measure to the 
functions of financial intermediation (King and Levine,1992) as the ratio of money to 
gross domestic product do not capture the use of the bank generated financial 
resources (see Rother, 1999). 
 
3.2 Financial intermediation landscape in developing countries  
 
Access and use of formal financial services is argued to offer more benefits in terms 
of savings, investments, payments and risk management than the non-formal sector 
(Aguera, 2015). In most developing economies the provision of financial services to 
low income and poor households is rarely by the formal financial intermediaries. Figure 
3.1 summarises the provision of financial services and products in developing 
countries. The low-income household and the poor in developing countries are mainly 
served by Alternative Financial Institutions (AFI) as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
The financial providers at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP hereafter) seek mainly 
financial and social returns, rather than profit maximisation, which is the main goal of 
formal financial intermediaries (Rabobank, 2005; CGAP, 2004). The BoP describes a 
consumer profile, and the financial products and services accessed by this consumer 
profile (Chapman and Mazer, 2013). According to the CGAP (2018) the financial 
services and products provided at the BoP are comparatively costly or rigid. 
Susceptibilities such as low or variable incomes, lower levels of financial literacy and 
capability, and limited access to or experience with formal financial services 
characterises this consumer profile (Rajan and Zingales, 1996; Karlan, Ratan and  
Zinman, 2014; Sundaram and Sriram, 2016; Chandwani and Kulkarni, 2018). More 
often than not lower education levels, illiteracy, language variances, minority racial or 
ethnic status, and longer distances from main population centres correlates with the 
lack of access and use of formal finance by this consumer profile (Chapman and 




poverty reduction is not based in the number of financial assets held by the poor but 
on whether they have access to the financial products and services. 
 
 




 Standard financial service  




    
 
Source: adapted from (Rabobank, 2005 
 
Fig 3.1 illustrates the nonexistence of formal bank financial intermediation at the 
bottom of the pyramid. The BoP is characterised by large numbers of vulnerable 
customers with limited financial resources and frequent small transactions (Hannig 
and Jansen, 2010). As a result, they are regarded as high risk by formal financial 
intermediaries leading to involuntary exclusion from using the services of formal 
financial products and services (Rabobank, 2005; Demirguç-Kunt, Beck, and Honohan 
2008). According to Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. (2008) involuntary exclusion refers to the 
people who are rejected by the financial system because they are regarded as high 
risk or their projects are regarded as poor projects. Furthermore, there are price and 
non-price barriers for the adoption and use of the financial services, sub-section 3.4.1 
discusses this further (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria, 2008, Arestis and 
Caner, 2005; 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013).  
 Subsidised social 
programs  
Development banks, 
Agricultural banks and 
Savings banks  
NGOs, moneylenders 
and self-help groups  
Commercial banks  High 
Middle income  
Economically active poor  
Extremely poor and destitute  
Poverty line 
Low income  




The financial markets also determine how the poor people raise external capital to 
initiate projects (King and Levine, 1993). The poor are limited on the knowhow to use 
the financial instruments that are available and in some cases these limitations affects 
intergenerational poverty (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). Besides the allocative 
efficiency of resources finance, also influences the comparative opportunities that are 
available to individuals (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008, Claessens, 2006). Earlier studies 
on the role of financial intermediation in poverty reduction focused mainly on the 
aspect of financial depth without looking at the other dimensions of financial 
intermediation (see Odhiambo, 2009; Jauch and Watzka, 2016). Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2008) opined that it is possible to have deep financial markets without delivering 
access for all. In this regard access to financial services in most previous studies was 
not regarded as a different dimension mostly because of lack of data. This has been 
captured as a different dimension in this study as there are improvements in the 
available data on access. The ability of financial intermediaries to allow people to 
smooth their income, insure against risks, and broaden investment opportunities by 
performing different functions (discussed in subsection 3.3.1-3.3.4) has poverty 
reducing effects (Claessens, 2006). 
 
Better developed financial systems have the capacity to reduce poverty and inequality 
by efficiently allocating resources (Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 2003). However as previously 
highlighted the previous studies have focused of the financial development which 
incorporates the overall financial system. According to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) 
most of the private credit in the developing economies is from the banking sector. 
However, in most developing economies finance from the banking sector and the 
financial markets caters mainly affluent areas with large enterprise and wealthy 
individuals (see Beck et al., 2004; Claessens, 2006). This suggests that the distribution 
of the financial services has been largely skewed without providing the welfare benefits 
of equitable distribution of income.  
 
This skewed distribution of finance result in allocative efficiencies of finance which is 
based on connections and nonmarket criteria which in turn act as an entry barrier to 
the poor households (see Rajan and Zingales 2003, Claessens, 2006). For example, 
Claessens (2006) argued that credit facilities in formal financial services in developing 




connections.Morduch (1999) argues that the financial services should be reliable 
(available when needed); convenient (easy access); continuity (can finance be 
accessed repeatedly) and flexible (is the product tailored to individual). These 
dimensions are usually lacking for the poor households with regard to the formal 
financial services that are available. Claessens and Perrotti (2007) argue that the 
depth of the financial sector do not equal access to the financial services. 
 
This suggest that the formal financial intermediaries can do more to a more inclusive 
finance for poverty reduction by structuring their products to accommodate the BoP 
with respect to credit, savings, payments and risk management. As discussed in the 
theoretical review and in the subsequent sections of this chapter formal intermediaries 
still regard the poor market as high risk for full participation of these intermediaries in 
the neighbourhoods where poor people live. As has been argued by Prahalad (2010), 
inclusive formal finance is not only beneficial for poverty reduction, but the banks can 
also benefit profitably in treating the poor as a market. It was asserted that innovation 
is key in order to achieve the benefits of capturing the BoP market (Prahalad, 2010). 
The major drawback of the formal financial intermediaries in servicing the poor is to 
enter the poor’s market with already developed products and services which were 
developed for the affluent (Prahalad, 2010; Karnani, 2009). Mainly the BoP market 
has low margins and high volumes which most formal financial intermediaries aren’t 
capturing as it is argued that the smaller transaction is expensive.  
 
In servicing the poor markets India is among the success stories as the Bank of India 
ruled that for every bank licence for an already served market a formal financial 
institution need to open four branches in unserved areas (see Burgess and Pande, 
2005). Furthermore, all post offices opened ATMs so the rural population can have 
access to the formal banking services. This did not only improve the outreach of banks 
but it also helped in poverty reduction as the rural poor were integrated to the formal 
financial services. This finding was further supported by Allen et al. (2013) in Kenya 
where it was asserted that the expansion of commercial banks in previously 
underserved area improved the access to formal finance by the underprivileged. Not 
only innovations in products and processes of servicing the poor is essential but the 
distribution systems that enhances the outreach of this market is equally essential 




(in our case banks) can still be profitable and help in poverty reduction by servicing 
the poor (Pitta, Guesalaga, and Marshall, 2008; Karnani, 2009). 
 
An examination of the importance of access to formal finance by Honohan (2007) 
revealed conflicting results on the significance of access to reducing poverty and 
income inequality. The significance was contingent on the model specification that is 
access was significant when financial depth was used in the model and the same could 
not hold with per capita income and dummy variables were included in the equation. 
However, the access measure that Honohan (2008) used was based on cross 
sectional data and did not consider the time dimension. Furthermore, the BoP 
population do not have adequate transactional services in the formal financial 
intermediaries of which these transactional accounts are very important for domestic 
and international remittances (Honohan, 2008, Inoue, 2018). Efficient financial 
management includes both deposits and loans and access to such paths of financial 
services are said to lower poverty and inequality (see Honohan, 2008, Allen, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper and Peria, 2016). Ratha (2003) argues that remittances have 
a potential of bringing new customers to the formal financial institutions by increasing 
demand for deposits, loans and insurance services. 
 
3.3 Financial intermediation and its functions  
 
The debate on the role of financial intermediaries, especially banks, dates back to the 
18th century. Hamilton (1781) in Hammond (1991:36), stated that banks were the 
greatest engines ever invented to drive the economy. However, this is refuted by 
Adams (1819) in Hammond (1991:36), who argues that banks harm the “morality, 
tranquillity, and even wealth” of nations. Hence the role and relationship between 
finance and poverty reduction has remained an on-going debate (Al-Hussainy, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Zia, 2008; Nanziri, 2016). In addition, Jeanneney and Kpodar 
(2011) suggest that the contribution of finance in poverty reduction is contingent to the 
transmission channel. Financial sector development does not necessarily mean 
increased intermediation. For example, Beck, Cull and Jerome (2005) stated that 
financial development of the Nigerian economy in the 1980s resulted in financial 
disintermediation. In this regard, the role of financial intermediation on poverty 





The financial intermediation role to poverty reduction has been studied albeit mainly 
as a trickle-down effect via economic growth (see Alexiou, Vogiazas, and Nellis, 2018; 
Uddin et al. 2014; Inoue and Hamori, 2012; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Odhiambo, 
2010; 2009; Beck et al., 2007a; Quartey, 2005; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Ravallion and 
Datt 2002; Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Schumpeter, 1934). Most of these studies 
have focused on country specific studies.  Although there is growing research in the 
role of financial intermediation in poverty reduction the results have been mixed and 
based on the methodology used for the study. Mishkin (2009) claims that efficient 
financial system brought about by globalisation is beneficial to the poor. The lack of 
access and use of basic financial services lowers welfare and hinders poverty 
alleviation (Guide and Pattillo, 2006). According to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2004) measures of poverty and inequality are lower in countries with well-developed 
financial intermediaries. Against this backdrop, the functions of financial intermediaries 
are discussed in sub sections. 
 
3.3.1 Easing the exchange of goods and services (payments) 
 
Facilitating payments has been an important function of financial intermediaries in 
poverty reduction (Pande et al., 2012). The ability to offer remittance services has 
enabled the poor to transfer their financial resources to their family’s intensively 
contributing to consumption smoothing and risk management to the recipient family 
members (Ashraf, 2009). Reliable and low transaction payment systems can increase 
the flow of remittances and ease the exchange of good and services which is useful 
for the income generating activities. The payments systems enabled by the 
intermediation process leads to economic growth (Rother, 1999). The trickle-down 
effect of financial intermediation via economic growth has a poverty reducing effect 
when the benefits of economic growth are distributed such that the poor people access 
the benefits of growth. (King and Levine, 1993; Rother, 1999 and Levine, 2005). 
3.3.2 Pooling savings from a large number of investors (savings) 
 
The saving facilities allow individuals to use today’s money to finance tomorrows’ 




allowed to access savings opportunities with formal financial intermediaries this is 
essential for consumption smoothing, risk management and capital accumulation 
which can be reinvested in entrepreneurial activities (Prina, 2015). This function 
enables the intermediaries to be liquidity creators in which they can lend to the poor 
who are mostly illiquid constrained (Jack and Suri, 2014). Furthermore, allowing the 
poor to formally save enables the financial intermediaries to produce information of 
the savings habits of the further poor facilitating access to credit opportunities 
(Aportela, 1999; Jayachandran, 2006; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; Dupas, Karlan, 
Robinson and Ubfal, 2018). If these credit opportunities are eventually accessed they 
can increase the future incomes of the poor through investments in entrepreneurial 
projects, education or healthcare. (Rother 1999; Aportela, 1999; Pande et al., 2012). 
Alternatively, Prina (2015) observed that savings account enables better management 
of resources by the poor households to manage and their expenditure categories 
changed. Most people in poverty are subjected to sharp but short lived changes in 
their financial resources (Carvalho, Meier and Wang, 2016a). However, the poor 
usually have small savings transactions which are regarded as having lower margin 
by formal financial institutions (Carvalho, Prina and Sydnor, 2016b).  
Economic theory suggests that the intertemporal substitution of resources that is 
facilitated by the formal financial intermediaries can increase the incomes of the poor 
if the poor have access to these services (González Vega, 1994; Fernando, 2007). 
The intertemporal choices are decisions that have consequences in multiple time 
periods (Lawrance 1991; Carvalho, et al., 2016b). The culture of poverty explained in 
theoretical literature can have an influence on how the poor people make financial 
decisions which can affects their poverty state over time (Claessens and Feijen, 2007; 
Carvalho, et al., 2016a) argued that financial access by the poor improves the 
consumption levels of the poor households. In the absence of financial intermediation, 
the households need to accumulate cash holdings before undertaking any investments 
(Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). If intermediaries have larger shares of pooled 
resources it means the deposited money as savings will be redirected as loans to the 
borrowers (Rother, 1999).  
 





According to Merton (1995) the financial intermediaries facilitates the allocation of 
economic resources through time and across geographic regions and industries. This 
explains the capacity of the financial intermediaries in credit extension to the most 
productive sectors of the economy (World Bank, 2018). For the poor to insulate 
themselves to economic shocks borrowing is necessary. However, in formal financial 
intermediaries credits extension is usually constrained as the small transactions are 
regarded as costly (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). Although the poor can benefit from 
this function of finance it is argued that their smaller transactions requires higher unit 
costs and has resulted in borrowing constraint for the poor households (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997). Deeper financial markets can be able to 
bear higher unit costs of smaller transactions thereby affording the poor to have 
access to credit (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
 
3.3.4 Diversifying and reducing liquidity and intertemporal risk 
(insurance) 
 
Unlike individuals and informal finance, formal financial intermediaries have better 
expertise with regard to risk management (Bajun, 2009; Pande et al., 2012). Formal 
financial intermediaries have the capacity to smooth individual risks due to their ability 
for credit extension to many projects, thereby enabling the formal intermediaries to 
offer loans at favourable rates than those of the informal sector (see Merton, 1995, 
Rother, 1999; Levine, 2005; Bajun, 2009; Turner, 2010, Pande et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, Carvalho et al. (2016a) argued that there are feedback loops to poor 
families as access to formal savings devices increases the desire of the poor to delay 
gratification as they take more risks. 
 
These discussed functions of finance highlight that the functional perspective of formal 
finance has a capacity to increase the incomes of the poor if they are made accessible 
thereby lowering poverty in the poor communities. The access and use of formal 
finance can potentially increase the incomes of the poor people if they ultimately have 
access to the functions of finance which described in sections 3.3.1-3.3.4 above (see 
Pande et al.’ 2012). Merton (1995) opines that the functions of financial intermediaries 
are fairly stable overtime and across borders however, it is how they are performed 




operations are motivated by profit hence provision of financial services that is not 
profitable can lead to financial crisis and/ bankruptcy (Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 
2017). 
 
Furthermore, the high costs of delegated monitoring by formal intermediaries have 
involuntarily excluded the poor and low-income household from using formal financial 
services (Allen et al., 2013). In most cases the costs of using financial intermediary 
products and services are so high that there is no net benefit of using such services 
(Schumpeter, 1939; Diamond, 1984). Aguera (2015) argues that sustainable finance 
should not be finance for all at all cost, but it should be viable and safe. In the same 
argument, it is stated that finance should be affordable for the consumer, 
sustainable/profitable for intermediary and should not threaten consumer protection or 
stability (Aguera, 2015). Given that the formal intermediaries operate on profit making 
business model, therefore, they have a very limited number of products that cater for 
the poor. Thus in most developing economies penetration of formal banking products 
and services at the base of the pyramid (see Fig 2.1) is very low (Realini and Mehta, 
2015). 
 
3.4 Opportunities and Challenges in formal intermediation  
 
Sub-section 3.4.1 to 3.4.5 discusses a review of opportunities and or challenges in the 
provision of formal financial services. Section 3.4.1 discusses the access and use 
barriers of formal financial services. The geographic barrier of financial intermediation 
is discussed in section 3.4.2 as the distance to the intermediary can affect the decision 
to use certain financial products and services. Most financial formal financial 
intermediaries require collateral for credit extension, Furthermore the requirements of 
documents such as proof of address and identification documents prohibits the poor 
from accessing financial services and this is discussed in section 3.4.3. 
3.4.1 Barriers to access and use of formal financial services 
 
Access to formal financial services by the poor remains a challenge in most developing 
and emerging markets (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). There are price and non-
price barriers that have resulted in the involuntary exclusion of mainly the poor and the 




and Caner, 2005; 2009; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Klapper, 2013). According to Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) the initial set-up cost 
required by the formal financial providers discourages the use of financial services by 
the poor.  
 
The Global Findex (2017) database cited a number of reasons of barriers to financial 
services with high cost, physical distance, and lack of proper documentation among 
the reasons of exclusion from the use and access of financial services. These barriers 
have remained the challenge for the poor and low-income households to equitably 
access and use the financial products and services (Beck, 2007; 2014; Aguera, 2015). 
Sahn, Younger and Genicot (2003) argues that as distance and time to the financial 
intermediary increases, demand for the services of formal finance decreases in favour 
of informal finance which are usually located closer to the communities of the poor 
people. Furthermore, the better outreach by financial intermediaries increases the 
adoption and use of financial services (Beck, et al., 2007b, Claessens, 2006). This 
was further supported by Filipiak (2016) that physical proximity positively affects trust 
of financial intermediaries by households with their money. As previously asserted by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Stiglitz (1998) argue that market imperfections result in 
unequal access to credit by people who do not have adequate wealth for collateral.  
 
This was supported by Aguera (2015) who noted that market imperfections result in 
involuntary exclusion from the use of financial products by the poor. Chigumira and 
Masiyandima (2003) reiterated by stating that formal financial institutions lack a 
lending criteria that is appropriate for micro-borrowers. Furthermore, Rau (2004) 
stipulated that the formal financial services have inappropriate products because they 
fail to distinguish between liquidity and credit needs among the poor. In support of this 
view, the World Bank (2013) opines that in most transition economies the formal credit 
opportunities are mainly based on payroll lending. This payroll based lending has kept 
most of the poor out from using formal financial services and products). Furthermore, 
formal banking is associated with non-monetary costs which are assumed to be large 
enough to discourage the use of formal savings services by the poor (Barr, 2004; 
Karlan et al., 2014). This has left the microfinance institutions, government, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to cater for the financial products needs of the 




capacity and resources that are found in the formal banking systems (Rau, 2004). The 
financial intermediation process should therefore bridge the gap in access barriers to 
extend the reach of formal services by poor households (Chandwani and Kulkarni, 
2018). 
 
Access to intermediation services by households and micro firms allows for better 
consumption smoothing improving their living standards (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 
2011; Beck, Büyükkarabacak, Rioja and Valev, 2012). Informal risk‐sharing provides 
only limited protection hence the poor are left vulnerable to extreme negative shocks 
and poverty (Dercon, 2002). Traditional financial intermediaries have been viewed as 
only to serve the needs of the affluent thereby marginalising the majority of the people 
at the BoP (Realini and Mehta, 2015). The SDGs advocates for the need to build 
resilience to household living in extreme poverty of which the majority of them are in 
SSA (United Nations, 2017a, b). 
 
Figure 3.2 below gives a summary of demand and supply side factors that are 
challenges to access and use of formal financial services by mainly low income 
earners and the poor households. The access and use of financial services can result 
in voluntary and involuntary exclusion (see Beck et al., 2007).  
Figure 3.2: Summary of the challenges of using formal financial intermediaries. 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2013  
Demand Side:  
Documentation  
Lack of trust 
Financial illiteracy 
Complex products 
High cost  
Non-payroll based income  
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Linking these demand and supply side factors with the functions of financial 
intermediation Figure 3.3 by (Pande, Cole, Sivasankaran, Bastian and Durlacher, 
2012) explains how access to the formal financial system can increase the poor’s 
income. However, having the formal financial services in the financial systems do not 
necessarily mean efficiency in the use and access of such services by poor people 
(Levine, 2005; Barr, Kumar and Litan, 2007; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010; Pande 
et al., 2012). The access of the financial service in enables by the proximity of services 
providers to the larger population. Furthermore, the take-up of the financial services 
and products the larger population need to be aware of the services and they have to 
suit their needs. The functions of finance as illustrated in Figure 3.3 inevitably accord 
the savings, payments and credit services to the households and firms (Levine et al., 





Figure 3.3: Function of bank financial intermediation on poverty reduction 
 
Source: Pande et al. (2012) 
 
3.4.2 Distance to the bank/financial intermediary 
 
The geographic distance to access financial intermediary services and products plays 
a crucial role in how poor households use these services (Aportela, 1999). In most 
countries, formal financial intermediaries are seldom located in low-income 




the number of bank branches had an effect on the financial condition and the living 
standards of low income households in India. Bank branch expansion in the 
geographic areas where poor people live reduces poverty in that the poor are able to 
access the services of financial intermediation (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Lyman, 2012; 
Burgess and Pande, 2005; Bruhn and Love, 2009; 2012).  
 
The geographic distance of financial intermediaries which has limited the access and 
use of formal finance by poor households affirms the distributional role of financial 
intermediation effect to poverty reduction (Beck et al., 2009). However, Jeanneney 
and Kpodar (2011), and Levine (2005) argue that benefits of economic growth to the 
poor can be offset by income inequality. Economic systems with poor infrastructure 
have low outreach for formal banking systems (Beck et al., 2008). Most developing 
countries have infrastructure challenges which have further obstructed the role of 
financial intermediaries in poverty reduction. Andrianova and Demetriades (2008) did 
not support the distributional role of finance-growth nexus in poverty reduction where 
there is acute or high concentration of poverty. Thus the poverty reduction benefits of 
economic growth cannot be sufficient if there are geographic barriers for sufficient use 
of formal financial services and products by the poor.  
 
3.4.3 Financial innovation and its role to poverty reduction  
 
Innovation in the financial sector such as electronic finance (e-finance) and mobile 
money have bridged the financial access gap (Beck et al., 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2008). According to Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (2017), two billion people have 
remained out of the formal finance mainly due to lack of options that suits their needs 
in the formal economy. Mobile money is bridging this financial exclusion gap as it is 
cheap, accessible and affordable as compared to the traditional financial intermediary 
alternative such as banks (Ouma, Odongo and Were, 2017). The IMF (2017) defined 
mobile money as  
‘digital medium of exchange and store of value facilitated by mobile money 
agents and stored in mobile money accounts, and accessible through mobile 
phones’. 
The presence/absence of banking branches (geographic access) has been the 




mobile money provides the other channels in which financial services are delivered 
financial services without the need of a physical banking outlet (Beck et al., 2007; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). The digital banking especially in the form of mobile money 
has been successful in bridging the cost, geographic and gender barriers to financial 
services (Global Findex, 2017, Suri and Jack, 2016). The World Bank (2014) asserted 
that seventy-five percent of the poor people live in the rural areas of which the mobile 
signals cover ninety percent of the rural population connecting the service providers 
to the market of their financial services. Suri and Jack (2016) postulated that access 
to mobile money has a poverty reducing effect by improving household consumption 
in the long term, changes in occupational choices (from subsistence farming to 
operating small businesses) and better financial management. 
 
According to the Global Financial Index (2017) mobile money has been critical and 
successful in banking at low cost the populations that have been difficult to reach such 
as the poor, rural populations and women. The provision of low cost mobile banking 
accompanied with high transaction volumes has made the model also profitable to 
service providers (Global Findex, 2017). Rasmussen (2010) argues that the 
conventional banking costs are twenty-six percent more expensive that the branchless 
banking. This has enabled more adoption of branchless banking such as mobile 
money by the poor households (Rasmussen, 2010). According to the World Bank 
(2017) the notable successes in mobile money in African countries are in Kenya (M-
PESA), Zimbabwe (ecocash) and Namibia (mobipay). Kenya has the largest pool of 
poor people participating in the mobile money market whilst Zimbabwe and Namibia 
although the pool is small as compared to Kenya they however have the greatest 
inclusion as they have availed new services and products via mobile money (World 
Bank, 2017). In this the mobile money has been instrumental in providing the poor with 
transfers, payment and savings instruments which they previously did not have access 
to in the formal financial markets (Ouma et al., 2017). 
 
The access to the saving opportunities via mobile money has enabled financial 
management by the poor via the precautionary and commitment savings which has 
allowed them to smooth consumption and manage their risks (Wilson et al., 2010; 
Honohan and King, 2012; Shem, Misati and Njoronge., 2012; Jack and Suri, 2014; 




to absorb severe negative shocks using their mobile savings without altering their 
consumption levels as compared to the non M-PESA users whose consumption fell 
by 7 percent after a major shock. Furthermore, the access to mobile money facilitated 
the occupational switch in Kenya from farming to operating businesses using the 
savings opportunities accorded by the mobile money (Suri and Jack, 2016). Dupas et 
al. (2018) further observed that in poor countries (Malawi and Uganda) even when 
provided with no frills bank account some poor households did not use the bank 
account either because they are too poor to save or the products were not tailor made 
to suit their needs.  
 
The other narrative for non-use of the formal banking services was the perception by 
the population as generally banking fees are highest in Africa (Beck, et al., 2008). This 
switch to the traditional financial services can be as a result that as consumer are 
aware of financial services products mobile money is inadequate in providing a range 
of services that are needed especial on the insurance dimension. Mobile money has 
further enhanced the intermediation to poor households by participating in the 
payment market including remittances market (World Bank, 2018).  Mobile money has 
been effective in squeezing the cost of remittances below that of the formal financial 
institutions such as banks (World Bank, 2018). According to the World Bank (2018) 
the average cost of remitting money using mobile money is on average 4.2% 
compares to a 7% average when using cash and bank accounts. The regulations in 
the banking systems such as know your customer (KYC), and the anti-money 
laundering (AML) has made the payments facilitation formally using the banking 
system very expensive. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) argued that remittances have 
been an alternative source of finance for most recipients either for consumption, risk 
management and capital accumulation.  
 
In a nutshell digital innovation especially mobile money is making great inroads in 
banking the unbanked and the underserved with financial services even in areas that 
have been difficult to reach for the traditional banking services (Global Findex, 2017).  
 





The World Bank asserts that there is a mismatch on the collateral requirements by 
banks and the type of collateral the unbanked are willing to offer. Beck (2006) argues 
that financial intermediation reduces poverty by broadening access to financial 
services and efficient allocation of savings. Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan (2008: 
129) states that poverty is not only reduced by access to credit by the poor but they 
should also have access to savings, payment system and insurance. In most transition 
economies the poor are locked out of the formal credit and they use the microfinance 
which does not necessarily use collateral as a lending barrier. According to Bester 
(1987) in the absence of collateral, lenders rely on interest rate in risk pricing at the 
expense of crowding out good risks. However, Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) argued 
that the banking systems are more beneficial to the poor through the savings and the 
transaction opportunities than the credit availability opportunity.  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2015), opines that poor households are 
regarded as high risk and end up paying more for credit than middle and upper income 
individuals. In most developing countries the poor have been the major market for 
microfinance than formal intermediaries for access to financial intermediation 
(Burgess and Pande, 2005). However, the role of the microfinance in poverty reduction 
is not a subject for this study and it will not be further argued as the study seeks to 
examine the role of formal finance in reducing poverty in selected developing 
countries. There have been alternative channels for access and use of financial 
services that have emerged due to improvements in financial innovation such as 
mobile money and internet banking (Rasmussen, 2010; Dupas et al., 2018). 
 
The emergency of these alternatives such as mobile money for accessing and using 
financial services has proved to reach the poor at reduced cost (Beck et al., 2005; 
Jack and Suri, 2016). More on how digital innovation has improved the breadth of 
financial services was discussed in section 3.4.3 as they are opportunities for access 
and use financial intermediation. In most developing and emerging economies, the 
poor are seldom serviced formally for saving, risk management and payment services 
(Pande et al., 2012). The availability of these alternatives through digital innovations 





3.4.5 Entrepreneurship channel 
 
Ayyagari, Beck, and Hoseini (2013) reiterated that financial intermediation reduces 
poverty by the entrepreneurship channel whereby finance enables more 
entrepreneurship to thrive. Saint-Paul (1992) argues that intermediaries enable the 
expansion and risk diversification by entrepreneurs as they provide the much need 
capital. De Gregorio and Kim (2000) concurred that intermediaries allow entities to 
specialise in skills beneficial for industrial development. Financial intermediation 
enables entry and growth of new firms, removes new firms’ financial constraints as 
they access the credit and risk management services to protect their businesses there 
by supporting the growth of businesses (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2006; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005). However, the World Bank (2016) stated that 
over 200 million formal and informal, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) in emerging markets lack sufficient financing to expand their businesses. 
According to the World Bank (2016), the MSMEs mostly cite lack of collateral, credit 
history and the informality nature of their business as the reason of not using formal 
financial services. Improving the efficiency of the financial intermediation process 
without broadening access of the financial services is insufficient for poverty reduction 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 2008: 138). 
 
3.4.6 Savings and risk management 
 
According to Schumpeter (1911) financial intermediation through the banking system 
plays a fundamental role in the process of improved wellbeing by affecting the 
allocation of savings and management of risk. The screening and risk pooling ability 
of financial intermediaries is necessitated by high set up cost which the poor 
households aren’t able to pay for in the formal financial intermediaries (Greenwood 
and Jovanovic, 1990; IMF, 2015; Pande et al., 2012). The National Tresuary (2018) 
postulates that financial services allow people to make daily economic transactions, 
save and preserve wealth to meet future goals and retirement needs, and insure 
against personal disaster. Insufficient access to finance has kept the poor people 





Besides credit, the poor can benefit from financial intermediation via savings and risk 
management such as insurance opportunities provided by financial intermediaries 
(Keynes, 1937a; b; McKinnon, 1973; 2010; King and Levine, 1993; Claessens and 
Feijen, 2007; Kiendrebeogo and Minea, 2016). Information gaps in the market have 
further constrained access to formal financial services by the poor excluding them from 
using formal risk management services provided by these intermediaries (Beck et al., 
2007; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014). Mullainathan and Shafir 
(2009) argue that formal financial intermediaries such as banks treat the low income 
households and the high income households differently. Banerjee and Duflo (2007) 
lamented that the poor mainly participate in the informal saving service. 
 
Formal banking institutions tend to market their products differently to households, 
promoting credit over savings to lower income earners whilst the wealthy households’ 
savings is promoted over debt (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009). Thaler (1999) opines 
that the low income earners equally need the help of formal finance with regard to 
formal savings as there is a greater tendency of unnecessarily spending cash in hand 
than the cash in the bank. Brune, Giné, Goldberg and Yang (2016) further support this 
assertion by arguing that lack of self-control led to funds depletion of agricultural 
income of Malawian households. However, there was an increase in output for 
households who had access to formal savings, as the formal services assisted in 
preserving the agricultural income between the harvest and the next planting period 
(Brune et al., 2016). 
 
Burgess and Pande (2005), stated that a percentage increase of bank share of savings 
in rural India reduces poverty by 2.22 percent. Hence enabling the poor with formal 
savings vehicles reduces poverty (Dupas and Robinson 2013; Brune et al., 2016; 
Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman 2014; Prina 2015). The studies argued that access to 
formal financial services enables asset build-up which in turn can proliferate 
investment activity and smooth consumption (Carvalho et al., 2016a). Zhan and 
Sherraden (2011) and Prasad (2010) reiterated that the savings accumulation by poor 
household improves the education attainment by their children which in turn increase 
the income of poor households. In a different study in Chile, Kast and Pomeranz (2014) 
found out that access to formal savings reduces the formal debt of the study 




economic shocks improving the welfare as the households did not need to reduce 
consumption (Kast and Pomeranz, 2014; Karlan et al., 2014). Inadequate formal 
savings opportunities makes it harder for the poor to diversify their savings and to 
initiates projects that can increase their future incomes (Prasad, 2010). 
 
3.5 Role of Institutional Quality 
 
Poverty is not only an economic problem but is also made out of interactions of social 
and political processes effectively mediated by the existing institutional frameworks 
(Deolalikar, 2002). Cepparulo et al. (2017) postulated that the role of financial 
intermediaries in poverty reduction can be achieved via other channels than the one 
working through growth. This supported the previous assertion by Law, Azman-Saini 
and Ibrahim (2013) who state that the effect of finance in the real economy is 
contingent to the quality of institutions. Market inefficiencies and resources 
misallocations are muted to be the ways in which institutional quality influence poverty 
(Tebaldi and Mohan, 2010). Hence Cepparulo et al. (2017) and Law et al. (2013) 
suggested that there exist other channels than the growth channel in which finance 
can be an epitome of poverty alleviation.  
Cepparulo et al. (2017) suggests that resource allocation by financial intermediaries 
with inadequate institutional frameworks cannot reduce poverty. This supports the 
previous assertion by Claessens and Perotti (2007) who state that financial 
intermediation succeeds in reducing poverty only if it is matched by a build-up in 
oversight institutions. In examining the role of institution on poverty incidences, Chong 
and Calderón (2000) posit that high institutional quality reduces poverty incidences. 
The study however, used the share of government spending on defence which can be 
correlated to poverty resulting in endogeneity problems (see Tebaldi and Mohan, 
2010; Perera and Lee, 2013). Allen, Carletti and Valenzuela (2013), argue that 
financial markets are effective in causing changes in the real economy if a minimum 
level of efficiency by institutions is reached.  
 
The institutional quality fosters the poverty reducing effect of finance through the 
strengthening of the rule of law, oversight of financial regulation and the enforcements 




intermediaries will be willing to improve the breath of the financial intermediation. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), opined that the poverty of nations is not determined 
by geography and culture but by the state of the nation’s institutions. This concurred 
with the assertions of Olson (1996) and Chong and Calderón (2000) that institutions 
play a significant role in poverty reduction. However, Perera and Lee (2013) disputed 
the role of institutions in reducing poverty incidences as it was stated that the 
institutional reforms (for example bureaucratic quality and democratic accountability) 
worsens income distribution. This assertion on the role of bureaucratic settings in 
worsening poverty incidences concurs with the Marxist theory (discussed in Chapter 
2) on the determinants of poverty that the bureaucracy allows the political and 
economic powerful to determine the distribution of resources in an economy (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003; 2004; Perotti and Volpin, 2007; Claessens and Perrotti, 2007).  
 
3.6 Changing Functions of financial intermediation 
 
Despite the importance of traditional role of intermediaries, Allen and Santomero 
(1997) asserted that over the years the role of financial intermediation has evolved to 
facilitators of risk transfer and dealing with complex financial instruments and markets. 
Additionally, Allen and Santomero (2016) opined that as the breadth and depth of 
intermediation has increased, participation has shifted from direct participation by 
individuals to participation via various kinds of intermediaries. The complexity of the 
new financial products and services has limited the use of such services by the poor 
due to lack of financial literacy (Kelkar, 2014; Nanziri, 2016; Iqbal and Shami, 2017). 
Most of the complex instruments have alienated the poor in participating in these 
financial instruments due to lack of knowledge denying them the opportunity of inflation 
hedging and capital accumulation (Pande et al., 2012; Rewilak, 2017). A change in 
the mix of activities performed by the financial sector resulted in the adoption of some 
activities that do not offer any economic value and do not enhance welfare (Turner, 
2010; Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Beck, Degryse and Kneer, 2014). If these 
assertions are applicable to emerging markets it is imperative for this study therefore 
to ask if the role of financial intermediation is still central to equitable resource 
allocation for poverty reduction. According to Beck (2007), policy-makers should also 
be interested in the efficiency of financial intermediaries rather than only the amount 





Some developing economies focused of the savings and capital mobilisations and 
neglect the functional perspectives of financial intermediaries (Otchere, Senbet and 
Simbanegavi, 2017). This has limited the availability of formal intermediaries in areas 
where there is uncertainty to the profit maximisation goal (Allen and Gale, 1995). 
Financial intermediation focuses the provision of services on users with promising 
prospects as they aren’t willing to bear any risks under uncertainty (Greenwood, 
Sanchez and Wang, 2013). These profit maximisation drives usually rely on the 
population density as a deciding factor in the provision of formal intermediary services 
in Africa than anywhere else (Allen et al., 2012). Allen et al. (2012) further quizzed the 
inadequacy of financial intermediaries in certain parts of the African continent to effect 
poverty reduction as a result of policy failures than the financial role of these 
intermediaries. 
 
3.7 Domestic Public Debt  
 
The central government raises income using three main sources namely tax revenue, 
money creation and borrowing (debt). This study is only going to look at how 
government borrowing impact the levels of poverty levels in a financial intermediation 
setting rather than the evolution of debt and the various components of public debt in 
detail. The inclusion of the variable is not to extensively argue the effects of its 
components on the financial intermediation process as it is outside the scope of this 
study. Domestic debt is muted to have crowding out effects which reduces bank 
lending to the private sector investments (Christensen, 2005, Ismihan and Ozkan, 
2012). Christensen (2005) argued that a percentage increase in domestic debt 
reduces private lending by 15 percent in most African countries that were under study. 
According to Christensen (2007), sovereign participation in the domestic debt markets 
taps into the domestic savings which could have been made available to the domestic 
private sector. Furthermore, unsustainable domestic debt and debt servicing creates 
a vacuum of resources as it substitutes the sovereign long term investments in health, 
education and infrastructure (Peria and Schmukler, 2017). As compared to the 
external debt the domestic debt is said to be more expensive as there are few other 





In low income countries domestic debt is more short term than long term debts which 
potentially contributes to financial crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009; Raddatz, 2010; Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012; Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler, 2013, Peria and Schmukler, 
2017). The short term nature of the domestic debt markets further increase liquidity 
for sovereigns in low income countries due to the rolling over of large debts (Abbas 
and Christensen, 2007). Holding of public domestic debt by the financial sector 
reduces financial deepening and efficiency of the as the financial sector may be 
profitable without enhanced competition (Hauner, 2006). Furthermore, in economies 
that lack diverse investor base government borrowing result in increase in interest 
rates which crowds out investments by the private sector (Christensen, 2005; Arnone 
and Presbitero, 2010; Bua, Pradelli and Presbitero, 2014). This is further worsened by 
the large concentration of commercial banks as investor base for government 
borrowing as the small and medium enterprises debt is mainly from the banking sector 
that the capital markets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000; Hauner, 2006; Broner et 
al., 2013; Bua et al., 2014).  
 
A decrease in private lending can affect the poor due to credit rationing as less money 
will be available for private lending (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1985; Hauner, 2006; Broner, 
Erce, Martin, and Ventura, 2014). Ismihan and Ozkan (2012) argues that in economies 
that have lower financial depth government borrowings have severe consequences to 
the financial intermediation process and the outcomes in the real economy. Sovereign 
debt and high debt servicing cost further crowds out investments in crucial services 
such as health, education and infrastructure further worsening poverty levels (Kirchner 
and van Wijnbergen, 2016, Peria and Schmukler, 2017). However, Asonuma, 
Bakhache, and Hesse (2015) suggested that holding of government debt by the 
domestic financial markets is beneficial for fiscal consolidation. 
 
The interaction of public domestic debt and poverty incorporated in the financial 
intermediation setting is seldom researched in previous literature. It is therefore the 
aim of this study to further examine how domestic debt can affect the ultimate 
reduction in poverty levels high domestic debt levels can affect the private lending 
process (Peria and Schmukler, 2017). According to the World Bank (2018) sustainable 
sovereign debt is associated with countries' advancements in executing Poverty 




programs. High domestic debt ‘crowds out’ social programs as the government 
revenue is used for debt servicing than on social and developmental programmes (Bua 
et al., 2014; Kirchner and van Wijnbergen, 2016).  
 
3.8 The Economic growth argument  
 
There are arguments in literature to the effect that financial intermediation reduces 
poverty via its effects on economic growth (Odhiambo, 2009; Soederberg 2013). It is 
worth for this study to note the arguments that have been postulated on the effect of 
finance via economic growth in poverty reduction. There has been mixed findings of 
the role of formal finance in poverty reduction via economic growth. Soederberg (2013) 
asserted that access and inclusive formal finance can be a mechanism for growth and 
poverty reduction. The World Bank (2008), argues that deep financial markets are a 
positive driver for economic growth hence the improved standard of living. Finance 
influences economic growth and income distribution thereby affecting the level of 
poverty in any economy (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan, 2009, Jeanneney and 
Kpodar, 2011). Ayyagari et al. (2013) concur by stating that financial intermediaries 
help in equally dividing the benefits of economic growth by increasing the flow of 
capital to the poor.  
 
According to Beck et al. (2007) finance is pro-growth but questions still remain if 
finance is also pro-poor. As much as the finance has been pro-growth the benefits of 
growth hasn’t been equitably distributed as it remains centralised to areas with 
geographic access to financial intermediaries (Beck et al., 2009). This has contributed 
to inequalities especially in the developing countries where poor infrastructure usually 
excludes the poor from easy access of formal financial services (Jeanneney and 
Kpodar, 2011). Turner (2010) argues that the 2007-2009 global financial crisis was a 
result of the increase in the scope of financial intermediation. This would mean that 
increase in the scope of financial intermediation without proper monitoring by financial 
intermediaries is not always beneficial for the real economy (Clarke Xu and Zou, 
2006). Thus, this study attempts to contribute to insights on the other channels than 






Todaro (1997) argues that progress in economic growth does not necessarily translate 
to improved livelihoods of poor people. This was supported by (Christiaensen and 
Demery 2007; Suryahadi, Suryadarma and Sumarto, 2009) who argued that poverty 
reduction through economic growth differ across sectors. Although economic growth 
is necessary for poverty reduction it is not sufficient if it is not accompanied with 
progressive distributional changes which include the distribution of financial services 
and products (see Ames, Brown, Devarajan and Izquierdo, 2001, Allen et al., 2012). 
Christiaensen and Demery (2007) and Suryahad et al. (2009) further asserts that 
poverty can be alleviated if it happens in sectors where the poor can easily access the 
benefits brought by economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, Salem and Donaldson (2016) asserted that although economic growth 
is an important factor in increasing the income of the poor, it was not the only or the 
supreme pathway. Analysing economies that had experienced progressive poverty 
reduction for a period of twenty-five years, Saleem and Donaldson (2016) suggested 
that there are other pathways for poverty reduction than the growth channel. Moreover, 
Deaton (2006) argued that economic development is a better assertion to poverty 
reduction than economic growth hence economic growth is necessary but not 
adequate to be the epitome on the effects of finance on poverty. Sen (1983) argued 
that economic growth is an aspect of development which Todaro and Smith (2015) 
defined as an improvement in living conditions, self-esteem and a free and just society 
and best measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). 
 
Irrespective of experiencing progressive economic growth post colonialism, most 
developing economies are subjected to persistent poverty. This persistent poverty has 
academics and policy makers looking for answers in the financial sector as a tool for 
poverty reduction. This has cast doubt on the efficacy of economic growth channel as 
the most important conduit through which finance reduces poverty in economies that 
are subject to high levels of inequality (see Levine, 2005, Fosu, 2017). Deaton (2013: 
18) argued that there should be a holistic approach which separates itself from the 
parochial view of poverty by academics and researchers alike. For example, it was 
argued that progress in national income growth cannot be studied separate from 
progresses in health care for policy making initiatives on poverty reduction (Deaton, 




ignores financial literacy and gender will fall short of addressing the welfare benefits 
of finance.  
 
Hoff and Walsh (2018) concurred that poverty has many dimensions but lack of 
income is the most manifestation of all poverty factors. Increasing the outreach of 
financial intermediaries has the capacity of reducing poverty in low-income households 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Honohan, 2009). According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), (2016) there is an optimal level of financial intermediation that maximises 
its social value. Naceur et al. (2017) argues that the effect of the financial sector in the 
real economy varies across regions. The OECD (2017) narrated that economic growth 
is inadequate to reduce poverty in societies with high inequality and a lack of social 
cohesion. The inadequacy of economic growth as a catalyst for poverty is supported 
by Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2017) that irrespective of resurgence of economic 
growth in most developing and emerging economies these countries have failed to 
meet the MDGs goals of reducing extreme poverty (see Fosu, 2015).  
 
It is therefore imperative for this study to determine if there are other channels than 
the growth channel in which financial intermediation can be key to poverty reduction. 
Most products and services offered by formal financial institutions lack the value 
proposition for the excluded households and enterprises. This study will contribute by 
coming up with other channels of financial intermediation as a tool for poverty 
reduction by having a comparative study for the regional blocks. Although Rewilak 
(2013) had a comparative review of regional blocks the study was more of an 
extension of data to the Dollar and Kraay (2002) study. Focus was mainly on the 
trickle-down effect of economic growth than investigating if there are other channels 
in which financial intermediation can be a tool for poverty reduction (Rewilak, 2013). 
Kelkar (2014) referred use of sustainable formal finance as an economic security for 
both the rich and the poor hence inclusive formal financial intermediation is a necessity 
for an improved standard of living.  
 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) focus on the money and credit as the channels in which 
formal finance directly affect poverty whilst Cepparulo et al. (2017) opines on the direct 
channel of strong institutional frameworks. Leftwich and Sen (2011) argued that for 




institutional quality. This suggests that institutional quality plays a role on how financial 
intermediation affects poverty. Quality institutions which includes but not limited to rule 
of law, property rights and bureaucracy in governments. However, the studies mostly 
looked at financial development which includes not only the functional role of financial 
intermediaries but also the institutional perspective of finance. There hasn’t been any 
conclusive agreement to explaining why some nations are left behind in reducing 
poverty irrespective of experiencing progressive growth (Fosu, 2015). Rewilak (2017) 
argues that efficiency of financial intermediaries in facilitating transaction in a 
sustainable way is crucial as a direct effect of finance for poverty reduction. Deep 
financial markets which are wasteful are not beneficial in alleviating of even mediating 
the poverty of the poor people. 
 
In most developing and emerging economies poverty has remained persistent 
irrespective of multiple poverty reduction strategies in place. The main focus area of 
the available research on the role of finance on poverty reduction is on the indirect 
channel via economic growth (see King and Levine, 1993; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; 
Odhiambo, 2009; 2010, Beck et al., 2008; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; 
Beck and Levine; 2004). Most studies focus on financial development however this 
study will mainly focus on financial intermediation which is a component of financial 
development. The transmission channels from financial intermediation to poverty 
reduction are numerous. Therefore, there is need to differentiate the impact of financial 
intermediation on poverty reduction and the impact of growth on poverty.  
 
Financial intermediation can impact on poverty levels directly through changes in 
direct access and use of formal financial services and products and indirectly through 
economic growth effects. There are numerous studies that support that bank financial 
intermediation facilitate the access and use of formal finance by the poor in the 
developing economies (see Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Chandan and Mishra, 
2011; Ergungor, 2010, Pande et al., 2012; Prina, 2015). Most studies on the role of 
finance in poverty reduction are based on financial development than financial 
intermediation (see Honohan, 2004; Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Beck et al., 2007; 
Odhiambo, 2010; Perez-Moreno, 2011; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011 and Sehrawat 
and Giri; 2015). Beck et al. (2007) argued that financial development includes other 




intermediation and supports the take up of more activities that do not necessarily 
enhance welfare.  
 
Subject to the reviewed literature this study does not seek to re-examine the finance-
growth nexus, nor does it re-evaluate the financial intermediation and poverty 
relationship (see Honohan, 2004). Rather, the study seeks to identify other channels 
in which financial intermediation can be a catalyst for poverty reduction. Furthermore, 
the study seeks to examine the contegrating relationship between financial 
intermediation and poverty as well as the causal links between finance and poverty. 
Thus, the approach of the study complements the finance and poverty literature by 
examining whether financial intermediation and the other dimension of finance exerts 
a significant influence on improving the living conditions of the poor. There are few 
studies that the researcher is aware of that sought to review the direct relationship 
between finance, poverty and inequality (Honohan, 2004; Quartey, 2005; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Lyman, 2012, Rewilak, 
2017). Most available studies focus on the financial development than the component 
of financial intermediation however in most cases developed financial markets do not 
necessarily mean access and efficiency in servicing the larger population sustainably. 
This study therefore looks at the components of finance as reflected by depth, access, 
efficiency and stability and how these aspects are related to poverty.  Financial 
intermediation reduces poverty in a number of ways through the already discussed 
function of finance in section 3.2.  
 
Financial intermediation improves financial avenues for the low income earners and 
the poor to participate in formal financial activities (Beck et al., 2007; Pande et al., 
2012). This is achieved by financial intermediations role in reduces market failure such 
as information asymmetry and efficiency in lending (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002; 
Stiglitz, 1998). Access to formal financial services enhances the productive capacity 
of the micro-sectors and poor households there by enhancing their welfare (Jalilian 
and Kirkpatrick, 2002; World Bank, 2001). Deeper financial intermediation reduces the 
external cost of enterprises (Rother, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1996). In this regard 
more can be invested in the entrepreneurial projects improving capital accumulation 





Futhermore this has a poverty reducing effect in that the financial intermediaries are 
able to increase the available credit to which the poor can access and this can improve 
poverty incidences as the poor are able to smooth consumption, invest in human 
capital and manage their risks (Li et al., 1998, Allen et al., 2016). Honohan (2004) 
further argues that deeper financial intermediation reduces poverty although the 
results are sensitive to the proxies used for poverty and financial intermediation. 
However, there are mixed findings on the effect of increasing the depth of financial 
markets as it can also be accompanied with financial fragilities (Honohan, 2004; 
Rewilak, 2017). The poor are more prone to external shocks than the affluent as the 
poor mainly lack he risk management instruments to hedge their small resources 
(Claessens, 2006, Honohan, 2008).  
 
Rewilak (2017) and Cull, et al. (2012) lament that most studies available in literature 
focus of the depth of finance neglecting other dimensions such as access, efficiency 
and stability. In this regard as there are improvements in the data available especially 
on the access dimension, this study will include the variable and contribute to literature 
on how access to formal financial intermediaries’ services and products can reduce 
poverty. Moreover, the previous studies that have included this variable in their studies 
have used time series studies (see Cull et al., 2012; Rewilak, 2017). The time series 
studies might have endogeneity problems hence the study adopts the panel data 
analysis. There are other distributional policies mainly in Africa to address inequalities 
such as land reform that however, may, if not accompanied by proper policies may not 
address core and long-term challenges of poverty. There are few studies that the 
researcher is aware of that have included the four dimensions of financial 
intermediation in poverty studies (see Naceur et al., 2017; Rewillak, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, research is inconclusive on which sector of the financial markets has 
more influence in poverty reduction. Naceur and Zhang (2016) argued that the banking 
sector than the stock market has more influence on the role of finance in poverty 
reduction. However, in a different study Makina and Fanta (2017) suggest that the 
bond market has more effect on growth than the banking and stock market which 
influence growth which in turn helps in the reallocation of resources and reduces 
poverty. These studies (Naceur and Zhang, 2016; Makina and Fanta, 2017) were 




at different financial markets effects on poverty as in some developing countries the 
bond market and the stock market data is not available. Furthermore, the bond market 
has limited potential as compared to bank finance as participants in the bond market 
are mainly large enterprises (Gormley, Johnson and Rhee, 2006; Beck et al., 2009). 
This study will focus on selected developing countries in Africa and Asia depending 
on data availability.  
 
3.9 Chapter summary  
 
The present empirical literature review chapter has discussed the financial 
intermediation landscape and the functions of financial intermediaries to contextualise 
the importance of finance in poverty reduction. In most transitioning economies the 
provision of finance to the poor is mainly in the form of grants and subsidised social 
programmes with little or no active formal finance participation in providing financial 
products and services to the poor. The main functions of finance have been easily 
accessed mainly by the middle and high income individuals. There are mixed 
assertions on the role finance via economic growth in reducing poverty. If the growth 
is not equitably distributed it cannot benefit the larger population.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter discusses how the opportunities and challenges in the 
financial landscape can be a catalyst or binding on the sustainable access and use of 
formal financial services. Collateral requirements and payroll based banking services 
have limited the participation of the poor in the formal finance, and this has further 
denied them the opportunity of improving their livelihoods. Digital innovations such as 
mobile money have been instrumental in banking the poor. Mobile phones and 
networks are ubiquitous and the service has been able to reach the larger population 
at low cost. It is suggested that the access to financial services using the mobile money 
has been able to reduce poverty as the poor are now able to save, borrow and make 
payments using their mobile devices (Jack and Suri, 2016). Furthermore, institutional 
quality is suggested to be a component for effective and efficient provision of financial 
services. Debt levels in most transitioning economies have been growing at an 
alarming rate in which the sovereigns borrow from the domestic market crowding out 




engages in the development of the hypotheses that are deployed as the points of 








4. Introduction  
 
This chapter delves into the development of the hypothesis of the study. To date, the 
role of financial intermediation in poverty reduction has no conclusive debate as there 
is a multiplicity of contesting standpoints and suggestions. Financial intermediaries 
have a poverty reducing effect either directly or indirectly via economic growth (Dollar 
and Kraay, 2002; Honohan, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2004). Most of 
the available literature on the role of finance in poverty reduction focus on financial 
deepening without including the other aspects of finance (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; 
Honohan, 2004; and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2007). However, there are 
other aspects of the financial sector such as the instability of the financial system which 
is more detrimental to the poor than the rich (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011) and 
access to the finance which is beneficial to the poor (Claessens and Perotti, 2007, 
Rewilak, 2017). Furthermore, the benefits of growth in reducing poverty can be 
undermined by income inequality (Kanbur, 2001). As has been witnessed in the 
2007/9 global financial crisis, the performance of the financial system has an effect on 
the real economy. This study seeks to identify the channels through which financial 
intermediation (including the other aspects of intermediation such as efficiency, 
stability and access) reduces poverty. From here this chapter proceeds to explore the 




This chapter aims to provide a link between the reviewed literature and the 
methodology chapter that follows this one. Kerlinger (1956) stated that a hypothesis 
is an intellectual statement predicting the relationship between two or more variables. 
This view was supported by Creswell (2014) who defined a hypothesis as a formal 
declaration presenting an expected relationship between variables in research. The 
main reference point for the hypothesis development of this study is the objectives that 




to examine the deterministic relationship between financial intermediation and poverty 
in selected developing countries. Furthermore the to the study seeks to examine the 
cointegrating and shot run relationship between poverty and financial intermediation. 
Additionally the study examines the causal relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation.  
 
The hypothesis developed from the above objectives is empirically tested in this study. 
The hypothesis outlined in this chapter provides a link between the reviewed literature 
and the methodology chapter of the study as stated earlier. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation. 
 
Levine (2008) opined that intermediation alone without the access to the financial 
services is inadequate. Levine et al., (2008) asserted that access to finance by poor 
households maybe poverty reducing as the poor have funding for education and 
business undertakings. However, Inoue and Hamori (2016) argued that the extension 
of scale of financial services (depth) without the expansion of the financial networks is 
inadequate to effect any change in the real sector. Not only is the credit availability 
beneficial to the poor but the availability of saving and insurance vehicles enables 
consumption smoothing from the accumulated wealth as savings (McKinnon, 1973; 
Rewilak, 2017). Without financial intermediaries households do not invest in highly 
illiquid productive assets against economic shocks (Pagano, 1993). Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1993) postulated that in the absence of financial intermediaries, grain, 
livestock and other physical assets are the main forms of storing and accumulating 
wealth by the poor. In the event of any economic shock, wealth accumulated using 
these saving tools is easily lost, worsening the plight of the poor people (Rewilak, 
2017).  
 
In the midst of income inequalities Prokopenko and Holden (2001) argued that it is 
possible for the economy to grow with little or no value to its poor households. 
Similarly, Aguera (2015) observed that the distributional benefits of financial systems 
depend on where one lives, indicating that there is a geographic barrier for the benefits 




it was argued that access to the financial products and services by the poor has a 
poverty reducing effect among the poor households (Prokopenko and Holden, 2001, 
Rajan and Zingales, 2014). Access to finance enables the poor to accumulate capital 
and invest in education (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti, 2003; Dehejia and Gatti, 2005). 
In Peru Jacoby (1994) argued that the perpetual poverty was due to lack of access to 
credit as the poor households were unable to invest in education for their children. 
This view was supported by Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) as they as they found a 
reduction on investment in schooling due to temporary shocks in poor Indian 
households. Linking poverty to child labour Beegle, et al. (2003) and Dehejia and Gatti, 
(2005) observed that access to finance allowed the poor to diversify and invest in 
education as access to credit facilities reduced child labour and there was an increase 
in school enrolments by poor households. Furthermore, it was asserted that child 
labour was prevalent in economies with underdeveloped financial systems 
accompanied with income variability (Dehejia and Gatti, (2005).  
 
Unlike in underdeveloped financial systems, Beck et al. (2007) argued that countries 
with better financial intermediaries experience declining poverty and inequality as 
access to intermediary services boosts the income of the poor. However, if the access 
to financial intermediation is limited to the poor it can result in income inequalities 
worsening the poverty level in the economy (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Rajan 
and Zingales (2014) reasoned that if financial intermediation is crucial for poverty 
reduction, why is there a failure of the emergence of effective financial institutions to 
unlock access to finance and spread the opportunities of the financial systems.  
 
It was argued that the political connections influence the efficiency of the financial 
systems by concentrating credit resulting in limited access of credit by the poor 
(Pagano and Volpin, 2001, Rajan and Zingales, 2014; Singh and Huang, 2015). 
Politically motivated lending is higher in economies with high bank concentration (few 
large banks) and high net interest margin whih is a phenomenon of most developing 
countries. This is more common in underdeveloped financial systems with lack of 
institutional structures for law enforcement, effective regulatory and supervisory 
authorities (Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco, 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 2014). Mainly the 
underdeveloped financial systems have limited access to financial services as they 




(Jappelli et al., 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 2014). This argument borders on the notion 
that institutional quality is crucial for facilitating the effectiveness of financial 
intermediation in reducing poverty (North, 1991, Knack and Keefer, 1995). North 
(1991) argued that the reason of stagnation in the world is mainly because the 
respective countries have failed to develop low cost contract enforcements. 
 
Payment facilitation by financial intermediaries is crucial for poverty reduction in that 
the facilitation of low cost transactions enables trade and specialisation by economic 
units which in turn spurs economic growth creating more jobs and increasing the 
incomes of the households (Levine, 1997). On the contrary Ferreira, Leite and 
Ravallion (2010) argued that it is possible to reduce poverty without improvements in 
economic growth as was observed in Brazil for the period of 1985-2004. The poverty 
reduction for this phase was mainly through controlling hyperinflation and increasing 
social security and social assistance transfers. Furthermore, the payments facilitation 
by financial institutions can be in the form of facilitating remittance transfers, which 
have been argued to have poverty reducing effects (Lucas, 1998; Yaron et al., 1998; 
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010; Inoue, 2018). Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) argued 
that any distortion to the financial payment system is more detrimental to the poor than 
it is to the rich.  
 
Despite the effect of remittances in reducing poverty in developing countries this has 
been constrained by high cost of formally remitting money in developing countries 
(Beck and Peria, 2009; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). The World Bank (2018) 
argued that remitting money in sub-Sahara Africa is the most expensive as compared 
to the other regions of the world. Inoue (2018) argued that remittances reduce poverty 
in recipient countries as they provide consumption income and physical, human capital 
formation. Allowing the recipients to save the received funds further increases 
loanable funds with financial intermediaries boosting the credit channel of financial 
intermediaries (Adams and Page, 2005; Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2009; Imai, Gaiha, 
Ali, and Kaicker; 2014; Azam, Haseeb, and Samsudin, 2016; Inoue, 2018). Although 
remittances were negatively correlated with poverty, studies do not, with any clarity, 
distinguish whether remittances are substitutional or complementary to financial 





Alternatively, some literature advances the argument that the indirect role of financial 
intermediaries on poverty reduction via economic growth can be offset by inequalities 
(Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). There is no consensus from the available literature 
on the relationship between poverty and finance (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2001; Singh 
and Huang, 2015; Rewilak; 2017). Claessens and Perotti (2007) argued that lack of 
access to finance is the major cause of persisting inequalities in most economies. 
Previously Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argued of a nonlinear relationship 
between inequality and finance. However, the nonlinear relationship was refuted by, 
Clarke, and Zou and Xu (2003), who failed to ascertain a nonlinear relationship for the 
91 countries under for 1960–1995 study period. Banerjee and Newman (1993) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) do not support the nonlinear relationship between 
finance and poverty. Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2003) argued that the relationship between 
financial intermediation and inequality relies on the sectorial structure of the economy.  
 
The role of formal finance in determining who gets credit has the ultimate effect poverty 
and income distribution (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). Beck et al. (2007) argued 
that countries with better financial intermediaries have declining poverty levels and 
low-income inequality as the poor access to the intermediary services boosts their 
income. Credit and or money are the mainly discussed channels of financial 
intermediation that has an effect to poverty reduction (Dollar and Kraay; 2002; 
Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2004). However, Loayza and Rancière (2006) posited 
that excessive credit growth may result in banking crises which in turn is detrimental 
to the poor households. Availability of credit and other monetary aggregates are 
leading indicators of economic performance and they have the ability of reducing 
poverty if the poor have access to the services (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  
 
On the contrary excessive credit can result in financial fragility if the credit is extended 
excessively further worsening the plight of the poor (Honohan, 2004).There is a dearth 
in literature on the direct role of financial intermediation dimensions on poverty except 
for studies by (Rewilak, 2017; Zhang and Naceur, 2018). For the studies that looked 
at the finance growth nexus as discussed above, the studies only examined the depth 
of the financial market in poverty reduction without examining the other financial 
dimensions. These studies have some limitations in the role of finance in poverty 




poverty reduction except for Rewilak (2017) and Zhang & Naceur (2018). Burgess and 
Pande (2005) and Odhiambo (2009) argued the role of financial intermediation in 
poverty reduction in India and South Africa respectively but these studies can be 
subject to external validity of the data as they are country specific studies.  
 
Odhiambo (2009) argued the role of finance in poverty reduction in an economic 
growth setting and found out that finance has a poverty reducing effect. Burgess and 
Pande (2005) found out the increased access to finance through increasing the bread 
of the bank branches to the previous unbanked rural areas reduced poverty in India. 
Furthermore, the studies focused on time series analysis of which the data may have 
the endogeneity problem, which neither of the studies controlled. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2009) argued that the finance inequality relationship is better examined by use 
of broad complementary methodologies as each methodology suffers from distinct 
problems. Studies using a different methodology that addresses the problem of 
endogeneity might find a different result from these findings. Unlike in other studies, in 
these studies inequality is used both as a control variable and also as a dependent 
variable (in separate equations) as poverty can also be used to measure relative 
inequality.  
 
The relative poverty, for this study, is captured by the income inequality as measured 
by the Gini index. This has an advantage of capturing information that is not 
considered in other poverty measures such as the gross domestic product per capita 
and the headcount ratio, which depends on a national poverty line. Alternatively, it 
improves the rigour of the study as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argued that 
financial intermediation does not improve the lives of the poor because as the financial 
sector deepens, inequality prohibits the benefits of deep financial markets to filter to 
the poor in the economy. Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) argued that the role of 
financial intermediation in poverty reduction is dependent on the transmission channel. 
Financial intermediation per se, might not be adequate for poverty reduction if the poor 
households do but have access to the available financial products and services and 






Hypothesis 2: There is no cointegrating relationship or short run relationship 
between poverty and financial intermediation.  
 
The role of finance in the real economy cannot be ignored as finance is said to be a 
catalyst of developmental finance (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 2009). The role of finance in poverty reduction can either be direct through 
the distributional effect of financial intermediaries or indirectly via economic growth 
(Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). The functions of financial intermediaries as discussed 
in Chapter 3 include: easing the exchange of goods and services, pooling savings 
from a large number of investors, allocating society's savings to its most productive 
use, and diversifying and reducing liquidity and intertemporal risk (see Merton, 1995, 
Rother, 1999; Levine, 2005; Bajun, 2009; Turner, 2010).  
 
Through these functions the financial intermediaries reduce poverty (Merton and 
Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997). By extending credit, financial intermediaries enable 
consumption smoothing, capital investments and risk management, which reduces 
poverty in poor households (Shaw, 1973). The impact of the credit channel in reducing 
poverty is dependent on the relationship that the financial intermediaries with their 
debtors (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The credit channel is only effective to poverty 
reduction through consumption smoothing and capital investments only if the poor 
people can have access to credit at reasonable cost (Claessens and Perotti, 2007; 
Inoue and Hamori; 2016). By eliminating the credit constraints of the poor the financial 
intermediaries increase the productive efficiency of the poor households thereby 
reducing poverty (Inoue and Hamori, 2012).  
 
However if the credit extension is reckless, the credit channel can contribute to 
financial fragility which is detrimental to the poor more than their richer counterparts 
(Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Rewilak, 2017). This coincided with Uddin (2014) 
assertions that the greater availability of credit does not necessarily benefit the poor. 
Due to lack of collateral and documents that are required by the formal financial 
intermediaries, the poor do not adequately participate, adopt and use formal financial 
products and services (Kirkipatric, 2000; Aguera, 2015). Furthermore if the imperfect 
markets (discussed in Chapter 2) persist there is no convergence of the incomes of 




intermediation will not reduce income inequalities (see Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Barnejee and Newman, 1993). This was further supported by Clarke, Xu and Zou, 
(2006) in that, indivisibilities in the financial markets will not reduce inequalities. The 
initial distribution of wealth has a role to play in the long run for the convergence of 
incomes of the rich and the poor households (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is no causal relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation selected developing countries.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (2014) argue that it is inadequate for any research to only establish 
the correlations between variables; effective policy studies should examine the causal 
relationships. In this regard, the study seeks to examine the causal links between 
financial intermediation and poverty. According to Lucas (1988) the financial system 
develops as the need for the financial products grows. Rajan and Zingales (2014) 
argued that healthy and competitive financial markets are particularly an effective 
instrument in distributing opportunities and fighting poverty. Financial intermediation is 
conducive for poverty reduction but the instability that is accompanied by deep 
financial markets is detrimental to the poor (Akhter and Daly, 2009). Financial 
instability affects the poor more than the rich in that for any distortion in the financial 
markets, the poor lack the ability for asset diversification and reinvest their savings in 
foreign banks (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011). In addition, instability in the financial 
sector distorts the prices of goods and services and the poor are most affected by the 
price distortions (Easterly and Fischer; 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Above all, in 
financially fragile periods banks ration small loans as they have higher transactional 
cost and are less profitable for the bank and the poor are affected more by this credit 
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Rajan and Zingales, 
2014). 
 
Available literature on the role of finance in poverty (see for example Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 2009; Donou-Adonsou and Sylwester, 2016; Rewilak, 2017) that all focus 
on the association of finance and poverty and none of these focused on the causal 
links. Although Odhiambo (2009) and Perez-Moreno (2011) argued on the causal links 
both studies did not consider the other dimensions of finance such as access and 




of access to financial services contributes to persistent inequalities in developing 
countries. Financial intermediaries can have a dual effect on poverty in economies 
with underdeveloped financial markets (Loayza and Rancière, 2006). For example in 
financially fragile economies which are prone to financial instabilities poverty level can 
be worsened by financial intermediation expansion and the services offered during this 
expansion (Loayza and Rancière, 2006; Uddin, Shahbaz, Arouri, and Teulon, 2014, 
Allen et al., 2016). Poor monitoring and reckless lending by financial intermediaries 
during periods of expansive real sector can result in worsening of poverty incidences 
as the lending ability of financial intermediaries to profitable projects is compromised 
(Dehejia and Gatti, 2005).  
  
In separate studies, Odhiambo (2009; 2010) observed the causal links between 
finance and poverty in Zambia and Kenya respectively. Furthermore, Ho and 
Odhiambo (2011) observed a bidirectional causal link between financial intermediation 
and poverty in China. This was different to the finding of Perez-Moreno (2011) who 
found a unidirectional causal link between financial intermediation and poverty and the 
reverse did not hold for a study of thirty-five developing countries. The study found 
that finance causes poverty in certain periods of the study, commenting that other 
factors such as political and social factors affected the causal links (Perez-Moreno, 
2011). Using different proxies for financial intermediation such as broad money supply 
(M2), domestic credit to the private sector and, Khan, Ahmad and Jan (2012) observed 
that the results were sensitive to the proxy used for financial intermediation.  This view 
is similar to that of Odhiambo (2009) who argued that the results of finance poverty 
nexus are sensitive to the selected proxies. 
 
The direction of causality between financial intermediation and poverty is crucial for 
policy as the financial sector is regarded as the epitome in the distribution of the 
economic resources. In a discussion where the finance-poverty nexus is not direct but 
the one working through economic growth, Levine (1997) argued that the financial 
sector is a predictor of future economic growth. The economy follows the growth of the 
financial sector, and the financial sector distributes the benefits of growth in the 
economy benefiting the poor (Levine, 1997). However, this argument on the indirect 
role of financial intermediation in poverty reduction via economic growth is not the main 




financial intermediation and poverty. To the best of this researchers’ knowledge, all 
the studies that are available that examine the direct link of finance and poverty 
incorporating all the four dimensions of finance (depth, access, efficiency and 
instability) (Rother, 1999; Rewilak, 2017), none has examined the causality effect 
between financial intermediation and poverty. The examination of the causal 
relationship between financial intermediation and the other financial dimensions is the 
contribution of this study to the literature on finance and poverty. That is the gap in 
literature that the present study seeks to fill.  
 
4.2 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has stated and also discussed the three main hypotheses for the present 
study namely that, (i) Poverty is a function of financial intermediation and the selected 
control variable of the study. (ii) Cointegrating and short run relationships exist 
between poverty and financial intermediation and the control variable of the study. (iii) 
There is no causal link between poverty and financial intermediation. Thus besides 
seeking to provide the deterministic relationship between financial intermediation and 
poverty, this study also examines the cointegration and the short run relationships. 
Further, the causal links between the variables under study are ascertained. The 
concepts discussed in these hypotheses provide a link between the literature reviewed 











The previous chapters have delineated the hypotheses and review of literature of the 
study. This chapter aims to flesh out the methodology of the study. As illustrated in the 
reviewed literature, different methodologies yield different results on the relationship 
between poverty and financial intermediation. Moreover, given the numerous 
methodological approaches used in previous studies in determining the relationship 
between finance and poverty, this chapter reports on the identification and an 
explanation of the methodology most suited for this study. For that reason, this chapter 
benefits from methods that have previously been used in other studies and develops 
a suitable methodology for this study. As discussed below, the elected methodological 
approach of this study is quantitative and therefore benefits from using numerical and 
statistical data to decipher meanings and nuances. 
 
5.1 Research design and paradigms 
 
The study will follow a quantitative approach by analysing existing numerical data on 
poverty and financial intermediation to address the research objectives (see Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). A quantitative approach is adopted in order to “establish, 
confirm, or validate relationships and to develop generalizations that contribute to 
theory” (Leedy and Ormrod: 2001:102). Descriptive statistics and panel data 
methodologies (for example GMM, FE, RE and the Pooled Mean Group) are used to 
determine the relationship between the poverty and financial intermediation including 
the selected control variables for the study. Furthermore the cointegration and causal 
links are examined by using the panel ARDL and the panel error correction model. 
The ARDL and ECM are used to examine the long run relationships amongst the 
selected variables and to analyse if any changes in financial intermediation explains 
poverty levels in the sample of the study and vice versa. In support of the quantitative 
nature of the study the positivist and deductive research paradigms are adopted (see 





The research design links the research problem and objectives discussed in chapter 
1 to the relevant (and attainable) empirical component of this study. This concurs with 
the assertion of Yin (2002: 21) that research design is a logical sequence linking the 
empirical data to a study’s initial objectives and its ultimate conclusion. The methods 
and techniques for collecting and analysing data on determining the relationship 
between poverty and financial intermediation are outlined in the research design. 
Alternatively, research design enunciates the type of data needed, the methods used 
to analyse the collected data, and how the data and the methods answers the research 
problem (Philliber, Schwab, and Sloss, 1980; Saunders et al., 2012). Subsections 5.1 
to 5.9 provide a framework for data collection and the statistical analysis that 
addresses the stated objectives in chapter 1. Furthermore this research outlines the 
ethical issues and the limitations that are encountered in the whole research process 
as described by Saunders et al. (2012). According to Kuhn (1962) and Creswell (2014) 
‘research paradigm’ represents a certain worldview that constitutes the researcher’s 
beliefs, values and methodological assumptions. This worldview is the perception, 
logical thinking or a set of common beliefs that enlightens the significance or analysis 
of research data (Lather, 1986; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006).  
 
Positivism was defined by Krauss (2005) as capturing information by quantifying a 
phenomenon where statistics and mathematical procedures are used to predict, 
describe and explain a pattern. The collected data in the sample of the study is 
analysed using the Stata 15 and Eviews 9 statistical packages to determine and 
examine the relationship between poverty and the explanatory variables of the study 
as describes in subsection 5.5. In positivism, the theory discussed in chapter 2 is used 
to draw hypotheses (discussed in chapter 4) and deductions during the research 
process and the researcher is independent of human interest within the study (see 
Carson, Gilmore, Perry and Gronhaug, 2001; Ramanathan, 2008; Crowther and 
Lancaster, 2012). Positivism incorporates a scientific technique of investigation where 
observations are interpreted using facts or measurable entities (Kaboub, 2008). 
Alternatively in positivism the postulated theory is tested using empirical data (see 
Bhattacherjee 2012: 35).  
 
The secondary data collected is unambiguously analysed for the determinants of 




Furthermore the cause and effect relationship of poverty and financial intermediation 
is proposed with provisions of making predictions using measurable outcomes as the 
construct of positivism is adopted (see Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000; Kaboub, 
2008). Cohen et al. (2000) suggested a set of foundational assumptions used in 
positivism construct namely: determinism, empiricism, parsimony and generality. 
 
Determinism assumes that the events we observe are caused by other factors of which 
these causal links can be uncovered and understood (Cohen et al., 2000: 10). 
Incorporating the determinism, the study seeks to determine if there is any relationship 
between poverty and the explanatory variables selected. Using empiricism Cohen et 
al. (2000: 10) and Creswell (2014) argued that research problem is investigated by 
collecting verifiable empirical data to support the chosen theoretical framework which 
enables the researcher to test the developed hypothesis for the study. On the other 
hand parsimony orates that phenomena must be explained in the best economical 
technique possible (Cohen, 2000: 10).  
 
In this regard an appropriate methodology for the collected quantitative data from 
verifiable sources is chosen to answer the research objectives for the study. Lastly, 
generality argues that the study can be applicable elsewhere in the world (Cohen, 
2000: 10). In support of the explained positivism paradigm assumptions, an empirical 
analysis for the study uses secondary data as it is financially economical. Furthermore 
the use of credible data sources for data collection means that the study can be 
replicated elsewhere. As will be explained in the methodologies used for this study the 
determinism is addressed as the study seeks to examine and determine the 
relationship and the causal effects between financian intermediation and poverty.  
 
In conjunction with the positivist paradigm a deductive paradigm is also incorporated 
in the study. According to Krauss (2005) a deductive approach is when data is used 
to test theory of which Saunders et al. (2012) opines that data is used to test the 
developed conceptual framework in a deductive approach. Additionally Wilson (2014: 
119) argued that in the deductive approach hypothesis is developed using the existing 
theory. The hypotheses discussed in chapter 4 were developed using the theory 
discussed in chapter 2. Furthermore this chapter develops a research strategy to test 




and McCartan (2016) agreed that a deductive approach is adopted where pre‐existing 
theoretical philosophies are tested. Figure 5.1 illustrates the deductive approach in a 
research process.  
 
Figure 5.1: The summary of a deductive research process 
 
Source: Gray, 2013 
 
Figure 5.1 is a summary of the deductive research process which was adopted for this 
study as the study started by reviewing the existing literature. We further developed 
hypotheses as our propositions in based on the reviewed literature in which measures 
of poverty, financial intermediation and the control variables of the study. 
Bhattacherjee (2012) and Wilson, (2014) opines that these propositions are empirically 
formulated hypothesis indicating the cause-effect relationships between variables of 
the study The study then select a sample from developing countries in Africa and Asia 
where random selection was done using data availability as the benchmark for 
selection of countries in the study. Data is then collected and analysed where the data 
can either validate or refute the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The performed 




inferences as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The inferences either confirm or reject the 
theories and concepts which were discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
5.2 Data  
 
Secondary data which is defined as the data that already exist (Andrews, Higgins, 
Andrews and Lalor, 2012) is used for this study. The study uses the secondary data 
due to the financial constraints as the collection of such data is cheap and economical 
(see Corti and Thompson, 2006; Saunders et al., 2012). For the purpose of this study 
annual panel data is employed. The data is collected from World Bank and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The study focuses on the selected 
developing countries in Africa and Asia mainly on data availability for the selected 
countries. Hence panel study is employed and it is comprised of time dimension (T) 
and the cross section dimension (N) (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003). In panel data a 
variable y
it
 is observed for cross section units i = 1…… N and the time periods t = 
1….…T. The type of the panel that the study utilised is a balanced panel in that each 
panel contains the same number of observations and contains the same time points 
(Arellano and Bond, 1988). The data used is annual data from 2004 to 2016. The time 
dimension was specifically chosen based on the data availability mainly on the 
dimensions of financial intermediation such as access. Prior periods do not have 
consistent data on the financial intermediation dimension. As highlighted in the 
literature review, financial intermediation has poverty reducing effects through the 
functions of financial intermediaries in which the poor people have access to these 
function (Claessens and Perroti, 2007).  
 
5.3 Population and Sampling 
 
According to Burns and Grove (2003:234); Zikmund and Babin (1997:471), the 
population encompasses all the fundamentals that can be included in the research 
project. In this study, financial sector will be the population for the study in which the 
banking sector is selected as the sample to represent financial intermediaries. The 
study focuses on the banking sector for the sample of the study as stock markets in 




2015; Svirydzenka, 2016). Efforts were made to collect data on the stock market and 
the bond market but very few countries have active stock market and publicly available 
data. 
 
Bank loans are the prime source of external finance in most countries (see Gorton and 
Winton, 2003; Gries et al., 2009). This assertion has guided the selection of banks as 
a representative sample for financial intermediaries. Additionally, stock market is not 
really active in some of the developing countries. Hence the data on the stock market 
for the panel of countries is not available. From a population of fifty-four African 
countries and forty-eight Asian countries, a sample is drawn from these countries 
based on the availability of data. The list of the countries included in the study is 
provided in the appendix. That is the sample is chosen from countries that have better 
data sources available for the time dimension proposed for this study.  
 
5.4 Data Sources 
 
Poverty data- poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap and the gross domestic product 
per capita were obtained from the World Bank whilst the Gini index was obtained from 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Financial intermediation 
data- the ratio of private credit to gross domestic product was used as a proxy for 
financial intermediation and the data was obtained from the World Bank database. 
Financial access- data was obtained from the Financial Access Survey (FAS) of the 
IMF. Financial Stability- The study used the bank Z-score to measure financial stability 
and the data was obtained from the Global Financial Development database (GFDD) 
of the World Bank. The World Bank database was used to extract inflation data.  
 
Institutional quality data- Three indicators from the ICRG group were used for  
measuring institutional quality namely, (i) law and order- From the ICRG this measure 
combine two components that is law and order where law element reveals the power 
and independence of the legal system whilst the order component assesses the 
popular observance of the law, (ii) democratic accountability- measure the 
responsiveness of governments to the people and (iii) bureaucratic quality- which 
embodies independence from political influence, power and the know-how to govern 




established procedures for recruitment and training. Remittances- Remittances inflow 
as a percentage of gross domestic product and the data was obtained from obtained 
from the World Bank. Domestic public debt- the central government claims as a 
percentage of GDP the data was obtained from the IMF. The missing data was treated 
by using three year moving averages.  
 
5.4.1 Data reliability and validity 
 
Credible and reputable data sources as stated in the data sources section and a 
reputable software (i.e. Stata and / Eviews) are used for the study for an accurate 
analysis on the relationships within the data (see Leedy and Ormrod, 2014:103). The 
study uses publicly available data and this has an advantage that the study can be 
easily replicated and data verified for accuracy thereby ensuring the reliability and the 
validity of the data. 
 
5.5 Definition of variables  
 
The following sub-sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.6 highlights the definitions of key variables 
used in this study.  
 
5.5.1 Poverty  
 
The World Bank Report (2000) defined poverty as the unacceptable physiological and 
social deprivation in human wellbeing. Several indicators have been developed to 
measure poverty (see Drewnowski, 1977). In absolute terms poverty is measured as 
the percentage of the population that is below the poverty line (see Sen, 1982) and 
the World Bank (2000) referred this to as the poverty headcount ratio. According to 
the World Bank (2000) headcount ratio is defined as the share of the population with 
income below the national poverty line. This is the definition that has been accepted 
in the SDGs and it will be adopted for the purpose of this study. The headcount ratio 
is used as a proxy for poverty as it has been used in other studies (see Inoue, 2018). 
For robustness other poverty measures such as the poverty gap, Gini coefficient and 





A higher headcount ratio indicates higher poverty level in a country at any given time 
(Inoue, 2018). Furthermore in absolute terms poverty is measured as the cumulative 
deficit of income of all the poor from the specified poverty-line and this is known as the 
poverty gap (Drewnowski, 1977). Alternatively poverty is measured as the inequality 
in the distribution of income (see Sen, 1986) and this is explained under the section 
5.5.9 under inequality. Drewnowski (1977) argued that among the many definitions of 
poverty the acceptable definition that matters is the one that has been defined by to 
influence policy. The World Bank (2000) reiterated that poverty lines are anchored to 
the cost of a food bundle based on the predominant general diet of the poor. The World 
Bank definition of poverty will be adopted for this study as it is the general definition 
that is adopted for policy making and the SDGs has adopted the World Bank definition 
of poverty (see Odhiambo, 2009; Beck, 2007).  
 
5.5.2 Financial intermediation  
 
OECD (2007) defined financial intermediation as a productive activity in which an 
institutional unit acquires financial assets by engaging in financial transactions on the 
market and incurs liabilities on its own account. In this study the ratio of private credit 
to GDP is used as a proxy for financial intermediation (see Rother, 1999; Jeanneney 
and Kpodar, 2011; Perez-Moreno, 2011; Beck, et al., 2014a; Zhang and Naceur, 
2018). This is a better measure to show how the private agents in the economy have 
access to financial intermediation or access to loans (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). According to Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck (2000) this is the closest measure of financial intermediation in 
relation to functions of financial intermediaries as highlighted in the literature review. 
The private credit has been a preferable proxy to financial intermediation as it excludes 
credits by banks and loans to the government and public enterprises (see Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2004). There are limitations however on the measure 
of financial intermediation as there is no direct measure for intermediation neither on 
the quality of the services provided by these intermediaries (see Rother, 1999). A 
negative relationship between financial intermediation and poverty is expected as 
more credit and savings vehicles are available to the poor it is expected to reduce the 




the study are financial access, financial instability and financial efficiency, these are 
discussed in sub sections 5.5.3, 5.5.4 and 5.5.5 below.  
 
5.5.3 Financial access  
 
Claessens (2006) defined access to finance as the availability of a supply of quality 
financial services at reasonable cost. For the purpose of this study access is measured 
in terms of access to formal financial institutions specifically banks. The access to 
financial intermediation illustrates the degree to which households and firms have and 
use of formal financial services and products (Levine, Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Feyen, 2012). The access in terms of specific financial products offered by the 
financial sector in this study is not considered as the data in this respect is not easily 
available. Rather, the access that is considered is the access to the banking services 
as there is considerable data available in this measure. Access is measured by 
automated teller machines (ATMs) per 1,000 km
2
 and branches of commercial banks 
per 1,000 km
2
 (see Levine et al., 2012; Rewilak, 2017). Prina (2015) found that the 
proximity of a bank branch to the poor people improves trust hereby improving the 
take up and usage of formal financial service by the poor households. There are very 
few studies that look at the impact of access to finance on poverty mainly due to 
unavailability of data. Svirydzenka (2016) argued the ineffectiveness of large financial 
systems without enhanced access to a sufficiently large percentage of the populace 
and firms. 
 
Access of the financial services in this case involves those who have access and use 
the financial services and those who have access and do not use the financial services 
(voluntary exclusion). According to the CGAP (2006) policy makers and the managers 
of financial institutions do not believe that the poor people save money. Access to 
financial services has a positive effect on the lives of the poor as access to the financial 
services and products allows the poor to save, smooth consumption and manage their 
risks (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, and Ruthven 2010; 
Kendall, Ponce and Mylenko 2010). Access is more on the supply side of the financial 
services whilst the use of the financial services is a demand concept (Claessens, 




poor is on those who want to use the financial services but do not have access to 
financial services (involuntary exclusion). Due to moral hazard and adverse selection 
banks may adjust prices (interest rates) and their willingness to provide credit to 
certain individuals (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) resulting in involuntary exclusions of 
certain individuals in accessing and using formal financial products (Claessens, 2006).  
 
5.5.4 Financial efficiency  
 
Financial efficiency is defined as how well financial intermediaries facilitates financial 
transactions at the lowest cost possible (Čihák, Demirgüč-Kunt, Feyen and Levine, 
2013; Naceur et al., 2017; Rewilak, 2017). The interest rate spread is used as the 
measure of efficiency of financial intermediation (see Rother, 1999; Beck, 2007). The 
expected profit margins determine the decision to provide broader intermediation. The 
efficiency of financial intermediation is expected to be negatively related with poverty 
levels. As the financial efficiency broaden the availability of financial product and 
services to the poor, more people will have access to finance reducing the level of 
poverty among poor households.  
 
According to Rewilak (2017) financial efficiency captures the cost of intermediation. 
Prokopenko and Holden (2001) suggested that higher interest spread usually indicates 
the exclusion of the poor household from the financial system due to the 
intermediaries’ inadequacy to reduce information asymmetries’ (Beck et al., 2007). 
The credit constraints as a result of information asymmetries reduce the efficient 
allocation of capital by financial intermediaries worsening poverty incidences (Aghion 
and Bolton, 1997; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004). Improvements in 
the efficiency of financial intermediaries reduce poverty hence the relationship 
between efficiency and poverty is expected to negative. Similar to access the data that 
is available for financial efficiency is more bank specific than other financial markets 
for the panel of our study.  
 





According to the World Bank (2005), financial stability is the absence of system-wide 
incidents where the financial system fails to function adequately (crises). It explains 
the resilience of key financial institutions and the financial markets in which they 
operate. In the event that the financial institutions fails to operate within the financial 
system in which they operate financial instability is experienced. The credit channel 
that explains the positive effect of financial intermediation in poverty can be reversed 
if too much credit is extended resulting in bank fragility (Loayza and Rancière, 2006). 
Bernanke (1983) argued that banking crises disrupts the process of financial 
intermediation.  
 
Fragility in the financial system increases the likelihood of credit rationing as banks 
are unwilling to issue new loans (Andrianova, Baltagi, Demetriades and Fielding 
(2015). Rewilak (2017) argued that the instability of the financial system increases 
poverty incidences as it inhibits the banks’ ability to offer credit during the periods of 
fragility. The fragility of the financial sector hurts the poor and small businesses most 
than the middle and the upper income households (Levine et al., 2012). The bank z-
score is used in this study as a measure of financial stability. It is a measure of distance 
to default, comparing bank buffers (capitalization and returns) with probable risk 
(volatility of returns). Higher z-score, represents a more financially sound financial 
system in a country. Instability in the banking sector is usually an unintended effect of 
increased intermediation (Akhter and Daly, 2009).  
 
5.5.6 Gross domestic product per capita (GDPC) 
 
For this study the real gross domestic product per capita is used as a measure of 
growth and it is given by real GDP (y)/total population (N) (see Odhiambo, 2009). 
There are limitations in the gross domestic product per capita as a measure of poverty 
since it does not include other poverty dimensions (see Odhiambo, 2009). However 
the measure is adopted in this study for robustness. In Dollar and Kraay (2002) and 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), the gross domestic product per capita is used as a 
measure of poverty. Other variables such as financial instability affect the 
effectiveness of the role of finance in poverty reduction in this case the level of the 




have been highlighted for using gross domestic product per capita as a measure of 
poverty in that  
 
• the accounting of in GDPC includes both bad and good meaning any increase 
in the gross domestic product per capita irrespective of addressing calamities 
in the economy is regarded as an increase in gross domestic product but it does 
not necessarily mean the quality of life has improved (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 
2009; World Bank, 2017).  
• Omission of goods that are produced on the parallel market to the official 
market. This error for developing countries can be significant as most goods 
and services are traded on the unofficial market (see Kuznets, 1962; Ivković, 
2016).  
• It does not include the nature of the distribution of the goods and services. The 
gross domestic product of an economy can be high irrespective of how it is 
distributed to the citizen of the respective countries. These weaknesses in 
GDPC as a measure of economic wellbeing (hence a proxy for poverty) 
requires an alternative measure of poverty such as the Gini which show the 
distribution on income in an economy and this has already been discussed 
under inequality as an alternative measure for poverty.  
 
To overcome these limitations of the gross domestic product per capita as a measure 
of poverty it was not the only poverty measure that this study has adopted. The other 
measures of poverty included in this study for the robustness on the analysis include 
headcount ratio, poverty gap and the income inequality. In most economies despite 
steady gross domestic product per capita disparities in income inequalities are 
increasing hence alternative measures that capture the income inequalities such as 
the gini index are adopted.  
 
 
5.5.7 Inflation  
 
Inflation is defined as the general increase in the price level usually expressed as an 




is used as a measure of inflation. The inflation in the economy can result in monetary 
instability which is more detrimental to the poor than the rich (see Dollar and Kraay, 
2002; Easterly and Fischer, 2001; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011, Beck et al., 2004, 
Inoue, 2018). According to Akhter and Daly (2009) inflation increases uncertainty and 
it compromises the sustainability of poor households. Most poor people in the 
developing countries tend to hold their income in cash which is easily affected by high 
level of inflations (Prokopenko and Holden, 2001). With better access to financial 
intermediary services such as risk management household can hedge against inflation 
in period of economic shocks without altering their consumption income (Clarke et al., 
2003). As has been argued by Dehejia and Gatti (2005), with better access to financial 
services there is a decrease in child labour which is a determinant of poverty in most 
developing countries. Children from poor families engage in child labour than being in 
school (Dehejia and Gatti, 2005). In this study the expectation in of a positive 
relationship between poverty and inflation.  
 
5.5.8 Institutional quality  
 
Institutions are defined as humanly formulated controls that natures the interaction 
between people (North, 1990). According to the World Bank (2016) the quality of 
institutions has an effect on the poverty reduction either directly or indirectly via 
economic growth as it has an effect on the income growth of the poor. Thus institutions 
imposes limitations of the executive powers which can either be formal informal, 
political or economic (North, 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson , 2013) Furthermore, 
Easterly (2013) argued that effective public service is a core element of the quality of 
institutions as legal and political rights without good public services is inadequate 
especially for developing countries. Resource mobilisation ability of financial 
intermediaries without quality institutions is inadequate for effective financial 
intermediation (World Bank, 1997; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi, 2003; World Bank, 2005) This supported the earlier assertion by Knack 
and Anderson (1999) that higher values of the index is strongly linked with income 





Cepparulo et al. (2017) argued conflicting results on the role of institutional quality in 
poverty reduction. In the study it was argued that pro poor finance had no role in 
countries where institutions work better whilst in countries with weaker institutions 
finance has more impact on reducing poverty (Cepparulo et al., 2017). For the purpose 
of this study the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) variables such corruption, 
law and order, and bureaucracy quality’ are used as a measurement of institutional 
quality. The principal components analysis (PCA) is used to develop an index for 
institutional quality using corruption, law and order and bureaucracy quality. The 
quality of institution fosters the quality and the depth of financial systems (Cull and 
Effron, 2008; Park and Mercado, 2015; Allen et al., 2016). Weak institutional settings 
hurt the poor more than the privileged (Rajan and Zingales (2003). Lipton and 
Ravallion (1995), argued that the quality institutions are a prerequisite for an effective 
allocation of financial resources by financial intermediaries 
 
5.5.9 Inequality  
 
The inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient (see Deininger and Squire, 1996; 
Lundberg and Squire, 2000). Sen (1986) opines that poverty index should be based 
on an income distribution. The World Bank (2018) asserted that income inequality has 
significant effects to a nation's aptitude to poverty reduction. Kuznets (1955) argued 
that the distribution of income shows how the economic wealth has been shared 
between the rich and the poor. This was supported by Dewilde (2008) with the 
affirmation that poverty is not only measured in income terms but also on the 
distribution of the income. For robustness on the measures of poverty in this study the 
inequality (Gini index) also is also used as a poverty measure in this case it is also a 
dependent variables in the study. The terms Gini index and Gini coefficient are used 
interchangeably. The expected relationship between inequality and financial 
intermediation is uncertain it is proposed to be either positive or negative. This is so 
because improvements in financial intermediation in terms of credit, savings and risk 
management can have a threshold effect (Zhang and Chen, 2015). The effect of the 
financial intermediation can contribute to highly unequal societies in the early phases 




increases with a decrease in inequality (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Beck et al., 
2007; Zhang and Chen, 2015).  
 
The stage of economic development determines the poverty reducing effect of 
financial intermediation (Claessens and Perroti, 2007). It was argued that with initial 
phases of financial expansion only the rich have access to financial services which in 
later stages of development financial services and products are also made available 
to the greater population including the poor (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; 
Claessens and Perroti, 2007; Burgess and Pande, 2005). However, Hamori and 
Hashiguchi (2012) found that deep financial market reduces income inequalities as 
the poor people are able to access financial services for consumption smoothing, 
capital accumulation and risk management. Furthermore it an inverse relationship 
between financial access and inequlity is asserted (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) 
 
As the banks expand their geographical presence to previously unserved areas 
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is reduced (Mookerjee and 
Kalipioni, 2010) Theoretical considerations suggests that the sectorial structure of the 
economy plays a role in determining the effect of financial intermediation on income 
inequality (as in Kuznets, 1955; Clarke et al., 2003). According to Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor (2010) argued that greater inequality is related with higher poverty in 
incidences in most developing countries. As economies grows their financial 
intermediaries inequality decreases as explained theoretically by (Galor and Zeira 
1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993) that financial imperfection perpetuate the unequal 
distribution of income. The Gini index has been adopted as the measure of inequality 
as it is the most widely available measure (see Solt, 2016).  
 
5.5.10 Remittances  
 
Remittances have the capacity to transfer the purchasing power among households 
reducing poverty, smoothing consumption and generally having a multiplier effect 
through increased spending by households (Ratha, 2003; Inoue, 2018). They are 
private transfer of money that are transmitted to households by migrant workers 




Inoue, 2018). Inoue (2018) argued that remittance inflows in most developing 
countries are an important financial source for ameliorating poverty conditions. 
Remittances in this study are the remittances received and are measured as a share 
of gross domestic product (see Ratha, 2003; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010). 
According to the FinMark Trust (2018) in developing countries, remittances are one of 
the significant products used by the poor for supporting the welfare of family members. 
Very few studies have used remittances as a control variable in finance and poverty 
studies. This study, among other predictors, incorporates international remittances 
which are money send to country of origin by migrant workers (Ratha, 2003; Ratha, 
Eigen-Zucchi and Plaza, 2016). Together with savings, remittances allows for 
consumption smoothing by poor households.  
 
The World Bank (2018) asserted that remittances are the second largest fund inflow 
to developing countries after foreign direct investment competing with foreign aid. 
International remittances tends to be positively related with income inequality as the 
international remittances are either inadequate or they disproportionately goes to 
those that are better off (Rodriguez, 1998; Ratha, 2003). Other studies argues that 
remittances reduce poverty and income inequality in that it improves the welfare of the 
households receiving the remittances as they can smooth consumption and invest in 
human capita such as paying for their children’s education(Viet 2008; Gupta, et al., 
2009; Olowa and Shittu, 2012; Azam et al., 2016). Inoue (2018) suggested that 
remittances have both substitution and complementary effect to financial 
intermediation as they act as an important source of finance for development. 
Financial intermediaries play a crucial role in remittance transfers or via the savings 
and risk management initiatives of the received remittance income (Terry and Wilson, 
2005; Gupta et al., 2009; Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Peria, 2011). The effect of 
remittances on poverty incidences is ambiguous hence they can either have positive 
or negative impact on poverty. 
 
 





According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2018) increasing sovereign debt 
and the failure to service the indebtedness in developing countries is increasing the 
poverty level. Domestic public debt is government debt incurred internally through 
borrowing in the local currency from  a country’s residents (Christenes, 2005; Kumhof 
and Tanner, 2005) posits that underdeveloped financial market and institutional 
imperfections where contract enforcement is weak, government debt is key for the 
financial intermediation process Under such economies the financial intermediaries 
holds more government debt compared to private debt as the weak institutional quality 
increases the risks of holding private debts (Christenes, 2005;   Kumhof and Tanner, 
2005). Beck and Honohan (2007) and Andrianova et al. (2015) argued that in most 
developing countries bank credit to government exceeds bank credit to the private 
sector. However, central government participation in the credit market can result in an 
increase in interest rate (cost of borrowing) resulting in crowding out of private 
investments (Andrianova, et al., 2015).  
 
The level of public debt result in crowding out of private investments as lenders can 
ration credit and reduce the available funds for investment the private sector (Bua, et 
al., 2014). Alternatively the interest payments of sovereign debt crowds out the social 
welfare programs by which in turn contributes to poverty reduction (Akram, 2016). 
According to Dollar and Kraay (2002) fiscal discipline affects a nation’s poverty rate. 
Domestic debt displaces the private investments as the crowding out effect results in 
the purchase of public debt at the expense of productive investments by the private 
sector (Broner et al., 2014; Bua et al., 2015). Literature on the role of government debt 
in reducing poverty levels is very scarce. This has been included in this study as it is 
considered instrumental in terms of the credit available for investment by the private 
sector in most developing countries (Kumhof and Tanner. 2005, Andrianova et al., 
2015).  
 
Imperfect financial markets and poor institutional framework in most developing 
countries results in banks holding more sovereign debts to private credit (Reinhart, et 
al., 2012). Despite the relevance of public debt in the financial intermediation process, 
the public debt ultimate effect in poverty reduction is not empirically documented. This 
study therefore seeks to fill this gap by empirically documenting the link between public 




intermediation process is to the link surplus and the deficit units through savings 
mobilisation and credit extension. If the government participation in the credit market 





5.5.12 Summary of variable description and expected signs 






The share of the 
population living on less 
than $1.90 a day at 2011 
international prices 
Beck et al., 2007; Akhter and Daly, 2009 
Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Seven 
and Coskun, 2016; Cepparulo et al., 
2017 
N/A 
 Poverty gap Mean shortfall from the 
poverty line of $1.90 per 
day measured as a share 
of the poverty line 
Beck et al., 2007; Jeanneney and 
Kpodar, 2011; Cepparulo et al., 2017 
N/A 
 Gini index/ 
coefficient 
Income inequality  Li, Squire and Zou, 1997; Honohan. 
2004; Page, 2006; Claesssens and 
Perotti, 2007; Mookerjee and Kalipioni 
(2010); Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012); 
Zhang and  Chen, 2015; Seven and 
Coskun, 2016, Jeon and Kabukcuoglu, 
2018 
N/A 
 GDPC Gross Domestic Product 
per capita in constant 
term with 2011 PPP 
Dehejia and Gatti, 2002; Akhter and 
Daly, 2009; Seven and Coskun, 2016; 









PCredit/GDP The ratio credit to the 
private sector  
Dehejia and Gatti, 2002; Beck,et al 
,2007; Akhter and Daly, 2009  Jeanneney 
and Kpodar, 2011; Samargandi et al., 




FA automated teller 
machines (ATMs) per 
1,000 km
2
 and Branches 




Kendall, Ponce and Mylenko, 2010; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; 
Adenuga and Omotosho, 2013; Inoue 




FE Interest spread (Lending 
rate –deposit rate  
Levine et al., 2012; Rewilak, 2017 +/- 
Financial 
stability  
FS Ratio of impaired loans to 
gross loans 
Loayza and Rancière, 2006; Naceur and 
Zhang, 2016; Akhter and Daly, 2009 ; 
Levine et al., 2012; Rewilak, 2017 
- 
Inflation  CPI General increase in 
prices  
Cepparulo et al., 2017; Rewilak, 2017 + 
Institutional 
quality  
INS An index from ICRG 





Cull and Effron, 2008; Law et al.,; 2013; 
Park and Mercado, 2015; Allen et al., 





Remittances  REM Remittances received as 
percentage of gross 
domestic product 
Gupta et al., 2009; Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor, 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011  
Ratha et al., 2016; Azam et al., 2016 
Inoue, 2018 
+/- 
Public debt  DPD Central government 
domestic debt as a 
percentage of gross 
domestic product  
Christensen, 2005; Bua, et al., 2014; 
Andrianova et al.  
+ 




5.6 Data analysis plan  
 
A number of econometric methodologies are used for data analysis in this study 
namely the ordinary least squares, general method of moments (GMM), fixed and 
random effects, panel autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL), the error correction 
model (ECM). The estimation results from the panel ARDL and the ECM are used to 
infer the cointegrating/ long run and causal relationship between the variables. These 
methodologies are applied to panel data to address the objectives of the study. The 
theories discussed in this study links the role of financial intermediation in reducing 
poverty. Each of the methodologies will be discussed in sections 5.8.1, 5.8.2 and 5.8.3.  
 
The methodologies will be employed using panel data analysis to determine the 
relationship, cointegration and causal links between poverty and selected financial 
determinants. In arguing the advantage of using panel data Baltagi (1995; 2008) 
opines that, panel data assumes heterogeneity which is not the case with either time 
series (T) or in cross sectional studies (N). If heterogeneity is disregarded that is the 
non-controlling of the individual country specific variables, the misspecification of a 
model occurs (Baltagi, 2008). Using the panel ARDL for cointegration we employed 
the procedures of pooled mean group, mean group and the dynamic fixed effects as 
suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1997, 1999). These techniques are used for 
estimating non-stationary dynamic panels where parameters are assumed to be 
heterogeneous across groups. To determine the best estimator between the 
techniques we employed the Hausman test.  
 
Panel data improves the efficiency of the econometric estimates in that it gives the 
researcher a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and 
reducing the multicollinearity among the variables of the study (Fujiki, Hsiao, and Shen 
2002; Hsiao, Mountain, and Illman 1995; Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2014). The increase in 
the degrees of freedom allows for the reduction of the gap between the information 
requirements of a model and the information provided by the data (Intriligator, Bodkin, 
and Hsiao, 1996; Hsiao, 2003). Another advantage of panel data is the lessening or 
removal of estimation bias (Intriligator et al., 1996; Hsiao, 2014) as collinearity among 
explanatory variables is reduced in panel datasets. In cross sectional studies the error 




biased coefficient estimates (Intriligator et al., 1996, Baltagi, 2008). Conversely, in a 
panel framework, the unobserved country-specific effects are controlled thus reducing 
biases in the estimated coefficients (Levine et al., 2000). Additionally panel data allows 
a researcher to analyse a number of vital economic problems using aggregate data 
that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time-series data sets (Baltagi, 2008; 
Hsiao, 2014). Unlike the cross section studies which would control only for the 
endogeneity of financial intermediation, panel estimation would allow for the control of 
endogeneity in all the variables of the study. Moreover considering the cross-country 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty, we would like to estimate 
how financial intermediation within a country over time may have an effect on the 
country’s poverty levels. 
 
5.7 Unit root testing  
 
Non-stationarity of the data is the main challenge with time series data (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1981). The data in time series studies must be stationary and satisfies the 
statistical property time independent in the data (see Box, Jenkins, Reinsel, and Ljung, 
2016:24). As much as the time series properties of the variables are of interest to the 
researcher the statistical properties of time-series estimators are essentially 
contingent to stationary or nonstationary data (Banerjee, 1999; Hsiao, 2014). Hence it 
is essential to determine the order of integration of the variables prior to estimating 
using cointegration techniques. The test is performed to ensure that the data do not 
have higher order integration beyond first order integration I(1) (Pesaran and Smith, 
1995; Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran et al., 1999). The ARDL bounds test is centred on the 
assumption that the variables are I(0) or I(1). Hence the unit root test determines the 
order of integration of the variables. Pesaran et al. (2001) argued that if the variables 
are of a higher order integration it results in spurious regressions as the F-statistic 
cannot be accurately interpreted. 
 
The study employs the panel unit root testing which originates from the times series 
unit root testing. The panel unit root testing differs from the individual time series unit 
roots in that the panel unit root considers the asymptotic behaviour of time series 
dimension (T) and cross section dimension (N) unlike the latter which only considers 




asserted that for any cointegrating relationship to exist the series must be non-
stationary. Hence the panel unit root tests are performed for diagnostic test to establish 
the stationarity of the series. The individual unit root tests have no power in panel data 
sets and this is worsened by small samples (Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2014), hence the 
standard unit root tests cannot be applied to this study.  
 
Literature suggests several panel unit root tests and no individual test is singled out 
as the most superior test in panel data sets (see Maddala, and Wu, 1999; Hadri, 2000; 
Choi, 2001; Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003; Bai and Ng, 2004; 
Moon and Perron, 2004; Breitung and Das, 2005; Pesaran, 2007). Most tests 
developed on the panel unit root test were an improvement to the assumption on cross 
section independence (see Pesaran, 2007). First generation panel unit root tests 
assumed cross sectional independence whilst second generation tests rejects the 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence (Hurlin and Mignon, 2007; Pesaran, 
2007; Breitung and Pesaran 2008, Hurlin, 2010). Using the first generation tests in the 
presence of cross section dependence may lead to size distortions and low 
explanatory power of the test (Baltagi, 2008; Breitung and Pesaran, 2008; Hurlin, 
2010).  
 
Due diligence and care on the benefits and drawbacks of the proposed tests is 
performed by comparing the outcomes of different unit root tests on the data set. A 
number of unit root test are performed and these tests incorporates both the first 
generation unit root test and the second generation unit root tests. Levin, Lin and Chu 
test (2002) (LLC test hereafter) the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS hereafter), 
Breitung tests, ADF-Fisher Chi-Square and the PP-Fisher Chi-Square panel unit root 
tests. As compared to the other unit root test the Fisher test can use different lag length 
although it has the disadvantage that the lag lengths are obtained by Monte Carlo 
simulations (Baltagi, 2008). However Maddala and Wu (1999) argued that the Fisher 
test lag selection is applicable to other unit roots.  
5.7.1 Levine, Lin and Chu (LLC) test 
 
Levin et al., (2000) articulated that there is limited power in individual unit root tests 
against the alternative hypotheses and they tend to have persistent deviation from the 




test (2000) hypothesised that each individual series have a unit root against an 
alternative of that each time series is stationary as follows  
 H0 = each time series contains a unit root 
 Ha = each time series is stationary 
The LLC (2000) suggested the use of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 1981) as the initial point of the unit root testing procedure 
(Barnejee, 1999; Levine et al., 2000). It hypothesised that the following model  
 y
it
 =ρ𝑖yi, t-1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖 𝐿 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝐿
𝑝𝑖
𝐿=𝑖 + 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 + εit          m =1, 2, 3   5.1  
with 𝑑𝑚𝑡 indicating the vector of deterministic variables whilst 𝛼𝑚𝑖 are the 
corresponding vector of coefficients for model m = 1, 2, 3, 𝑝𝑖 is the lag order(Levine et 
al., 2000). If ρ𝑖 =0 means the y process has a unit root for individual i, where i= 
1,2,3…..N and t is the time period 1, 2, 3…..T. if ρi < 0 y process is stationary around 
the deterministic part. L is the lag length. The lag order is allowed to vary across 
individuals (Levin et al., 2002; Baltagi, 2008). Auxiliary regressions are run on equation 
5.1 to obtain the error terms which are then standardised. However the test has low 
power in small samples and it assumes cross section independence (Baltagi, 2008; 
Barnejee, 2009). Hence for robustness the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test is also 
applied in this study. 
 
5.7.2 Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test   
 
Im et al (2003) extended the LLC test and allowed for heterogeneity of the roots across 
the units.  The null hypothesis is that the individual follows a unit root process against 
the alternative that allows for some but not all to have a unit root process (see Im et 
al., 2003). The IPS is said to be superior to LLC in small sample sizes (see Im et al., 
2003). As highlighted above for robustness the other panel unit root tests such as the 
ADF-Fisher Chi-Square and the PP-Fisher Chi-Square are performed.  
 
Before the panel ARDL is used the panel unit roots diagnostic test which test for the 
stationarity of the series is applied (see Im, et al., 2003). The panel ARDL is only used 
in level or first integration order data. We used the PMG that combines the long run 




address the relationship between poverty and financial intermediation, correlation 
does not mean causality hence the causality test is performed. Each of the 
methodologies that address the objectives of the study is separately discussed in the 
sections 5.8 – 5.10. 
 
5.8 Econometric model specification 
 
For this study poverty is hypothesised to be a function of financial intermediation and 
the selected independent variables which were selected guided by literature. 
Preliminary descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are performed. For 
determining the relationship between the poverty and the independent variables of the 
study poverty is specified as a linear function. Equation 5.2 outlines the functional form 
of the model for our GMM estimation technique.  
POV = f (FI, FA, IS, FS, INF, INSQ_INDEX, DPD, REM)          5.2  
In equation 5.2 poverty is hypothesised to be a function of financial intermediation (FI), 
financial access (FA), financial efficiency (IS), financial stability (FS), inflation, 
institutional quality (INSQ_INDEX), domestic public debt (DPD), remittances (REM). 
On the objective that seeks to examine the deterministic relationship between poverty 
and financial intermediation the OLS and GMM methods are proposed to address the 
relationship between poverty and financial intermediation. Section 5.8.1 provides an 
explanation of these methodologies. In order to test the objective of examining 
cointegration and the short run relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation the panel ARDL is used. If any cointegration is confirmed the short run 
relationship between poverty and financial intermediation is tested using the error 
correction model (ECM). The causal links between the variables is inferred from the 
results usig the significance of the coefficients and the error correction term. These 
ARDL and ECM methodologies are explained in section 5.8.2 and 5.8.3 respectively. 
Equation 5.2 can generally be specified in panel data form as in equation 5.3 
∆Yit= β0+ β1iYi,t-1





Yit is the dependent variable into country i for time t; is the lag of the dependent 
variable into country i for time t-1; 𝛽0 denotes a constant term;; μi is the time invariant 
country specific effect, 𝑖𝑡 is a random error term for country i for time t. 
 
The model specified in equation 5.3 poses a challenge when estimated using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Furthermore using the static panel estimation 
method such as the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models in estimating 
equation 5.3 has a possibility of obtaining biased estimates (Judson and Owen, 1999; 
Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The lagged dependent variable has correlation problems 
with the error term, and the autocorrelation will lead to spurious results. The data 
generating process in equation 5.3 is autoregressive and it yields inconsistent 
estimates from the OLS. Using the pooled OLS to estimate equation 5.3 is constrained 
by the restrictive assumption of common intercept and slope coefficients for all cross 
sections (Samargandi et al., 2015). This assumption implies the heterogeneity across 
individuals is disregarded by this estimation technique. Endogeneity problems also 
pose a challenge in estimating equation 5.3 using the fixed effects (see Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2010). On the other hand the random effects assume strict exogeneity in 
that the model is considered to be time invariant (Arellano, 2003). Hence the panel 
aspect of the data that distinguishes long run and short run relationships are not 
utilised by these models (Loayza and Rancière, 2006; Samargandi, et al., 2015).  
Thus the problems of endogeneity, measurement errors and specification bias 
remains if equation 5.3 is estimated using (Pooled OLS, FE and RE) estimation 
techniques. To address these challenges the system GMM discussed in section 5.8.1 
is adopted.  
 
5.8.1 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
The generalised method of moments (GMM) is adopted instead of OLS to address the 
problems of endogeneity and specification errors. The GMM was introduced by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) to address endogeneity 
and specification errors in panel data which could not be solved by the OLS method. 
The study therefore adopts the dynamic panel GMM estimator, which creates a matrix 




and the independent variables of this study (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
The GMM method is used instead of OLS and the generic model estimated is specified 
in equation 5.4  
 
Yit =Yit‐1 + βXi t-1 +𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡         5.4 
 
Where Y is poverty (estimated by the four proverty proxies adopted for this study), X 
is a matrix of explanatory variables (other than lagged poverty), μ is an unobserved 
country-specific effect, is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent country 
and time period, respectively. The nature of the 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡+𝑢𝑖. Taking the first difference 
of equation 5.4 can be parameterised as  
 
Yit = (‐1) Yit‐1 + βXi t-1 + 𝑖𝑡                5.5 
 
Bond, Hoeffler and Temple, (2001) argued that the difference estimator GMM removes 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific properties. However the difference GMM 
estimator has potential problems of a possibility of autocorrelation, individual specific 
heteroscedasticity, and omitted variable bias in the model. The differenced error term 
in equation 5.5 (𝑖𝑡) becomes correlated to Yit since they error term (𝑖𝑡) is now 
included in both variables. As explained earlier the estimates of equation 5.5 using 
either OLS or FE will be inconsistent and biased as the model is dynamic. 
 
The model is based on first differencing of the data of which the model still retained 
the problem of correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term 
(Levine Loayza and Beck, 2000; Seven and Coskun, 2016). Additionally as α 
approaches unit the estimates are meaningless. Consistent with Levine et al. (2000), 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) and Batuo, Mlambo and Asongu (2018) and to address 
these problems, a dynamic panel data model is adopted for this study and to address 
these problems a dynamic panel data model is adopted for this study. To obtain 
efficient and consistent estimates on the effect of financial intermediation on poverty 
and sources of poverty the system, GMM model as postulated by Arellano and Bover 




examine the country specific effect of financial intermediation and poverty the removal 
of the country specific effect by the differenced estimator ignores this country specific 
effect (Blundell and Bond; 1998). The system GMM combines in a system, the 
difference GMM estimator regressions and the regressions of the lagged level 
variables which are incorporated as instrument variables (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). Since the differenced GMM creates a problem of loss of 
efficiency as the variables are not used in levels, these shortcomings can be 
addressed by including level equation in the equation (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond; 1998). 
 
The decision to use the system GMM is validated by performing the specification tests 
as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). The Sargan and Hansen tests of over identifying restrictions are 
performed to test for the validity of the instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano 
and Bover, 1995). The general model specification under the system GMM is 
summarised in equation 5.6 as follows 
 
Yit =Yit‐1 + βXi t-1 +𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡        5.6 
 
Where Yit is the dependent variable of country i for time t. Yit‐1 is the lag of the 
dependent variable, X is a vector of the explanatory variables whilst 𝜇𝑖 captures the 
time invariant country specific effect. The disturbance term is captured by it. In order 
to estimate equation 5.6 for panel data the study need to determine whether the fixed 
effects model (FEM) or the random effects model (REM) is the appropriate estimating 
model. The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978; Hausman and Taylor, 1981) is therefore 
used to resolute between FEM and REM. The FEM assumes that the individual-
specific effect is a random variable where correlation with the explanatory variable is 
permitted (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2008). On the other hand the REM assumes that 
the differences across countries are random and uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables included in the model (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2008).  
 





POVit = POVit‐1 +β1FIit + ∑ βXi t
i
n=1 +𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡      5.7 
 
Where POVit is poverty as captured in this study as Headcount ratio, poverty gap GDP 
per capita and income inequality for country i at a time period t. this poverty proxies 
will be individually tested using equation 5.5. FI is financial intermediation. POVit‐1 is 
the first lag of the dependent variable for country i at a t-1 time period. The Xit is a 
vector of explanatory variables which include financial access, financial efficiency, 
financial stability, inflation, institutional quality, public debt (domestic debt) and 
remittances. The time invariant country specific effects are captured by 𝜇𝑖 whilst 𝑖𝑡 
the error term.  
 
The GMM models are generally easy to estimate if N is greater than T and likely to 
produced biased estimates when N is smaller than T (Roodman, 2009). The 
assumption of homogeneity of the slope coefficients of the lagged dependent variables 
is likely to produce inconsistent long run estimates in heterogeneous slope coefficients 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1998; Samargandi et 
al., 2015). Hence the panel ARDL as discussed in section 5.8.2 is employed for a 
dynamic panel analysis to determine the relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation.  
 
5.8.2 Panel Autoregressive distributed Lags (Panel ARDL)  
 
The study seeks to test for the cointegrating relationships between the variables of the 
study by applying the autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) bounds testing approach 
by (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). The traditional ARDL estimation is suitable in 
studies where N= 1 implying single time series studies (Pesaran et al 2001). However 
when N>1 and T>1 the panel ARDL is a preferred method of estimation. The panel 
ARDL seeks to determine the cointegrating relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation. The ARDL has the advantage that the variables do not need to be of 
the same level of integration, however, they cannot be of higher order intergration than 
I(2) (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999). The ARDL also has an advantage that it is 
applicable to smaller samples and it jointly estimates the long run relationships with 
short run parameters. Furthermore the ARDL incorporates the long run and the short 




is a requirement to calculate the F-statistics when using the ARDL bounds testing 
approach, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC)/Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are used to determine the optimal lag length. 
The lag length is chosen using the smallest values of AIC and SBC.  
 
In panel ARDL estimation there is need to establish whether the mean group (MG) or 
the pooled mean group (PMG) can be used in model estimation (see Pesaran and 
Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1999). Pesaran et al. (1999) argued that MG is 
inconsistent as it is not a good estimator when either N or T is small. Prior to the model 
estimation the hypothesis of homogeneity among the long run parameters cannot be 
assumed. Hence the Hausman test is used to determine whether the mean group 
(MG) or the pooled mean group (PMG) is the preferred method of estimation 
(Hausman, 1978). The main difference between the MG and the PMG is that under 
MG estimator, separate equations for each cross section (N) are run and the 
consistent estimators are produced by averaging of parameters of the model 
(Pesaran, 1999). Contrary, to the MG and the DFE, the PMG estimator incorporates 
MG estimator characteristics and pools the estimators (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
Consistency and the independence of the the regression residuals across countries is 
the essential assumption of the PMG estimation (Loayza and Rancière, 2006).  
 
The PMG permits country heterogeneity in error variances, the short-run coefficients, 
together with the intercepts, the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium values 
with a proposal of homogenous long run slope coefficients across countries (N) 
(Pesaran et al., 1999, Loayza and Rnciere, 2006). In this study the financial 
intermediation is a determinant of poverty. For the purpose of this study poverty is 
hypothesised to be a function of financial intermediation (including other dimensions 
of financial intermediation such as access, efficiency and stability), inflation, 
institutional quality, remittances and the domestic public debt. The following system of 
equation is estimated to examine the relationship between financial intermediation and 
poverty is the selected developing economies. The unrestricted panel ARDL system 
of equations to be estimated is generalised as below  












            5.8 
Where Yit is the dependent variable and Xi, t-1 is the (k×1) vector of the explanatory 
variables for group i and μ
i
 is the fixed effect, k is the studied country with p and q as 
the lag length (see Pesaran et al., 1999). Equations 5.7 – 5.41 are the proposed model 
specifications of the ARDL system of equations that are specific for this study.  
Equation 5.3 – 5.15 can be reparameterised to the specifics of this study to a system 
of equations in which the dependent variable (poverty) is proxied by headcount ratio, 
povgap and Gini and the following system of equations illustrates the proposed model 
specifications for this study.  
 









 + ∑ δ∆HCRi,t-1
n
i=0 + ∑ 𝛿2t∆FIi,t-1
n
i=0 +   
∑ 𝛿4t∆FEi,t-1
n
i=0  +  εit          5.9 
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FSi,t-1 + ∑ δ∆HCRi,t-1
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i=0  +  εit                  5.15 
 







FSi,t-1 + ∑ λ1t∆FIi,t-1
n





i=0 + εit                  5.16 





 + ∑ λ1t∆FSi,t-1
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i=0 + εit                  5.17 
 
Equation 5.16 - 5.24 is the system of equation using poverty gap as the dependent 
variable.  














i=0 + ∑ 𝜓4t∆FEi,t-1
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i=0  + εit             5.18 
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i=0  ∑ ψ4t∆FSi,t-1
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i=0  + εit               5.24 
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i=0  + ∑ 𝜓4t∆FSi,t-1
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i=0  + εit             5.25 
 




















i=0  + ∑ ψ4t∆FIi,t-1
n
i=0  + εit              5.26 
 
Equation 5.25 - 5.34 is the system of equation using Gini index as the dependent 
variable 
 









 + ∑ 𝜑1t∆GINIi,t-1
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FSi,t-1 + ∑ 𝜑1t∆GINIi,t-1
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i=0 + εit                  5.34 
 









 + ∑ 𝜑1t∆FSi,t-1
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i=0 + εit                  5.35 
 
Where HCR is headcount ratio, POVGAP is the poverty gap and Gini is the Gini index 
all as proxies of poverty.   
 FI is financial intermediation  
 FA is financial access  
 FE is financial efficiency 
FS is financial stability  
β are the long run coefficients of the independent variables  
δ, φ, λ,ϴ, γ are the short run coefficients 
it is error term with the i and t representing the country and time period 
 respectively. 
 
The lag order (p, q) is selected using the AIC. The lagged variables and the differences 
variables of the ARDL respectively test for the long run and the short run relationships 
of the variables. 
 
5.8.3 Error Correction Model (ECM) 
 
After determining the long run relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation the study determines the short run effects using the panel based error 
correction model (ECM) (Pesaran et al., 1999; Apergis and Payne, 2010). The ECM 
has the advantage that it incorporates cointegration and also captures the short run 
effects of the variables under study (see Engle and Granger 1987; Engle and Yoo, 
1987; Hoffman and Rasche, 1996). If cointegration is found the error correction model 




Hoewever in panel ARDL the error correction model is estimated. The generic error 
correction model that is proposed for this study is therefore specified in equation 5.35:  
∆POVi,t= α0,t+ ∑ βj∆POVi,t-j
p
j=1 + ∑ ϕi,j∆Xi,t-1
q
j=0 + φ1iECTi, t-1+ ωit           5.36 
Where  is the first-difference operator; p, q the lag length selected using the AIC 
 POV is each of the poverty proxies  
X is a vector of the independent variables  
ECT is the error correction term 
α is the constant 
β,ϕ, are short run coefficients  
φ is the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium 
ω is the error error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
 mean and constant variance.  
The error correction term coefficient (φ) in the ECM equations explains the speed of 
adjustment of the system to the long run equilibrium after a shock in the short run. The 
coefficient of the ECT (φ) is expected to be negative and statistically significant to 
show how the variables converge to the equilibrium level (Bildirici and Kayıkçı, 2013).  
The system of equations for the tri-variate ECM is as specified in equation 5.37 to 
5.63.  
 
∆HCRit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1 +   λ1iECTi, t-1 + ε1it 
                    5.37 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1  + λ2iECTi, t-1 + 2𝑖𝑡 
                    5.38 
∆FEit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + λ3iECTi, t-1 + ε3it 
                    5.39 
∆HCRit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FAi,t-1
q
k=1 + λ4iECTi, t-1 + ε1it 




∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FAi,t-1
q
k=1  + λ5iECTi, t-1 + 2𝑖𝑡 
                    5.41 
∆FAit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FAi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + λ6iECTi, t-1 + ε3it 
                    5.42 
∆HCRit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1 +   λ7iECTi, t-1 + ε1it 
                    5.43 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1  + λ8iECTi, t-1 + 2𝑖𝑡 
                    5.44 
∆FSit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆HCRi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + λ9iECTi, t-1 + ε3it 
                    5.45 
 
Equations 5.46 – 5-54 are the proposed specifications using the poverty gap 
∆POVGAPit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1 + φ1iECTi, t-1 
+ ε1it 
                    5.46 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1  + φ2iECTi, t-1 + 2𝑖𝑡 
                    5.47 
∆FEit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + φ3iECTi, t-1 + ε3it 
                    5.48 
 
∆POVGAPit = αβ0 + ∑ β1i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q










∆FIit = αβ0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FAi,t-1
q
k=1  + φ5iECTi, t-1 + 2𝑖𝑡
                    5.50 
 
∆FAit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FAi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + φ6iECTi, t-1 + ε3it 
                    5.51 
 
∆POVGAPit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1 + φ7iECTi, t-1 
+ ε1it                  5.52  
 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1  + φ8iECTi, t-1 + 2𝑖𝑡 
                    5.53 
∆FSit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆POVGAPi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + φ9iECTi, t-1 + ε3it 
                    5.54 
 
We also used the Gini index as a measure of inequality and the equation 5.55 – 5.63 
is a system of equation for the error correction between poverty as measured by the 
Gini index and the financial variables (financial intermediation, financial efficiency, 
financial access and financial stability).  
∆GINIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  +∑ β3i∆FEi,t-1
q
𝑘=1   + ϕ1iECTi, t-1 + ε1t 
                    5.55 
 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FEi,t-1
q
𝑘=1  + ϕ2iECTi, t-1 + ε2t 
                   5.56 
∆FEit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FEi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
𝑘=1  + ϕ3iECTi, t-1 + ε3t 
                   5.57 
∆GINIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  +∑ β3i∆FAi,t-1
q
𝑘=1   + ϕ4iECTi, t-1 + ε1t 
                    5.58 
 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIt-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FAt-1
q




                    5.59 
 
∆FAit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FAi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
𝑘=1  + ϕ6iECTi, t-1 + ε3t 
                   5.60 
 
∆GINIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  +∑ β3i∆FSi,t-1
q
𝑘=1   + ϕ7iECTi, t-1 + ε1t 
                   5.61 
 
∆FIit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FSi,t-1
q
𝑘=1  + ϕ8iECTi, t-1 + ε2t 
                   5.62 
∆FSit = α0 + ∑ β1i∆FSi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β2i∆GINIi,t-1
q
k=1  + ∑ β3i∆FIi,t-1
q
𝑘=1  + ϕ9iECTi, t-1 + ε3t 
                   5.63 
 
From equation 5.37-5.63  
α, is the constant  
β, short run coefficients 
λ, φ, ϕ are the speed of adjustments to the long run equilibrium  
 
For easy of reference and clarity in the methodology the equation of the ARDL and 
the ECM are presented separately but in Stata the ARDL and ECM are estimated as 
one equation  
 
5.9 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has clarified the elected methodology and research design of the study. 
The methodologies used in the study are discussed. An explication of the empirical 
models that are deployed in testing the hypotheses of financial intermediation and 
poverty is given. The econometric models that are specified seek to provide the ground 
work for empirically testing the relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation. The estimation models are explained as a basis for testing the 




In examining the relationship between poverty and financial intermediation the initial 
intention was to use the ordinary least squares methods. However the method has 
severe estimation bias in panel data sets with N cross sections and T time series. The 
GMM method is considered but however, the assumption of homogeneity in the slope 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variables poses a challenge of inconsistent long 
run estimates in heterogeneous slope coefficients. That is if the slope coefficients are 
not homogenous the method can produce biased estimates. The Hausman test is 
used to test if the model is a fixed effect model or random effect model. Other advance 
econometric estimation techniques such as the panel ARDL are used to determine the 
long run relationships between poverty and financial intermediation. Within the panel 
ARDL estimation other tests such as the mean group (MG) and pooled mean group 
(PMG) and the dynamic fixed effects are performed to determine the best estimator 
for the panel error correction estimators.  
 
Since the data is a panel with a time series dimension it is necessary to examine the 
stationarity in the data using the unit root method. For robustness of a number of unit 
root tests such as IPS, LLC, Breitung, ADF-Fisher Chi-Square and the PP-Fisher Chi-
Square were applied. Although the ARDL do not necessitate the testing of unit root, it 
is adequate to employ the unit root test to ensure that there is no higher order 
integration than the first order integration in the variables. For consistent estimates the 
ARDL requires that the data should only be in levels I(0) and first order integration I(1). 
Furthermore the ECM method is used to determine the short run relationships in the 
data. The ECM is only employed where there is cointegration after the ARDL 
estimation. Since the data is panel data the ARDL model employed when any 
cointergration is found will be estimated using the error correction model than the 
vector error correction. The error correction term which shows the speed of adjustment 
to the long run equilibrium is expected to be negative and significant. Although these 
estimations are adequate to establish the relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation, the study further examines the causal link between poverty and its 
determinants using the significance of the long run and short run coefficients and the 
significance of the error correction term. The following chapter delves into the 






DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6. Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to engage in the discussion and interpretation of research results 
that are presented in the previous chapter. The GMM and the ARDL techniques were 
used to empirically test the determinants of poverty and the long/short run 
relationships. Further, the causal effects between poverty and financial intermediation 
are reported and discussed. The empirical results of the analysed data are reported 
using the already stated techniques. Since poverty is a dynamic the panel data model 
is adopted in the study and the results discussed in this chapter are for a dynamic 
model using short panel. The main aim of this study, as stated before, is to: 
• Examine the deterministic relationship between financial intermediation and 
poverty in selected developing countries.   
• Examine the cointegrating relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation  
•  Examine the causality effects between poverty and financial intermediation  
The study employs the system generalised method of moments to examine the 
deterministic relationship between the selected independent variables and the poverty 
proxies of this study. To examine the cointegration between financial intermediation 
and poverty the panel autoregressive distributed-lags (ARDL) is employed. After 
finding the cointegration between the variables the panel error correction (ECM) is 
used to examine the short run relationships between financial intermediation and 
poverty. Furthermore, the study employs the pooled mean group approach within the 
ARDL framework where the long run and short run relationship are jointly estimated. 
The inference of the causality between the variables in the study will be obtained from 
the significance of the long run and short run coefficients and the error correction term. 
The significance of the long run coefficients implies long run causality whilst the 




significance of the error correction term is further examined to determine joint causal 
effects of the financial dimension to poverty.  
 
One of the determinants of poverty was found to be institutional quality. For this study 
we developed the institutional quality index from law and order, democratic 
accountability and bureaucracy quality using the principal component analysis. The 
construction of the institution index as a measure of institutional quality using the PCA 
is discussed undersection 6.2. Section 6.3 of the chapter presents and discusses the 
descriptive statistics for variables of the study. The pre-test diagnostics of unit root that 
are performed before the analysis of the variables are presented in section 6.4. The 
empirical results of the analysis of the measures of poverty against the determinants 
of poverty used in this study are outlined in section 6.5. Lastly section 6.6 delineates 
the conclusion of the study.  
 
6.1 Principal Component Analysis 
 
The study uses the principal component (PCA) technique to generate a single 
composite index of institutional quality index for the 35 countries in this study. the 
structure of the variance of a set of variables was modelled using the principal 
component analysis. There is no consensus in literature on a single measure of 
institutional quality index hence we applied PCA to come up with a single composite 
index. The principal component analysis was used for the measure of institutional 
quality the index was made up of three components which included law and order, 
democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. This differs from Cepparulo et al., 
(2017) who use the arithmetic average of the same variables as a measure of 
institutional quality. A composite index from PCA was used as it is beeter than 
independently using individual varialble which might not have reflected and captured 
the status of the institutional quality of the selected developing countries.  
 
The principal component analysis is used to condense data sets to lower dimensions 
while retaining ample information of the original sets as possible. Using previous 




a single component index. The computed Eigen values of the variance matrix to come 
up with a single institutional quality index using the PCA are presented in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Principal Component Analysis for Institutional Quality Index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.40872 .462928 0.4696 0.4696 
2 .945789 .300296 0.3153 0.7848 
3 .645493 . 0.2152 1.0000 
Authors own computation using Stata 
A composite indicator for institutional quality was created as an independent variable 
to determine the relationship between institutional quality and poverty in the selected 
developing countries. This composite indicator is created to reduce over 
parameterisation and multicollinearity. Furthermore, PCA was employed to reduce the 
data to lower dimensions whilst retaining as much information from the original data 
set as possible (see Gries, 2009).  
 
The Eigen values of the correlation matrix of the three separate indicators that 
compose the institutional quality index are presented in Table 6.1. The first component 
explains about 45 percent of the variation. The first component has an eigenvalue of 
more than 1 and it explains 46.96 percent of the maximum variance whilst the second 
component with an Eigen value of 0.945789 explains 31.53 percent of the variance. 
The last component with an Eigen value of 0.645493 explains the remaining 21.52 
percent of the maximum variance. The components thus have the sufficient 
information for the institutional quality index as reflected by their Eigen values.  
6.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
6.2.1 Data  
 
A dynamic short balanced annual panel data from 2004- 2016 was used in this study. 
The data has many individuals (group) and a short time period. The study couldn’t 
extend the time series of the data prior to the year 2004 as the data on the 





6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
The summary statistics of the variables used in the estimation of this study is 
presented in this section. The summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in this study are presented in Table 6.2. The section discusses the summary 
statistics of the pooled data on the variables used in the entire sample for this study. 
Four poverty proxies are measures such as headcount ratio, poverty gap, Gini index 
and the gross domestic product per capita are used. Table 6.2 is the summary of the 
descriptive statistics of the study.  
 
Table 6.2: Summary descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
country 455 18 10.11062 1 35 
Year 455 2010 3.745776 2004 2016 
Hcr 390 0.3865197 0.2369702 0.0034569 0.941 
povgap 390 0.1518886 0.1239008 0.0012895 0.636 
Gini 452 43.54987 6.497573 32.7 62 
Gdpc 455 4451.903 4136.657 577.8607 15914.67 
pcredit 455 28.24928 31.62341 1.01723 160.125 
ATMs 374 5.416875 11.52236 0 98.44005 
Cb 434 2.650476 5.704712 .0213152 44.95105 
is 448 7.623939 9.688882 -3.601667 66.89482 
inst1 455 3.063187 1.012434 1 5.583333 
inst2 455 3.522894 1.212984 1 6 
inst3 455 1.358883 0.7972836 0 3 
z 448 12.40535 7.796914 -1.30824 44.7768 
inf 454 7.576795 6.771693 -3.099781 44.35669 
rem 454 2.958784 4.09548 0.000197 31.5034 






455 2.46e-09 1.000003 -2.07995 2.042197 
Notes: Obs= Number of observations; Std. Dev. = Standard deviation. Hcr is the poverty headcount ratio; povgap is the poverty gap; gini is the gini 
index whoch measures inequality; pcredit is the private credit, ATMs measures the number of ATMs/1000km
2
, cb represents the commercial 
banks/1000km
2
 inst1 is law and order; inst2 represents democratic accountability; inst3 is the bureaucracy quality. instQ_index is the created index 
of institutional quality using PCA   
Source: Authors own computation  
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive (summary) statistics of the variables of the study 
over the full sample period (2004-2016). The total number of observation is 455 for 
variables with full data set. The period covered by this data for the pooled estimation 
was from 2004-2016 mainly due the available of data on the measures of financial 
access. The data from the Financial Access Survey (FAS) is only available as from 
2004 and the study could not include the period prior to 2004. The study covers 35 
countries.   
 
The maximum private credit as a percentage of the gross domestic product is at 
160.125 with a minimum of 1.01723. Some of the countries in the study have very low 
private credit with a minimum of 1.01723. Low private credit implies lack of financial 
intermediated products and services.  
 
Income inequality as measured by the Gini index in the panel of our study is very high 
as it has a minimum of 32 and a maximum of 62. The Gini index ranges from 0, when 
income among the households is the same and 100 when only one household has all 
the income.   
 
The domestic debt for the panel of the study is very high with a maximum of 74.4 
percent of the gross domestic product. Higher domestic debt can mean revenue 
collected in most of these developing countries is servicing interest on debt. Eventually 
if the interest payment on debt is too high it crowds out the space to fund economic 
and social priorities of governments. Furthermore, high public domestic debt implies 
the government is competing with the private sector for funds and this can result in 
crowding out of private investment.  
 
The interest rate spread is generally high for the countries that are covered in this 




as the maximum interest rate spread is at 66.89 which was realised in Angola during 
the early 2000. The average interest rate spread is 9.688882 further indicating that 
bank charges have a higher interest rate for the extended credit. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000) argues that countries with high bank concentration and no or few credit 
bureaus have very high interest rate spread. The panel of countries in this study have 
mainly few large banks in their economies.  
 
The accessibility of the of financial services as measured by the ATMs or commercial 
banks per 1000km2  there is lower access to formal financial services as the maximum 
number of ATMs/commercial banks per 1000km2 is 98.44005 and 44.95105 
respectively. The minimum for ATMs is 0 showing that there are other countries where 
these services were not available at all.  
 
The maximum rate of inflation is 44.35669 with a minimum of -3.099781. Inflation 
shows the ability of the economy to stabilise the price levels. Higher level implies the 
instability of the consumer prices which can be detrimental to the poor households and 
small businesses more as they lack the hedging mechanism to downwards risks  
 
The Z-score had a maximum of 44.7768 and an average of 12.40535, a higher z score 
implies stability in the financial system and it best represents the low risk of financial 
insolvency of the banking system. According to the World Bank (2016) the stability of 
the financial system enables the system to allocate resources efficiently and the ability 
of the banking system to absorb shocks in the event of a financial shock 
 
6.3 Unit root tests  
 
To determine the order of integration of the variables of the study, stationarity tests 
were performed in order to determine the order of intergration of the variables to carry 
out regression analysis and cointegration tests. Although the ARDL do not require that 
the variables be of the same order of intergration, the unit roots were employed for 
robustness such that no variable that has higher order of integration is included in the 




AIC automatic lag selection using Eviews 9.5. The lag length selected by the software 
was between 0 and 1.  
 
Following Granger and Porter (2009) the unit root chosen relied on the power of the 
test including the test’s level of significance (size of test). The probability of rejecting 
a false null hypothesis is explained by the power of the test. The Levin, Lin and Chu 
(LLC), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), Augmented Dickey-Fuller ADF-Fisher Chi-square 
and the Phillips-Perron PP-Fisher Chi-square test were employed in this study. The 
null hypothesis under all these tests is that the panel contain a unit root, it the p-value 
is significant the null hypothesis is rejected for the alternative hypothesis that the panel 
do not contain a unit root. Table 6.3 presents the results of the unit root test LLC, IPS, 
ADF-Fisher Chi-square and the PP-Fisher Chi-square estimation techniques.  
 
Table 6.3: Unit root Tests  
Variable   
 
No trend  Intercept and 
Trend  
Trend   Decision  
Panel Unit root test using the LLC 
hcr  -16.3878*** -22.8188*** -19.7426*** I(1) 
povgap -5.93967*** -9.37869*** -10.0351*** I(0) 
gini -10.6663*** -9.70437*** -8.02836*** I(1) 
gdpc -4.08692*** -13.5273*** -9.75936*** I(1) 
pcredit -13.8969*** -15.4596*** -14.6910*** I(1) 
ATMs  -5.19586*** -13.6585*** -14.3276*** I(1) 
cb  -5.26442*** -12.9075*** -10.4297*** (1) 
is -4.50351*** -255.717*** -248.125*** I(0) 
instQ_index -40236.8*** -19.3891*** -21.5881*** I(1) 
z -22.4538 -13.8315*** -17.0877*** I(1) 
inf -2.99425*** -11.1959*** -11.1559*** I(0) 
rem -21.3551*** -8.79870*** -9.02607*** I(1) 
dpd -16.5497*** -13.9730*** -13.8827*** I(1) 
Panel unit root tests using IPS 




povgap - -0.70989 -2.45392*** I(0) 
gini  - -5.67646*** -5.21106*** I(1) 
gdpc - -6.97807*** -6.11692*** I(1) 
pcredit - -7.65393*** -9.89963*** I(1) 
ATMs  - -2.33941*** -6.42348*** I(1) 
cb  - -4.28029*** -7.62193*** (1) 
is - -43.0174*** -54.8416*** I(0) 
instQ_index - -8.16012*** -10.3526*** I(1) 
z - -6.19248*** -12.0075*** I(1) 
inf - -5.57631*** -8.20833*** I(0) 
rem - -10.3124*** -13.4532*** I(1) 
dpd - -6.52532*** -9.05481*** I(1) 
Panel unit root testing using ADF – Fisher Chi-square 
hcr 306.337*** 210.058*** 269.169*** I(1) 
povgap 197.882*** 98.1730** 104.839*** I(0) 
gini  200.422*** 151.298*** 145.637***  I(1) 
gdpc 135.779*** 171.613*** 159.162*** I(1) 
pcredit 293.055*** 178.598*** 226.784*** I(1) 
ATMs  128.364*** 133.703*** 165.218*** I(1) 
cb  132.106*** 138.072*** 178.300*** I(1) 
is 89.1857** 138.418*** 200.522*** I(0) 
instQ_index 260.045*** 145.848*** 168.379*** I(1) 
z 456.345*** 168.414*** 260.418*** I(1) 
inf 73.9615 151.981*** 194.027*** I(0) 
rem 461.571*** 219.346*** 284.468*** I(1) 
dpd 347.949*** 168.149*** 216.948*** I(1) 
Panel unit root testing using PP - Fisher Chi-square 
hcr 387.829*** 301.140*** 336.279*** I(1) 
povgap 224.006*** 164.456*** 172.797*** I(0) 




gdpc 156.455*** 205.894*** 166.464*** I(1) 
pcredit 289.158*** 244.724*** 237.466*** I(1) 
ATMs  134.406*** 170.280*** 174.590*** I(1) 
cb  147.645*** 174.885*** 207.814*** I(1) 
is 118.493*** 215.444*** 197.316*** I(0) 
instQ_index 260.373*** 189.937*** 194.634*** I(1) 
z 458.363*** 334.043*** 352.592*** I(1) 
inf 127.678*** 254.537*** 191.603*** I(0) 
rem 495.472 219.346*** 362.281*** I(1) 
dpd 380.975*** 334.960*** 314.252*** I(1) 
***; **; * indicates that the null hypothesis of unit root tests is rejected at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All the tests are at first 
difference (except where indicated otherwise.) Probabilities for all the tests assume asymptotic normality except for Fisher tests 
which are computed using the asymptotic Chi-square distribution. Hcr is the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line, 
povgap is the poverty gap, gdpc is the gross domestic product per capita, inequality is measured by the gini index, pcredit is the 
ratio of private credit to the gross domestic product measuring financial intermediation, [ATMs are the automated teller 
machines/1000𝑘𝑚2,  cb are commercial banks/1000𝑘𝑚2 as financial access measures],  is-interest rate spread measuring 
efficiency of the financial sector, z is the bank z score measuring financial instability. Infl is the consumer price index, rem s 
remittances inflows and dpd is the domestic public debt.  
Source: Athours Own Calculations using Stata 
 
Table 6.3 indicates that the variables under study are mostly of first order integration 
for the entire unit root test employed for the study except for poverty gap, interest rate 
spread and inflation which were stationary at levels. This section did not discuss the 
correlation matrix but the test results for correlation matrix have been included in the 
Appendix 1 for reference.  
 
6.4 Econometric model estimation results, discussion and analysis 
 
To validate the relationship between poverty and financial intermediation the study 
applied the dynamic panel data estimation for the determinants of poverty. The panel 
System GMM is used to determine the relationship between poverty and financial 
intermediation. Separate equations were estimated using different poverty proxies for 
this study namely (headcount ratio, poverty gap, gross domestic product per capita 
and gini. Furthermore separate regression equations are estimated using the same 




teller machines per 1000km2 (ATMs) and commercial banks per 1000km2 (cb). The 
panel ARDL is used to determine the long run and short run relationship between 
financial intermediation and poverty (as measured by the proxies of this study). The 
individual techniques and results are discussed in sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2.  
 
6.4.1 System General Method of Moments 
 
The deterministic relationship between financial intermediation and poverty was 
estimated using the system GMM approach. Three other estimation techniques such 
as the random effect (RE), the fixed effect (FE) and the Least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) are presented for robustness checks on the preferred method. The results of 
these techniques are reported in the appendix. The GMM was the preferred method 
of estimation due to endogeneity problem in the variables used in estimation (see 
Roodman, 2009). Additionally the system GMM is more robust to the 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Poverty is persistent and can pose 
problems of autocorrelation and unobserved heterogeneity (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 
2012). Furthermore the GMM technique yields an asymptotically unbiased estimation 
of the t-statistics without requiring the heteroscedastic structure of the regression 
equation (Hansen, 1982; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The GMM estimation method 
addresses these problems, thus it was a preferred technique for the deterministic 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty. Moreover, GMM is more 
efficient with short panel type of data (Arellano and Bond, 1991)  
 
The dynamic effects of poverty can render the fixed-effects estimator of panel models 
biased and inconsistent, particularly for the sample of this study which is finite and 
have short time periods. From the Hausman test performed the null hypothesis that 
the random effect is the appropriate was rejected for the alternative hypothesis that 
the fixed effect model is the appropriate model. To preserve the sample size since the 
panel on the poverty proxies specifically (hcr and povgap) have got gaps the 
estimation used the forward orthogonal deviation (FOD). A ‘transformed’ estimation 
using FOD was used following Arellano and Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2009 and 
Hayakawa, 2009). The generic dynamic panel model that is estimated in this study is 





Yit =Yit‐1 + Xi t-1
' 𝛽 +𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡         6.1 
 
Where Yit represents the poverty proxies in this study Xi t-1
'
 represents a vector of 
poverty determinants including financial intermediation and the control variables 
selected for this study,  𝜇𝑖 are country fixed effects 𝑖𝑡 is the error term with E(𝑖𝑡)≠0 
for all i and t  
 
As discussed in chapter 5 differenced GMM could not be used to estimate equation 
6.1 as poverty is persistent and the sample for this study is a finite sample with small 
time period (T) (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999; Heid, Langer and Larch; 2012). 
To circumvent the differenced GMM bias in finite sample the study followed Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and performed the system GMM. 
Hence a number of experimentations with the system GMM were performed using 
different estimation parameters to ensure robust results to the changes of the set of 
instruments to examine the relationship between financial intermediation and poverty. 
To the best of my knowledge literature provides no guidance on the cut off points on 
the number of instruments that should be used in GMM estimation. Ruud (2000; 515) 
argues that in some cases bias is present even in illustrations where the instruments 
are few.  
 
The Roodman (2009) rule of thumb that holds that the number of instruments should 
not be more than the number of groups (35 countries which are the groups) was used 
as the benchmark for the number of instruments for this study. To ease the instruments 
proliferation which significantly affected the Hansen statistics, the instruments set was 
‘collapsed’ (see Roodman, 2009). Both the one step and the two step system GMM 
were performed but only the two step system GMM is reported as it is argued to be 
more efficient and robust as compared to the one step estimation technique (see 
Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998).  
 
For robustness comparison Appendix 2, 4, 6, and 8 shows the results of the System 
GMM in comparison with other estimation technique such as the Pooled OLS, Fixed 
effects etc. for all the proxies of poverty (refer to the Appendix for more details). The 




effects hence the System GMM model estimated is for a panel with fixed effects.  
These other technical results which are presented in the appendix 2, 4, 6, and 8 are 
not discussed in this chapter as the core technique for this study is the System GMM 
although some reference will be made to the techniques for a robust discussion. In 
this study two proxies were used as proxies for financial access and they have been 
estimated separately and the results are presented are presented in Appendix 10-14 
 
The study uses four proxies of poverty and these include headcount ratio, poverty gap, 
gross domestic product per capita and Gini index. The dynamic panel estimations 
were performed for all the poverty proxies as linear equations. Since the validity of the 
instruments is crucial for the reliability of the econometric model, the diagnostics on 
the validity of the instruments were confirmed by the Sargan and Hansen statistics 
(Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982). The validity of the instruments could not be rejected 
using the Hansen statistics for all the four models using different poverty proxies. This 
is vital as the Hansen result confirms that no type II error emanates from pooling valid 
and invalid instruments. The estimates of the model are consistency as confirmed by 
the result of first order AR(1) and second order AR(2) serial correlation which were 
performed using the Arellano and Bond (1991). The AR(1) is reported in the appendix 
3, 5, 7, 9 and 11, it is expected that the model can have first order serial correlation. 
The AR(2) assumes that the explanatory variables are not ‘post-determined’ implying 
that the independent variables are not correlated with future errors (Roodman, 2017).  
 
The result of the models fail to reject the null hypothesis of no second order (AR(2)) 
serial correlation and the results are reported in the appendix 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11. The 
consistency of the estimates also depends on the serial correlation in the error term. 
The Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) confirms the presence of serial correlation of order 
one, which is expected, and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) provides no indication 
that the instruments are correlated with the error term. Hence the study cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in all regressions. As the study 
did not find second-order serial correlation provides additional evidence that use of 
lags in this study is valid, and the use of a dynamic model is supported (Akobeng, 
2016). Sobiech (2019) opined a benchmark for the reliability of the estimates from 
GMM results, which asserts that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies 




reliability and consistence of results benchmarking as shown in the Appendix 10 for 
all poverty proxies except for lagged Gini index. The result from the Gini index was 
tested and did not satisfying this suggested benchmarking. For comparison purposes 
with the other estimation techniques such as the pooled OLS the FE RE and the LSDV-
K Appendix 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 presents the results from these estimation techniques in 
comparison with the system GMM. The results of the system GMM summarised for all 
the poverty proxies are presented in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4: System GMM regression results for the determinants of poverty.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 

















































































N 248 283 353 353 
Notes: ***, **,* are statistical significance at the levels of significance of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; t statistics in parentheses, p values 




under the null of instrument validity. hcr is the poverty headcount ratio, pcredit is the ratio of private credit to gross domestic product, ATMs is the 
automatic teller machines  per 1000km
2
, is the interest rate spread, instQ_index  in the institutional quality index, inf is inflation z is the bank z-
score, rem is remittance inflows and the dpd is the domestic public debt. Each column represents a different poverty proxy using the System GMM 
estimation technique. 
Source: Authors’ own computations  
 
The diagnostic statistics (F statistic, AR (2) and the Hansen Statistic) in Table 6.4 are 
satisfactory; the F statistic is significant implying that the independent variables jointly 
explain the variability in poverty proxies. Roodman (2009) argued that the Hansen 
statistic is susceptible to weakness and the test becomes weaker with an increase in 
the moments conditions and Roodman (2009) conceded that it is complicated to 
satisfy all of them. As explained earlier number of experimentation were performed in 
order to reduce the number of instruments to improve the Hansen statistic. Poverty as 
measured with the headcount ratio is statistically significant at 10 percent level to 
interest rate spread and institutional quality. The significance of the relationship 
between bank efficiency and poverty is also confirmed by the other estimation 
methods in the appendix 15, 16, 17 and 18 although the level of significance differs 
across the estimation methods. 
 
From the results in Table 6.4 different poverty measures related differently to the 
control variables with respect to significance, the sign and the magnitude of the 
coefficients. 
 
6.4.1.1 Financial intermediation (pcredit) and poverty  
 
The ability of the financial sector particularly the banking sector to provide financial 
services to the poor is best captured by the credit channel using the ratio of private 
credit to the gross domestic product (Rewilak, 2017). The study expected that credit 
be negatively related to poverty implying that increased intermediation reduces the 
poverty incidences of low income earners. Contrary to the expectation of a negative 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty there is a positive and 
insignificant relationship for headcount ratio. The gross domestic product per capita is 
expected to be positively related with financial intermediation implying that an increase 
in private credit increases the per capita incomes. As private credit best represents 




extended credit did not have a poverty reducing effect. These terms may include the 
credit constraints from formal financial institutions such as collateral and credit history 
which hinders capital allocation to low income earners. This is contrary to the 
perception that financial intermediation reduces poverty by reducing credit constraints 
on the poor. Furthermore, it was observed that the relationship between financial 
intermediation and poverty depended on how poverty is measured. The results on the 
effect of financial intermediation on poverty were mixed, showing that the relationship 
depends on the proxy used to measure poverty.  
 
Financial intermediation has a poverty reducing effect (negative relationship). This was 
evident when poverty was measured by poverty gap and the Gini index. The 
relationship is significant at 10 percent only when poverty is measure by the Gini index. 
The results fail to reject the theoretical consideration of a negative relationship 
between financial intermediation and inequality as measured by the Gini index. 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) argued that the optimality of household choices 
depends on the availability of credit whilst Galor and Zeira (1993) opined that the 
investment in human capital is contingent to the availability of credit. A unit increase 
in financial intermediation reduces inequality by 0.00256 percentage points ceteris 
paribus. Alternatively, a 10 percent increase in domestic private credit reduces poverty 
by 0.00256 percent all other things held constant. As the credit is made available to 
the low income earners they are able to smooth their consumption and invest in human 
capital reducing the level of inequality. The finding of a negative relationship between 
better financial intermediation and inequality is in line with the findings of Beck et al., 
(2007). This is in contrast with Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) who found a positive 
relationship between finance and inequality in developing economies. Policy makers 
should make careful considerations on how poverty is measured. This will help in the 
formulation of effective policies that are targeted at poverty reduction. A distortion in 
the definition and measurement of poverty will have a distortion to the policies that are 
implemented to address poverty. 
 
6.4.1.2 Financial access (ATMs/cb) and poverty 
 
Financial access is proxied by the automatic teller machines per 1000km2 and 




of financial access (for example ATMs per 100 000 adults, commercial bank per 
100 000 adults as reported by the Financial Access Survey but the lack of data for the 
countries in the panel limited the inclusion of these measures for this study. 
 
From the results only gross domestic product has a positive and significant relationship 
with access to finance. The positive relationship between financial access and the 
gross domestic product per capita was expected since an increase in financial access 
leads to an increase the gross domestic product per capita as the income of 
households and firms increases. The access to financial products increases the gross 
domestic product per capita for the households who have access to credit facilities to 
smooth consumption and venture in the entrepreneurial activities. Increased financial 
access can increase inequalities and finding that is consistent with Giné and 
Townsend (2004) in Thailand.  
 
A 1 percent increase in access in turn increases by a percentage of 4.563 in the gross 
domestic product. This is in contrast with Rewilak (2017) who found a negative 
relationship between access and the gross domestic product per capita. An increase 
in access to finance increases the income per capita among households thus reducing 
poverty as households have more income to smooth consumption (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Klapper, 2013). As low income earners have access to financial services, the 
access to resources such as education can improve the income per capita for a nation 
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2012). Deep financial markets do not 
necessarily mean that the financial services are accessible to the low income earners.  
 
The priori expectations were for a negative and significant relationship between 
financial access and poverty (headcount ratio, poverty gap and Gini). For this study 
the relationship is positive and insignificant. The contrary to the finding may be due 
the nature of our sample of developing countries where there is lack of access and 
most of the poor and the small businesses mainly use the informal sector. Other 
factors such as institutional quality which isn’t very strong in developing countries can 
be a constraint on the outreach of banks to the poor (Yoshino and Morgan, 2018). The 
World Bank (2014: 3) in microfinance experience found mixed results on the role of 
financial access to poverty. The general consensus was the overextension of credit at 




these services (World Bank, 2014. In there is an increase in access to finance and the 
access is tilted more to the larger enterprises and the rich the increase in access 
cannot be beneficial to the poor (World Bank, 2014).  
 
Although there is improved access to finance in developing countries most of the 
financial products and services are on a top-down approach where services are 
available but the poor cannot access them because they do not meet their needs. The 
behavioural responses of the individuals can become an aspect of the relationships 
between increased access and poverty. Furthermore, when the concentration or 
market power of banks is brought in the mix the role of access to finance in poverty 
reduction can be complex. Stiglitz (2017) argued that where there is monopoly power 
the marginal return on investment is lower than the average return, market power is 
associated with inefficiency and a distortion in the allocation of resources (Atkinson, 
2016). In most developing countries the structure of the formal banking sector is 
oligopolistic where banks can still have higher profit margins with limited breadth of 
their services.  
 
Market power cannot be the only driver to higher inequalities, irrespective of increased 
access to finance if the financial products are too expensive or there exists other 
barriers to financial access, the increased financial access will be of little value to the 
unbanked. The nature of the market power affects the distribution of the financial 
resources such that market power can worsen inequalities (Beighley and McCall, 
1975, Stiglitz, 2017). Hence the relationship between financial access and income 
inequality in economies where banks have higher concentration can be positive. The 
cointegration and causality between the financial variables is discussed in the later 
section as access to finance can be influenced by other financial factors such financial 
intermediation and financial efficiency for it to be of great social and economic value 
to the poor and small businesses.  
With access measured with bank branch expansion (Appendix 10) access to finance 
has a poverty reducing effect as the headcount is negatively and insignificantly related 
to access to finance. Furthermore, GDPC and Gini index has a significant positive 
relationship with access to finance. The significant difference between the two 
measures of access was that as access in measured by commercial banks Gini 




expected that the relationship should be negative as with the headcount ratio and the 
poverty gap, in this case it is positive. In the developing countries context banks exerts 
significant monopoly power and access to financial services in not very competitive 
and lack on infrastructure have centralised the availability of banking services 
(Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon, 2019). Furthermore, an account at a 
commercial bank which has fixed costs leads to an increase in inequality to which 
access to finance initially increase inequality (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). This 
is because the financial services will only be affordable to certain population groupings 
widening inequality (Beck et al., 2007; Naceur and Zhang, 2016). 
 
6.4.1.3 Financial efficiency (is) and poverty  
 
It is imperative that the financial sector should be able to deliver financial services 
efficiently and is normally expected that efficiency of the financial sector is positively 
related to poverty. In this study the interest rate spread is used to measure efficiency 
of the banking sector and it is the difference between the lending rate by banks and 
the deposit rate. The larger the spread the more expensive are bank loans and this 
reduces their credit allocative efficiency as the credit is too expensive (implying 
financial inefficiency). The assertion is that efficient banks eases information 
asymmetry problem and affords savers with better liquidity and risk diversification 
(Bettin and Zazzaro, 2012). This study covers mostly developing countries in Africa 
where the interest rate spreads are relatively large meaning higher cost of 
intermediation (Beck and Cull, 2013). The study found a positive relationship between 
bank efficiency and poverty which was in contrast with the findings of (Rewilak, 2017). 
Larger interest rate spreads are mostly common in Africa making intermediation cost 
very expensive. The results show a positive and insignificant relationship between 
financial efficiency and the gross domestic product per capita. Financial efficiency is 
positive significant at 10 percent and 5 percent when poverty is measured the 
headcount ratio and poverty gap respectively. A 10 percent increase in the interest 
rate spread increase the poverty headcount ratio by 0.000584 percentage points whilst 
a 5 percent increase in the interest rate increase the poverty gap by 0.000917 
percentage points. Better financial intermediation (lower interest rate spread) reduces 




services has a poverty reducing effect which is a finding that is consistent with Zhang 
and Naceur (2018).  
 
Large interest rate spreads limit the expansion of financial intermediation and impedes 
the effectiveness of the financial sector in lifting people out of poverty (Calice and 
Zhou, 2018). Wider spreads indicate that the cost of financial intermediation becomes 
unaffordable for some debtors to use the financial services (Brock and Suarez, 2000; 
Svirydzenka, 2016). The interest spread is significant at 10 percent and 5 percent for 
the headcount ratio and the poverty gap respectively. As has been illustrated in 
Chapter 3, the provision of formal financial services to the poor has been mainly by 
development banks and aid organisation than the formal financial services 
(Prokopenko and Holden, 2001). Using the Gini index as a measure of poverty, 
financial efficiency is negatively related to poverty although it is insignificant. This is in 
contrast to the relationship between financial efficiency and poverty as measured with 
the (headcount ratio) and poverty gap.  
 
The results were consistent with theory when poverty is measured by Gini index as 
the study found a negative relationship with bank efficiency albeit the insignificance of 
the relationship in this study. The positive relationship can be as a result that as banks 
efficiency improves in the monitoring and screening of debtors they reject projects with 
negative present resulting in lower credit extension. Due to lack of collateral to loan 
applications and non-availability of credit history the low income earners are likely to 
have their projects rejected. Hence efficiency in this case can result in increase in 
poverty because there is limited credit issued by the formal banks for investing in 
entrepreneurial projects that can be a catalyst of investment in human capital and 
consumption smoothing. Furthermore, efficient financial systems mitigate asymmetric 
information problems with respect to adverse selection arising before a loan is granted 
and the moral hazards after the supply of finance. In this way, a highly developed 
banking sector in a sound regulatory environment ends up boosting saving and capital 
accumulation and, above all, enhances the efficiency of capital allocation and 
technological development within the economy. For robustness the regression 
equations were also estimated using the commercial banks per 1000km
2
 as a 





6.4.1.4 Financial Stability (z) and poverty 
 
The stability of the financial sector is crucial as it has social and economic 
ramifications. Financial stability and poverty as measured by the headcount ratio and 
the poverty gap has a negative and insignificant relationship with bank stability. The 
gross domestic product has a positive insignificant relationship with bank stability. 
Akhter and Daly (2009) argued that financial stability/instability is a positive/negative 
consequence result of financial intermediation. As in Table 6.4, the measures of 
poverty relate differently to poverty determinants. If active growth in the credit 
extended to the private sector results in the economy ‘overheating’ this can have a 
negative effect on poverty incidences (Afanasyeva, Lee, Modugno, M. and Palomino 
and 2018). When poverty is measured by the headcount ratio and the poverty gap the 
relationship with financial stability is insignificant and negative. Micro stability through 
healthier households and the business sector (improved standard of living) can 
enhance the stability of the financial system (CGAP, 2012). Instability in the banking 
sector can lead to banking crises and economic recession accompanied with job 
losses. Poor households have little headroom to absorb financial shocks. The 
instability of the financial system can increase poverty, which is a finding that is 
consistent with Neaime and Gaysset (2018).  
 
6.4.1.5 Institutional Quality (instQ_index) and poverty  
 
Similar to the previous findings the poverty proxies responded differently to the 
institutional quality variable. The relationship between institutional quality and the 
inequality is negative and significant as expected. A percentage point increase in the 
quality of institutions tends to reduce the inequality as measure by the Gini index and 
quality institutions tend to reduce the income gaps by 0.0453 percentage points. The 
institutional quality reduces poverty in that if the economy has favourable legal and 
policy environment with the capacity to cost efficiently address the market failures 






The institutional quality is positively related with poverty as and it is significant at 10 
percent level in the case of poverty as measured by the headcount ratio. This finding 
is consistent with Perera and Lee (2013) who found that improvement in the 
institutional quality (democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality) increases 
poverty. Referring back to the descriptive statistics (Table 6.2) this variable is fairly 
constant across the sample for the period under investigation. This might be difficult 
to observe the effect of an improvement in the quality of the index on poverty. The 
study concurs with Perera and Lee (2013) that an improvement in institutional quality 
can be a shock to the system with an effect to increase in poverty levels. Alternatively, 
for this study we observe that the improvements in the institutional quality index 
reduces inequality, there might be a trade-off between the reduced inequality and 
increase in poverty an assertion which was also observed by Andres and Ramlogan-
Dobson (2011), Chong and Calde´ron (2000) for developing countries.  
 
6.4.1.6 Inflation (inf) and poverty  
 
The coefficients of inflation were not significant for all the poverty measurements and 
inflation related differently depending on how poverty is measured. When poverty is 
measured by the Gini index and the gross domestic product per capita the relationship 
between inflation and poverty is positive. Although in this study the relationship is 
insignificant it is in line with literature that inflation increases poverty incidences as it 
is detrimental to the poor more than the rich (Easterly and Fischer 2001, Dollar and 
Kray 2002; Neaime and Gaysset, 2018) As measured by headcount ratio and poverty 
gap inflation had a negative relationship with poverty which is contrary to Zhang and 
Naceur (2018) who found a positive relationship between inflation and poverty gap. 
 
Literature does not show a clear cut effect of inflation on poverty as it can either be 
positive or negative (Blank and Blinder, 1985; Romer and Romer, 1998). UN Report 
(2010) argues that the real wage reducing effect of inflation increase employment 
opportunities which increase income. In this case inflation can have a negative effect 
on the poor. Cardoso, 1992 argued that inflation do not have an effect on households 
below the poverty line as they have negligible cash holdings. Methodological 




finding on the relationship between inflation and poverty between this study and 
previous studies (see Zhang and Naceur, 2018; Rewilak, 2017). 
 
6.4.1.7 Remittances (rem) and poverty 
 
The role of remittances in poverty reduction is mixed depending on how poverty is 
measured. For headcount ratio, poverty gap and the gross domestic product per capita 
the relationship is insignificant. As measured by the headcount ratio the relationship 
is negative as expected although it is insignificant. Remittances are thought to reduce 
poverty since they are directly received by the poor households (Adams and Page, 
2005). According to the World Bank (2018) remittances in Africa are a major source 
of external finance providing stable finance more that the official development 
assistance and the foreign direct investment. The study found out that the effect of 
remittances on poverty relies on how poverty is measured.  From the results poverty 
as measured by the headcount ratio have a negative insignificant relationship with 
remittances. The finding contradicts those of Inoue (2018) who found that remittances 
have a significant poverty reducing effect for a panel of developing economies. Adams 
and Page (2005) found a negative significant relationship between remittances and 
poverty and found that remittances might decrease the depth, level, and severity of 
poverty. The international remittances are thought to have a poverty reducing effect 
among households that have international migrants. Remittances have the potential 
of increasing households’ income which is in turn used for, smoothing consumption 
and helping in reducing the capital constraints of the poor and the venturing into 
entrepreneurial activities. Studies on the relationship between poverty and remittances 
for a set of developing countries are scarce.  
 
Households that receive international remittances have a lower probability of 
remaining poor as compared to households who do not receive international 
remittances. Our results on the negative effect of remittance on poverty can be 
compared to Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) and Akobeng (2016) although the data 
frequencies and the methodologies used differ. As measured with the Gini index 
remittances has a significant positive relationship, a ten percent increase in 
remittances increases the Gini index by 0.0111 percentage point. The remittances in 




who finds that remittances have an inequality reducing effect in Mexico. This finding 
is however in line with the Adams Cuecuecha, and Page (2008) findings in Ghana that 
international remittances increases inequality. 
 
Russell (1992) opined that people’s choice between formal and informal channels for 
remitting money relies on socio-economic attributes of members of the household, 
their nature and degree of economic activity in the hosting countries, the sending 
charge differentials and relative effectiveness of the formal sector to the informal 
sector. Formal credit extension to the poor in the developing countries with 
underdeveloped banking sector countries is a challenge and remittances therefore 
provides liquidity and ease credit constraints of low income households (Meyer and 
Shera, 2017).  
 
6.4.1.8 Domestic Public Debt (dpd) and poverty 
 
The study uses the domestic public debt as one of the control variables to examine 
the relationship between domestic public debt in a financial intermediation setting. The 
study includes the variable in the analysis since high public debt crowds out private 
investments. In developing countries, the concentration of the investor base for 
domestic debt is mainly the concentration of the investor base, mainly dominated by 
the Central Banks and the commercial banks (Bua et al., 2014). This may render 
financial intermediation to be ineffective as the lending to the public sector can crowd 
out private sector lending by the commercial banks (Christensen, 2005)). Although 
none of the poverty measurements had a significant relationship with the domestic 
public debt they all have a negative relationship with domestic debt. Increase in 
domestic debt has a positive reducing effect if the debt is used in improving the welfare 
of the people.  
 
6.4.2 Cointegration and r Error Correction  
 
This section presents the analysis that addresses the two objectives of the study that 
is to examine the cointegrating relationship between financial intermediation and 
poverty, to ascertain if there are causality effects between poverty and the selected 




relationship and causality are headcount ratio, poverty gap and the Gini index. 
Cointegration is ascertained between variables if a long run equilibrium relationship 
between the variables exists (Awe, 2012). The study therefore found that cointegration 
exist between the variables and proceeded performing the  error correction between 
financial variables (financial intermediation, financial efficiency, financial access and 
financial stability as the determinants of poverty) and poverty is tested and discussed.  
 
In examining the cointegrating relationship between financial intermediation and 
poverty and financial intermediation the pooled mean group estimator in a panel ARDL 
procedure was the preferred method. The ARDL technique has the advantages that it 
does not require the variables to be of the same order of integration although for 
consistency of the estimates the variables should not be of higher order than first order 
integration I(1). Furthermore, the error correction term ECT is extracted from the panel 
ARDL estimation to examine the short run characteristics of the relationship between 
poverty and financial intermediation. Additionally, the significance/insignificance of the 
short run, long run and the error correction coefficients of panel ARDL explain the 
causal effects between poverty and its determinants. The panel ARDL can be 
categorised as the error correction model as it can identify the short run and long run 
relationships (Attiaoui, Toumi, Ammouri, and Gargouri, 2017). 
 
6.4.2.1 Pooled Mean Group (PMG), Mean Group (MG) or Dynamic fixed 
effects (DFE) 
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 4 regarding panel ARDL the study needed to 
determine whether pooled mean group (PMG), mean group (MG) or the dynamic fixed 
effects (DFE) is the most appropriate estimator for the panel ARDL. The Hausman test 
was performed to select the most appropriate estimator for the ARDL model and the 
p-value of the Hausman test is statistically insignificant rendering the PMG estimator 
is more appropriate. If there is homogeneity of the slope the PMG is the most 
appropriate estimator and the null hypothesis of slope homogeneity in the long run 
cannot be rejected if the probability value is more than 5 percent, the study assume 
that the PMG is the best estimator to use to analyse the panel data. The pooled mean 
group assumed that the long run coefficients are the same across the group that 




As PMG is the preferred estimation technique the discussion of the results will be 
mainly from the output of the PMG estimator (Hausman test results are reported in the 
appendix). The PMG has an advantage over the MG and the DFE in that PMG 
estimator allows heterogeneity in the intercept, the short run parameters and the error 
variances between the groups whilst restricting homogeneity of the long-run 
coefficients among the groups (Pesaran et al., 1999). When the homogeneity of the 
parameters holds the error term are serially uncorrelated and the long run parameters 
are homogenous across for all the countries in the panel (Pesaran, et al., 1999; Loayza 
and Rancière, 2006). Therefore to examine the cointegration between the variables 
the study used the panel ARDL.  
The panel ARDL permits us to examine the long run and short run dynamics of the 
variables of interest. The panel ARDL is preferable as it also allows us to examine the 
heterogeneity of the variables of interest across countries in the short run. The study 
compare these results with those obtained using more restrictive dynamic fixed effects 
(DFE) methods, and the more flexible, but data-intensive, Mean Group (MG) approach 
and the output of these results of all the three panel error correction estimators (PMG, 
MG and DFE are presented in the Appendix 15-44). This section gives emphasis on 
the results obtained by employing the PMG estimator, as the Hausman test failed to 
reject the null hypothesis. Furthermore, it will be a preferred estimator due to its 
benefits in consistency and efficiency over the other panel estimators (see Loayza and 
Rancière, 2006) The results that were obtained from mean group and the dynamic 
fixed effects are also presented for comparison purposes and the results are 
presented in the Appendix section of the study. This section only presented and 
discussed the results from the PMG estimator.  
 
6.4.2.2 Panel cointegration and the Error Correction Model: Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) approach  
 
In this section the study discusses the results of the cointegration and the error 
correction between the poverty proxies’ and the financial dimensions namely financial 
intermediation, financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability. Each of the 
financial dimensions is jointly tested with financial intermediation to examine the 




the pooled mean group which assumes that a long run relationship between poverty 
and the financial dimensions are identical across countries whilst allowing the short 
run relationship to be country specific. The coefficients have been verified for the long 
run homogeneity using the Hausman test as explained in section 6.5.2.1. Tables 6.7-
6.9 report the results of PMG estimation of the long-run and short-run coefficients of 
the financial dimensions and the coefficient of the error correction term.  
 
6.4.2.2.1 Cointegration and Error Correction Model for poverty proxies, financial 
intermediation and financial efficiency  
 
Table 6.5 summarises the pooled mean group estimates of the cointegrating 
relationship between the financial dimensions (financial intermediation, financial 
efficiency) and poverty proxies for the selected developing countries of this study. 
When estimating the model using financial efficiency as a dependent variable the 





Table 6.5: Summary of the Pooled Mean Group on the cointegrating and causality 
relationship between poverty proxies and financial intermediation and financial 
efficiency  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆.hcr ∆.povgap ∆.gini 






































N 321 321 411 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr (headcount ratio), povgap (poverty gap) and gini (gini 
index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial intermediation and is measures the interest rate spread measuring bank 
efficiency.  The xtpmg routine in stata was used for the estimations. The first panel displays the results of the long run effects 
whist the second panel displays the results of both the error correction term (ECT) and the short run effects. ∆ is the difference 
operator. 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The results from Table 6.5 showed that there is long run relationship between poverty, 
financial intermediation and financial efficiency. The long run relationship between 
financial intermediation and poverty as measured by the headcount ratio is negative 
and significant at 10 percent level. Increase in the financial intermediation in the long 
run reduces poverty incidences as the low income households access more credit for 
consumption smoothing or human capital investments. The same result were 
observed when the study measure poverty with the poverty gap that when financial 
intermediation is increased, poverty (headcount and poverty gap) is reduced in the 
long run and the result is significant at 1 percent significant level. The results show 
that increase in financial intermediation widens the inequality gap in the long run.  
 
There is a significant positive long run relationship between all poverty proxies and 




poverty proxies and financial efficiency where efficiency in financial intermediation is 
expected to reduce poverty. Theory has mixed results on the effects of the financial 
efficiency on poverty incidences as financial efficiency can either have a positive or 
negative effect on poverty incidences (Prokopenko and Holden, 2001; Rewilak, 2017). 
Theoretically, financial efficiency is expected to be poverty reducing as the banks are 
able manage the risk of information asymmetry and reduce transaction costs and 
make credit available to the poor. It is expected that as financial sector improves 
efficiency it should result in poverty reduction ceteris paribus. Lower interest rate 
spreads (better financial efficiency) can significantly reduce poverty in the long run in 
which this positive significant relationship between financial efficiency and poverty is 
consistent with the finding by Zhang and Naceur (2018).  
 
Most banks in developing countries have monopoly power and lack of competition 
enables them to charge higher spreads (Allen and Gale, 2004). Higher spreads 
discourage participation in the formal financial sector by the poor thereby increasing 
poverty incidences. Alternatively, higher spread implies that banks are still profitable 
without increasing a product offering that meets the need of the poor hence the higher 
spreads have a positive effect with poverty (Zhang and Naceur, 2018). The higher the 
cost of credit irrespective of it being profitable for the banks hurts the poor in that credit 
is expensive the availability of credit by the poor households’ who often lack the 
collateral or do not have good credit scoring for banks to advance credit.  The role of 
financial efficiency in poverty reduction to our knowledge is empirically under 
researched. Hence the cost of credit can be a barrier to participation in formal financial 
sector by the poor resulting in the failure to unlock human capital that has a potential 
to reduce poverty. Higher spread mean expensive credit and it hurts the poor whilst 
lower spread has a poverty reducing effect as the cost of credit is cheaper and the 
poor and small businesses can be able to access the credit which they can use for 
consumption smoothing, capital accumulation and risk management. 
 
Additionally, improved financial efficiency by the financial sector implies improved 
screening and monitoring of loan applications and most likely the loans with negative 
present value are declined. As most of the low income and small businesses lack 
collateral their loan application is likely to fall in the category of loan with negative 




reducing effect through consumption smoothing and availability of funds to absorb 
negative shock. However, in the short run the study observed an insignificant negative 
relationship between efficiency and poverty as measured by the headcount ratio and 
the poverty gap. As financial efficiency improves in the capital allocation and allows 
for income generation by enhancing the productive capacity of poor households this 
can have a poverty reducing effect. Bank inefficiency (higher spread) is accompanied 
with credit rationing consequently lowering the credit that is channelled to qualifying 
borrowers, (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Bester, 1987; Beck, 2007). Financial 
intermediation and financial efficiency can jointly explain the level of poverty in that if 
the credit is rationed and not all borrowers have the access to the financial services 
and products inequality can increase. This study found that in the presence of financial 
efficiency financial intermediation increases inequality in the long run (Table 6.5). 
The error correction term is negative and significant under the preferred PMG 
estimator. Poverty as measured with the headcount ratio adjusts to changes in 
financial intermediation and financial efficiency to its long run equilibrium at a speed 
of adjustment of 43.7 percent whilst is poverty is measured by the poverty gap it adjust 
to its long run equilibrium at an adjustment speed of 49.3 percent. The Gini index 
adjusts at a speed of adjustment of 20.8 percent to any shocks to financial 
intermediation and financial efficiency.  
 
All the poverty proxies have a significant long run relationship with financial 
intermediation, and financial efficiency. Zhan and Sherraden (2011) asserted that 
improved accumulation of financial assets among the low income earners has a 
poverty reducing effect as increase intermediation of the financial services allows for 
consumption smoothing and improved standard of living. All poverty proxies are 
significantly related to financial intermediation in the long run where the poverty is 
measured by the headcount ratio and the poverty gap is reduced as financial 
intermediation increases. However as measured with the Gini index an increase in 
financial intermediation increases the Gini index (inequality). The relationship is 
positive and significant at 5 percent. The relationship between poverty proxies and 
financial efficiency is positive and significantly related at 1 percent level for all the 





The insignificance of the p-values for all the proxies in the short run also implies that 
there is no short run cointegration. However, for all the proxies the error correction 
term is negative and significant as expected. For all the proxies of poverty there is a 
long run cointegration among the variables at 1 percent significance level. Any 
deviations from the long run equilibrium are corrected at the speed of adjustment of 
43.7 percent, 49.3 percent and 20.7 percent for poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap 
and the Gini index respectively.  
 
6.4.2.2.2 Cointegration and Error Correction Model for poverty proxies, financial 
intermediation and financial access  
 
This section discusses results presented in Table 6.6. These are results of the 
cointegrating relationship between financial intermediation, financial access and the 
poverty proxies.  
Table 6.6: Summary of the Pooled Mean Group on the cointegration of poverty proxies 
and financial intermediation and financial access 
 (1) (1) (3) 
 hcr povgap gini 







































N 271 271 313 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr (headcount ratio), povgap (poverty gap) and gini (gini 
index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial intermediation and cb measures the financial access. ∆ is the difference operator. 
 





From Table 6.6, the relationship between bank branch expansion and poverty as 
measured with the headcount ratio is negative. This is in line with the survey 
experiments findings by Burger and Pande (2005) in India, as banks branches 
increases in the rural India poverty decreases. Degryse and Ongena (2005) argue that 
as the distance between the bank branches and the borrower/firms increases the loan 
rates increases worsening the lending conditions. These findings are similar only when 
poverty is measured by the Gini index. However, the relationship is insignificant in the 
long run. With improved access to finance poverty can be reduced in that the poor 
have the capacity to reduce their vulnerability to economic shocks (Dupas, Karlan, 
Robinson and Ubfal, 2018). The study found out that the bank branch penetration is 
cointergrated to poverty as measured by the poverty gap and the cointegration is only 
significant in the long run. In estimating the Gini index in this model the study dropped 
the period before 2008 as data prior to this had no variability. 
 
In most developing countries the number of bank branches penetration is lower than 
in higher income countries (Dhrifi, 2015). Financial intermediation accompanied with 
financial access reduces inequality in the long run as more resources are accessible 
and are allocated to the poor (Dabla-Norries et al., 2015). There is no long run and 
short run relationship between access to finance and inequality in this study. This is in 
contrast with Mookerjee and Kalipioni (2010) findings of a negative and significant 
relationship between access to finance and inequality. The study fails to observe any 
short run effect between poverty proxies and financial intermediation and financial 
access. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggested that in the early stages of 
development finance increases poverty and later stages it reduces poverty as 
resource allocation will be accessible by the larger population. The Error correction 
terms for all the proxies of poverty are highly significant at 1 percent significance level. 
Any variability from equilibrium between the poverty proxies, financial intermediation 
and financial access is corrected at a speed of adjustment of 45.4 percent, 57.9 
percent and 14.4 percent for poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap and Gini index 
respectively.  
 
6.4.2.2.3 Cointegration and Error Correction Model for poverty proxies, financial 





This section discusses the results of our estimation on the cointegration between 
poverty proxies’ financial intermediation and financial stability as measured by the 
bank Z-score. The 2007/9 Global financial crises provided a hint that financial 
instability can have detrimental effects to the welfare of the people specifically the poor 
who lacks investments to absorb periods of economic shocks. For a comparison of the 
reported results from the PMG estimator Appendix 24-26 presents the results in 
comparison with the MG and the DFE estimators. The results are summarised in Table 
6.7 followed with the discussion of the long run and short run relationships between 
the financial intermediation, financial stability and the poverty proxies. 
 
Table 6.7: Summary of the Pooled Mean Group on the cointegration of poverty proxies 
and financial intermediation and financial stability  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆hcr ∆povgap ∆gini 






































N 324 324 411 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr (headcount ratio), povgap (poverty gap) and gini (gini 
index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial intermediation and z measures the bank z score measuring bank stability. ∆ is the 
difference operator. 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
In the presence of financial intermediation, the financial stability has a positive long 
run relationship with the headcount ratio and the poverty gap. In this study the positive 
coefficients of Z-score suggest that an increase in the Z score (financial stability) in 





For the entire tests where poverty proxies were the dependent variables the error term 
which measures the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium after the short run 
divergence is negative and significant at 1 percent. Gujarati and Porter (2009) posited 
that the ECT must be negative and significant for the correction of the short run 
divergence to the convergence of its long run equilibrium. A positive error term will 
signify the divergence of the time series from its equilibrium and none of the error 
terms from this study was positive. The results from the study further satisfies the PMG 
condition of dynamic stability (long run relationship), negative and significant 
coefficients of the error which are not less than -2 (Loayza and Rancière, 2006). 
Cointegration and causal relationships between the poverty proxies and selected 
financial variables, namely financial intermediation, financial efficiency, financial 
access and financial stability as the dependent variables were performed. This 
analysis gives this study the advantage of examining some relationships that have not 
yet been extensively empirically researched. The study is able to examine how 
financial access, stability and efficiency have an impact on poverty reduction if they 
are added to the financial intermediation setting. In the presence of financial access, 
the long run relationship between financial intermediation and poverty proxies 
(headcount ratio and the Gini index) is positive and negative respectively. These long 
run relationships are different from the relationship between financial intermediation 
and these poverty proxies in the presence of financial efficiency (see Table 6.7).  
 
In the presence of financial efficiency financial intermediation has a poverty reducing 
effect with the poverty headcount ratio whilst in the presence of financial access the 
poverty headcount increase with an increase in financial intermediation. Moreover, the 
same observation of the changes of the relationships was observed with inequality. In 
the presence of financial efficiency increase in financial intermediation increases 
inequality whilst in the presence of financial access financial intermediation reduces 
inequality. The financial dimensions can influence the other dimensions and its impact 
on poverty reduction. For example, access to finance is poverty reducing only when it 
accompanied with lower transaction costs (financial efficiency). If the financial services 
and products are accessible but too expensive the poor household and small business 





In the presence of financial stability, the relationship between financial intermediation 
has a positive long run relationship with all the poverty proxies although the inequality 
index is insignificant. The finding is consistent with Zhang and Naceur (2018) that in 
the presence of financial instability the effect of finance on increase poverty incidences 
as all the long run coefficients are positive. The financial dimensions have a link on 
each other as they can amplify or reduce the favourable effects on each other to 
poverty reduction. Policy makers should be mindful of other financial dimensions when 
instituting policies targeting poverty reduction using any of the financial dimensions. 
The study observed that the short run relationships between the joint effect of financial 
intermediation and the other financial dimensions were not significant except for the 
joint effect with financial stability on poverty gap. In a nutshell the study observed some 
changes in the coefficients of financial intermediation if another financial dimension is 
introduced to the model. The causal relationships of the financial variables and the 
poverty proxies are discussed in section 6.5.2.5 
 
6.4.2.3 Panel Causality Test 
 
The tri-variate ECM within the ARDL framework was utilised to examine the causal 
relationships between each of the poverty proxies and the selected financial variables 
namely (financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability) within the financial 
intermediation setting. The study did not perform the Granger causality test, rather the 
study used the ECM to examine the causality between the variable of interest in this 
study. The causality links that this study inferred are in three categories namely long 
run causality, short run causality and strong causality/joint causality and the results 
are summarised in Tables 6.10-6.15 for each of the poverty proxies. Literature 
references on the causal relationships between the financial dimension and poverty 
that we have analysed in this study is scant. For this study the causality between the 
variables is determined by the statistical significance of the coefficients while the 
statistical significance of the respective error terms shows joint causality of the 
variables for the panel.  
 
Each of the variables selected for examining the causal relationship were taken in 
turns as a dependent variable in the tri-variate analysis of the relationships. In the 




cointegration relationships results with poverty proxies as dependent variables. The 
study found cointegrating relationship between the selected independent variables 
and poverty hence the study proceeded and performed the error correction model to 
determine the short run relationships and infer causal relationship between the 
variables using the results. 
 
The results for causal links of poverty as measured by the headcount ratio are reported 
in Table 6.10. Although this main interest in the causal links is between poverty and 
the financial variable of interest the study included the causal links between the 
financial variables themselves. The feedback loops within the financial sector can 
affect the performance of the other variables with relation to poverty. For example, 
increased access to finance enhances financial stability by increasing risk diversity 
through an increase in the funding base of bank deposits (Han and Melecky, 2013; 
Morgan and Pontines, 2014). Increased intermediation and access to these 
intermediated services reduces the risk of bank insolvency.   
 
The results in table 6.8 are further elaborated in table 6.9 indicating a summary on the 






Table 6. 8: Panel-ECM  
Dependent 
variable 
Source of Causation (independent variables) 
 Long run coefficients  Short run coefficients   
 hcr pcredit  is ∆hcr ∆pcredit ∆is ECT  
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Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr (headcount ratio), povgap (poverty gap) and gini (gini 
index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial intermediation and is measures financial efficiency, cb measures financial access z 
is the bank z score measuring bank stability. ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
The causal links that are presented in Table 6.8 where the headcount ratio was used 
as the proxy for poverty are further elaborated and summarized in Table 6.9. The 
causal links are mainly in the long run and there is joint causality for the selected 
variables as the ECT coefficients are statistically significant. The causal analysis for 
the panel of the developing countries in this study is unique in that it did not only allow 
us to examine the relationship between poverty and financial variables, but also 
among the financial variable used in this study. Policy makers should not only be 
concerned with one dimension of financial intermediation of financial services to the 
poor and the small businesses. The efficiency and accessibility of the financial 
services is also important for the poor to have maximum benefits of financial 
intermediation (Beck 2007). Literature on the causal effect of the financial dimension 




Previous studies who examine the causal effects of finance on poverty mainly used 
the trickle down approach where it was conditional on economic growth (see Jalilian 
and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Odhiambo, 2010; Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Naceur et al., 
2017). Furthermore, the analysis allows us to examine the causal analysis and the 
behavior of the variables within the financial intermediation setting by substituting 
financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability.Expanding financial 
intermediation and financial efficiency is on no value if the poor cannot access the 
financial services (Levine, 2008).  
 
Table 6. 9: Panel ECM. Dependent variable- Headcount ratio  
Dependent 
variable 
Source of Causation (independent variables 
 Long run Causality  Short run Causality    
 hcr pcredit  is ∆hcr ∆pcredit ∆is ECT  
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*, **, *** represent 10, 5 and 1 percent level of significance respectively, t statistics in parentheses, hcr (headcount ratio),  
pcredit is financial intermediation and is measures financial efficiency, cb measures financial access z is the bank z score 
measuring bank stability. ∆ is the difference operator 




The study found bidirectional causality between poverty headcount ratio and financial 
intermediation in the long run. The causal links are in both directions where financial 
intermediation causes poverty and poverty causes financial intermediation. This 
finding contradicts that of Perez-Moreno (2011), who did not find any causality 
between private credit and poverty for a sample of developing countries. The Perez-
Moreno (2011) study did not include the other financial dimensions in the regression 
analysis as for the period under study there no data was available for other financial 
dimension such financial access. Furthermore, the periods included 1970–1980 and 
1980–1990 during which period financial reforms such as financial liberalisation could 
have an effect on the causality effects as the results were sensitive to the period of 
study. The study further tested the causal links jointly with other financial dimension 
and found that financial intermediation jointly causes poverty with financial efficiency, 
financial access and financial stability. The relationship between financial efficiency 
and the headcount ratio is bidirectional where the financial efficiency causes poverty 
and vice versa. Efficient provision of financial services reduces poverty which in turn 
increases the demand of financial services providing an explanation of the causal links 
between poverty and financial intermediation and financial efficiency (Beck et al. 
2007).  
 
The causal link between poverty and financial access is unidirectional in that financial 
access causes poverty headcount ratio in the long run but the study failed to observe 
the same links in the direction of poverty to financial access. Empirical studies 
available focused on the role of financial access in reducing poverty than the causal 
relationship between financial access and poverty (see Burgess and Pande, 2005; 
Mookerjee and Kalipioni, 2010; Naceur and Zhang, 2018). There is bidirectional long 
run relationship between financial stability (Z-Score) and the headcount ratio. As 
earlier noted that the study also allows for an inference of the causal links between the 
financial variable in the study, there is bidirectional relationship between financial 
efficiency and financial intermediation. In the long run financial efficiency causes 
financial intermediation and the vice versa in the long run. Beck (2007) argued that 
lower interest spread facilitates the increased access of credit. Hence improved bank 
efficiency causes financial intermediation as the credit extension increases as credit 




links between financial access and financial intermediation as the results shows that 
financial intermediation causes financial access and vice versa.  
The stability of the financial sector is crucial for the performance of the sector in the 
real economy. The study found bidirectional causal links between financial 
intermediation and financial stability. Financial intermediation causes financial stability 
and vice versa. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) opined the monetary aggregates such 
as domestic credit are the best predictors of financial fragility in any economy. 
Furthermore, unsustainable intermediation of financial services cause instability in the 
banking sector (Beck and Feyen, 2013). The study fails to observe causal links in the 
short run when the study used poverty headcount as the proxy for poverty except for 
financial access. The error correction term is significant for all the relationship at 1 
percent significance level. Any short run deviation from the equilibrium is corrected at 
a speed of adjustments of 25.8 percent form financial stability to headcount ratio and 
38.1 percent from headcount ratio to financial stability. From the results presented in 
the Table 6.11 there is no causal relationship between the poverty proxies and 
financial intermediation and financial efficiency in the short run as the short run 
coefficients are all insignificant.  
 
Table 6.12 presents the results of the analysis on the causal links between poverty 
gap and the financial variables selected for this study. In Table 6.12 the study used 





Table 6.10: Panel ECM. Dependent variable- Poverty Gap  
Dependent 
variable 
Sources of Causation (independent variables 
 Long run coefficients  Short run coefficients   
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Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr (headcount ratio), povgap (poverty gap) and gini (gini 
index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial intermediation and is measures financial efficiency, cb measures financial access z 
is the bank z score measuring bank stability.  ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
Table 6.11 summarises the causal links between the selected financial dimensions 
and poverty gap. The summary is of the results depicted in Table 6.10 and it further 





Table 6.11: Causal links among the variables with poverty gap as the poverty measure  
Dependen
t variable 
Sources of Causation (independent variables 
 Long run coefficients  Short run coefficients   
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Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr (headcount ratio), povgap (poverty gap) and gini (gini 
index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial intermediation and is measures financial efficiency, cb measures financial access z 
is the bank z score measuring bank stability.  ∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Author’s own computations 
 
For the causal links with poverty gap as the measure of poverty all the financial 
variables the study mostly found long run and joint causal link than in the short run. 
The causal link between poverty gap and financial intermediation exist under all the 
links analysed in this study, the relationship of financial intermediation and poverty 
was estimated jointly with financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability 




with poverty. Furthermore, the results show that has a joint causality to poverty with 
financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability respectively.  
 
The empirical finding on the causality between financial efficiency and poverty gap is 
bidirectional causality in the long run with unidirectional causality in the short run from 
poverty to financial efficiency. Together with financial intermediation they jointly cause 
poverty. The study observed bidirectional causality between poverty gap and financial 
access in the long run with no short run causal links. The causal links of financial 
efficiency and poverty gap in the long run is bidirectional whilst the short run has a 
unidirectional causality from financial stability to poverty. In our empirical analysis the 
study further examined the relationship between the financial dimensions. There is 
bidirectional causality between financial efficiency and financial intermediation with no 
short run causality. In the long run causality between financial intermediation and 
financial access is unidirectional from financial access to financial intermediation. The 
stability of the financial sector causes better financial intermediation and better 
financial efficiency which in turn reduce poverty (Uddin et al., 2014). In the short run 
there is no causality between financial access and financial intermediation. The study 
further found bidirectional causality between financial stability and financial 
intermediation in the long run. In the short run the causality is unidirectional from 
financial stability to financial intermediation. Unlike with the other variables in which 
neutrality was observed on the short run causal relationship between the independent 
variables and the selected poverty proxies, with the Z-score the study observed a 
causal relationship between bank stability and poverty gap in the short run. Bank 
stability (Z-score) has a short run causality to poverty gap at 10 percent significant 
level and causal effect is unidirectional as the poverty gap do not cause bank stability 
in the short run (as shown in Table 6.10 and 6.11). 
 
Table 6.12 and 6.13 reports the results of the analysis using the Gini index as the 














Table 6.12: Panel ECM. Dependent variable- Gini index  
Dependent variable Source of Causation (independent variables 
 Long run coefficients  Short run coefficients   
 gini pcredit  is ∆gini ∆pcredit ∆is ECT  
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Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. gini (Gini index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures financial efficiency, cb measures financial access z is the bank Z-score measuring bank stability.  
∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
Table 6.13 is a summary of the results presented in table 6.12. Gini index and 





Table 6. 13: Causal links among the variables with Gini index as the poverty measure  
Dependent 
variable 
Source of Causation (independent variables 
 Long run coefficients  Short run coefficients   
 gini pcredit  is ∆gini ∆pcredit ∆is ECT  




































 gini pcredit  Cb ∆gini ∆pcredit ∆cb ECT  







































 Gini pcredit  z ∆gini ∆pcredit ∆z ECT  






































Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. gini (Gini index) as poverty proxies, pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures financial efficiency, cb measures financial access z is the bank z score measuring bank stability. 
∆ is the difference operator. 
Source: Author’s own computation 
 
Tables 6.12 and Tables 6.13 summarises the causal links of Gini and the financial 
intermediation, financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability. Theories do 
not explicitly provide a framework on the causal relationship between financial 
dimensions and inequality, the relationships that are theoretically available provide for 
the association between the variables than the causal effects (see Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine). Finance can determine the gap between the rich and the poor, consequently 
finance shapes the persistence of the inequality across generations (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 2009). There is unidirectional causality between financial intermediation 
and inequality (Gini index) in that financial intermediation causes inequality and 




In the long run there is a bidirectional causal relationship between income inequality 
and financial efficiency whilst in the short run the causal relationship is unidirectional 
in that income inequality causes efficiency in the financial sector since only the 
coefficients of the Gini index are significant. Theoretically, financial intermediation and 
financial efficiency can reduce intergenerational persistence in relative income by 
expanding economic opportunities to the small business and the poor (Becker and 
Tomes 1979, 1986; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). Naceur and Zhang (2018) found 
that enhancing financial efficiency reduces inequality the study was short of examining 
the causal relationship between financial efficiency and inequality. The study mostly 
found causality in the long run and joint causality with only unidirectional short run 
between financial efficiency and Gini index. In the short run inequality causes financial 
efficiency but the reverse does not hold for our study in the short run.  
 
In the presence of financial efficiency the study found a unidirectional relationship 
between Gini and financial intermediation in that financial intermediation causes 
poverty and poverty do not cause financial intermediation in the long run. Higher fixed 
costs associated with small transaction hinders the intermediation of financial services 
to the poor and small businesses and together with financial efficiency, financial 
intermediation can cause poverty (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). The study further 
analysed the relationship of poverty and financial intermediation including other 
financial dimensions. When financial efficiency was introduced in the model the study 
found that financial intermediation and efficiency jointly causes poverty. The study fails 
to observe short run causal links between financial intermediation and financial 
efficiency. But in the short run there were causal links with a short run unidirectional 
causality where financial efficiency causes poverty and but poverty do not cause 
financial efficiency. Furthermore, jointly with financial access, financial intermediation 
causes poverty. Inequality in accessing financial services hurts the poor more than the 
rich, political influence protects the established rents for a few individuals at the 
expense of the poor and small business causing inequality in income (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson,2005). Empirical studies that looked at the 
causal relationship between access to finance and poverty are scant as previously 





When the study included financial stability dimension to financial intermediation the 
study found out that there were no causal links between financial intermediation and 
the Gini index in the presence of financial stability. The study fails to observe the 
causal links both in the long and the short run between financial stability and inequality 
although the joint causal links as depicted by the error correction term was significant. 
In the long run the study found a bidirectional causal links between financial efficiency 
and Gini index. In the short run the causal links are unidirectional where inequality 
causes financial efficiency and financial efficiency do not cause inequality. There is no 
causal relationship between Gini and financial access both in the long run and short 
run. The study fail to find even the joint causal links between the variables as the error 
correction term was insignificant. 
 
The financial stability does not have any causal links with the Gini index both in the 
long run and short run, there was joint causal links together with financial 
intermediation. Dabla-Norris et al., 2015 opines that for developed countries prolonged 
periods of persistent inequality can cause financial instability as the influence of the 
rich affects the economic decisions. This did not find any causal links between financial 
stability and inequality. Further analysis of the causal links between the financial 
dimensions themselves shows that there is bidirectional causality between financial 
efficiency and financial intermediation in the long run. In the short run financial 
intermediation and financial efficiency do not have any causal links. Empirical literature 
mainly looked at the association of the financial dimensions, there is dearth of 
empirical literature that examines the causal relationship between the financial 
dimensions and poverty in which this study is contributing to this literature. Financial 
access has a bidirectional causal links with the financial intermediation. Increased 
intermediation of financial products and services has causal links with the access of 
financial product in the long run. In the short run the study fail to observe any causal 
links between financial access and financial intermediation. In the long run financial 
stability and financial intermediation have a bidirectional causal links where financial 
intermediation causes financial stability and vice versa. In the short run the causal links 





As with the other poverty proxies the coefficient of the ECT for all the estimations is 
significant meaning there in joint causality that exists for the variables in the panel. 
Short run causality was only observed unidirectional from Gini to financial efficiency. 
As explained earlier that the performance of the financial variables can have feedback 
mechanisms within the financial sector. In most developing economies interest rate 
spreads are higher reflecting the higher cost of financial intermediation which in turn 
is associated with high risk aversion among lenders, higher opportunity cost 
emanating from the higher reserve requirement ratio, lower bank completion and 
higher overhead cost. These are mostly some of the traits of formal finance in the 
developing economies and they have repercussion of the well-being of society.  
 
6.5 Chapter Summary  
 
Summatively, various econometric methodologies were applied to answer the 
objectives of the study. Preliminary tests such as descriptive statistics and correlation 
analysis were performed to examine the nature of the data. Before the study 
performed the econometric models the diagnostic tests such as the unit root test and 
the Hausman test were performed. The study used the GMM to determine the 
relationship between poverty proxies and the selected variables of interest. The study 
performed the Hausman test to determine whether we should estimate the model 
using the system GMM for a panel with random or fixed effects. The results from the 
Hausman suggested that the most appropriate the test is for a panel with fixed effects. 
The results showed that there is no common consensus on the relationship between 
the selected independent variables and poverty. The variables related differently to 
the poverty proxies signalling that how poverty is defined and measured is significant. 
 
After determining the relationship between the variables the ARDL was used to 
examine the cointegrating relationships between the financial variables namely 
(financial intermediation, financial access, financial efficiency and financial stability) 
and poverty. Although the panel ARDL do not specify the requirement to perform unit 
root test the variables should not be of higher order integration more than the first 
order integration. Using the unit root test some of the variables were at level whilst 





In the ARDL the study needed to determine whether the PMG, MG, or DFE is the most 
appropriate estimator. Using the Hausman test the PMG was the most appropriate 
estimator for the cointegration and the causal analysis between the variables. As the 
variables were cointegrated the study further used the panel ECM to test the short run 
relationship between the variables in this study. From the analysis the study concludes 
that there was mostly long run relationship between financial variables and poverty. 
The study found that the short run relationships between the financial variables and 
poverty are mostly insignificant. The error correction term for all the variables under 
examination was negative and significant. This implies that after the short run shocks 
the variables converge to the long run equilibrium. Using the results from the ARDL 
test the study deduced the causal links between the variables using the significance 
of the long run, short run and the ECT coefficients. The variables mostly had the causal 
links in the long run. The significance of the coefficients indicates causal links between 
the variables. The study observed neutrality of the causal links in the short run except 
for Gini and financial stability and poverty gap financial efficiency which had a positive 
cointegration in the short run with the financial stability. In both causal links the 
relationship was unidirectional from Gini to financial efficiency and from financial 






SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 




This concluding chapter provides a summation of the study that includes suggestions 
for future research in the subject area. Section 7.2 summarises the objectives of the 
study in order to illuminate the observations, arguments and conclusions of the study 
that are summarised in this chapter. Section 7.3 discusses the summary results of the 
study whilst section 7.4 provides the contribution of the study to the research area and 
the discipline. The theoretical, social and policy implications of the results are 
discussed in section 7.5. The limitations of the study and the recommendations for 
further research are elaborated in section 7.6. 
 
7.1 Summary on objectives of the study 
 
The main aim of the study was to examine the nexus between financial intermediation 
and poverty using panel of selected developing countries. The study sought to achieve 
this by examining the relationship between the selected determinants of poverty for 
this study and poverty. Poverty is measured in absolute and relative terms; hence this 
study used different poverty proxies that capture both the absolute dimension and the 
relative dimension in examining these relationships. Furthermore, the study sought to 
determine the cointegration between poverty proxies and the determinants of poverty. 
After confirming the presence of cointegration, the study examined the short run 
relationships. The study further examined the causal relationship between poverty and 
financial intermediation. 
 
7.2 Summary of results 
 
The role of financial institutions and markets in the social and political facets of the 
economy has been increasing in terms of capital accumulation and distribution. 




opportunities to invest, save and risk mitigation. In most developing countries bank 
finance is the major source of external financing compared to the capital markets 
(Gries, 2009, Samargandi et al., 2015). The study examined the deterministic, 
cointegration and causal relationships among poverty proxies and the selected 
variables of interest for 35 selected developing countries. Annual data from 2004 to 
2016 was used for the study. The GMM method of analysis was applied. For the 
deterministic relationship between financial intermediation and poverty found out that 
how poverty is defined and measured had an effect on how it relates to the selected 
variables of interest as the significance of the variables and the relationship varies 
from each measure. Financial intermediation, that is the channelling of funds from 
surplus units to deficit units is a causal factor in explaining poverty reduction (Beck et 
al., 2007) and the reduction in inequality (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). In 
addition financial intermediation explains the causal effects in the expansion of the 
breadth of access to financial services (Beck et al., 2007).  
 
Theory is ambiguous on the role of finance in poverty and inequality reduction 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). Theoretically credit constraints in imperfect 
financial markets are binding on the poor and small businesses (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Galor and Zeira, 1993). The efficiency of the banking sector in overcoming these 
market frictions has a poverty reducing effect (Beck et al., 2004, 2007). Higher interest 
spread (bank inefficiency), for this study, increases poverty as measured by the 
headcount ratio of the poverty gap whilst a decrease in interest spread (better financial 
efficiency) reduces poverty in the long run. The finding confirms the theoretical 
constructs that transaction costs, contract enforcement and the lack of credit history 
can be detrimental to the poor and small businesses and the removal of these 
constraints benefits the poor (Beck et al., 2007). Furthermore, if the efficiency of the 
financial sector improves the quality of the financial products and services already 
enjoyed by the people who have purchased the services without broadening access 
to the financial services and products it tends to increase inequality (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990). This is affirmed by the results of this study which indicate that in the 
presence of financial efficiency, financial intermediation increases inequality. 
Empirically the finding of increase in financial intermediation with an increase in 
inequality is in line with the findings of De Haan and Sturm (2017). Although there are 




Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) argued that public policies on the financial sector 
can be shaped by income distribution and vice versa.  
 
The cointegration analysis of the study found that there is long run equilibrium 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty proxies. This long run results 
found out that in the long run financial intermediation and financial efficiency increases 
inequalities confirming the Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
assertions that countries with initial market inequalities maintain inequalities across 
generations and the rich benefits more from financial intermediation through 
accumulation of capital and investments in entrepreneurial projects to earn more 
income. This is further supported by the other strand of theory that suggests financial 
influence in intergenerational persistence of poverty and inequality (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, 2009 and Galor, 2011).  
 
Levine (2005) argues that the removal of these credit inefficiencies reduces inequality 
as the access to the financial products allow for capital accumulation, borrowing for 
consumption smoothing and for entrepreneurs to start business which has a poverty 
reducing effects. The results from the study where financial access have a poverty 
reducing effect confirms the arguments by Shaw (1973) and Pagano (1993) where 
finance is poverty reducing when the financial resources are available to the poor and 
the small businesses. For the cointegration relationships together with financial 
intermediation, the study found that the financial access has a negative and significant 
relationship with poverty headcount and poverty gap. For all the financial variables the 
study found long run relationships than the short run supporting that poverty is 
persistent. 
 
The results of the study reveal that financial intermediation has a poverty reducing 
effect when poverty is measured by the poverty gap and the Gini index. Improved 
financial intermediation compounded with bank efficiency contributes to poverty 
reduction by facilitating capital accumulation among the low income earners through 
making financial services efficiently available. Furthermore, as the intermediated 
financial services to the poor increases they are able to manage their risks as the 
availability of financial services increases their capacity for risk management. Access 




through the ability of the financial sector to channel financial resources from the deficit 
to the surplus units (Babajide, Adegboye and Omankhanlen, 2015; Demirguc-Kunt et 
al. 2017).  
 
To examine the cointegration and the causal relationship between financial 
intermediation and poverty the study employed the panel ARDL method of analysis. 
Using the PMG/ARDL the result suggests that how poverty is measured is important 
as the poverty proxies related differently to the financial variables. The ARDL answers 
the second and the third objectives of the study on the cointegrating relationships 
between poverty and the financial variables of interest. The study finds out that most 
variables have a long run relationship with the poverty proxies than in the short run.  
 
All the variables in the study had joint causality effect to the poverty proxies as all the 
results from the ECT are significant. The study found out that introducing the other 
financial dimensions (financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability) in 
other cases changes the magnitude and the relationship between financial 
intermediation and the poverty proxies. The study is able to demonstrate how financial 
access, stability and efficiency have an impact on poverty reduction if they are added 
to the financial intermediation setting. In the presence of financial access, the long run 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty proxies (headcount ratio and 
the Gini index) is observed to be positive and negative respectively. These long run 
relationships are different from the relationship between financial intermediation and 
these poverty proxies in the presence of financial efficiency (see Table 6.5).  
 
In the presence of financial efficiency, financial intermediation has a poverty reducing 
effect as the relationship with the headcount ratio in the long run is negative. When 
financial access is included to financial intermediation instead of financial efficiency 
the poverty headcount ratio increases with an increase in financial intermediation. 
Moreover the same observation of the changes of the relationships was observed with 
inequality. In the presence of financial efficiency, an increase in financial 
intermediation increases inequality whilst in the presence of financial access financial 
intermediation reduces inequality. The financial dimensions can influence the other 
dimensions and its impact on poverty reduction. For example access to finance is 




efficiency). If the financial services and products are accessible but too expensive the 
poor household and small business will not afford the financial services. In this study 
it was observed that there are feedback mechanisms among the financial variables 
themselves such that it affects the impact of each of the variables on poverty. 
 
7.3 Contribution of the study and policy implications 
 
The studies that have covered the role of finance in a panel of developing economies 
have mainly focused of the size of the financial sector than the other financial 
dimensions (Clarke et al. 2006; Nikoloski 2013; De Haan and Sturm, 2017). The study 
contributes to literature as an extension to the already existing knowledge. Over and 
above the commonly used proxies for financial intermediation and development, the 
study further includes remittances and the domestic public debt, which are not 
discussed extensively in financial intermediation settings. There are continuous 
improvements of data available for measuring financial access, the study uses new 
data and modern econometric procedures such as the panel ARDL that haven't been 
extensively used in previous studies on the relationship between financial 
intermediation and poverty.  
 
The role of remittances in poverty reduction in a panel of African countries is not yet 
extensively covered, the study included remittances in the econometric model 
estimation. Since 2000, remittances have outpaced FDI and ODA and they have a 
role to play in developing countries because the poor access the remittance money 
directly. In the developing countries in our panel for the poverty proxies under analysis 
there were mixed results on the effect of remittance on poverty. With poverty 
measured by headcount ratio and per capita income remittances are pro poor although 
the relationship is insignificant. The effect of remittances on the poverty gap is positive 
and insignificant. The positive and significant relationship was observed between 
remittances and the Gini index. The results shows increase in remittances reduces 
inequality Furthermore the previous studies did not examine the other characteristics 





Studies that have been done so far mainly focused on financial development which in 
most cases does not necessarily mean efficient or increased financial intermediation. 
For example Beck et al., (2005) found that financial development in Nigeria in the 
1980s was more of arbitrage and rent seeking it resulted in financial disintermediation. 
De Haan and Sturm (2017) recommended that the empirical studies should examine 
other characteristics of finance rather than only the size of the financial sector. This 
study contributes to this literature by including the other dimensions (financial 
efficiency, financial access and financial stability) of finance. Furthermore, by including 
remittances and domestic public debt in a financial intermediation setting the study 
sought to identify other channels to poverty reduction than the one that works through 
growth. The results of domestic public debt for this study were not significant with 
relation to the poverty proxies for our study. Irrespective of being insignificant for all 
the poverty proxies domestic debt had a negative relationship implying a pro poor 
effect of domestic debt. Public debt is only pro poor if that debt is used to finance 
productive investments.    
 
The use of the principal component analysis in developing an index, which is a 
multidimensional weighted index in coming up with the institutional quality index is a 
departure from previous studies where the index was developed using the arithmetic 
average. The results of this study are in contrast to Cepparulo et al., (2017) who used 
an arithmetic average to come up with an institutional quality index. For the poverty 
proxies of headcount ratio and the poverty gap all had a significant negative 
relationship with the institutional quality which is in contrast to this study. In this study 
an increase in the institutional quality increases the poverty headcount ratio. 
Consequently although insignificant, the relationship between poverty gap and the 
institutional quality index is positive. The difference in findings may be due to the 
differences in methodology, in the sample or the period of study. Since poverty is 
multidimensional, the study used a number of poverty proxies in order to achieve some 
rigour and robustness of observation and analysis. The reduction of inequality due to 
improvements in institutional quality is in line with the finding of Claessens and Perotti 
(2007) and De Haan and Sturm (2017). Poverty is regarded as multidimensional hence 






In examining the other financial characteristics the study included the analysis of 
relationship between financial intermediation and poverty within the context of financial 
efficiency, access and stability. To deduce the long run and short run equilibrium 
relationships between the financial dimensions and poverty the study used the 
financial dimensions of financial intermediation, financial efficiency, financial access 
and financial stability. Within the financial intermediation setting the long run 
relationship between the financial dimensions and poverty were all significant except 
for the Gini index and financial stability. Significant short run relationships were only 
observed with the dimension of financial intermediation in the presence of financial 
stability and poverty gap.  
 
The observation of the significant long run relationships with few significant 
relationships in the long run as confirmed by the significance of the coefficients can 
confirm the persistent nature of poverty. In the theory of the culture of poverty is argued 
to be a cycle with intergenerational persistence. When financial efficiency was 
substituted with financial access the long run equilibrium relationship between financial 
intermediation and the headcount ratio and the Gini index was positive and negative 
a result that is contrary to the long run relationship between financial intermediation 
and poverty proxies in the presence of financial efficiency. This suggests that the 
feedback mechanism within the financial dimensions can affect the effect of each of 
the dimensions on poverty in the long run. Policy makers should bear in mind the long 
term impact of financial dimensions in instituting policies that addresses the poverty 
and inequality challenges. The effect of financial dimension on poverty in the long term 
has more ramifications to the economic and social landscapes. 
 
Causality between financial intermediation including the other dimension of finance 
such as financial efficiency, financial access and financial stability and poverty is 
scantly studied for a panel of developing countries and therefore this study made a 
contribution in this regards. The causal relationships that were observed for this study 
were mainly in the long run than short run relationship. In the long run the study found 
bidirectional causality between financial intermediation and poverty proxies. 
Furthermore jointly with financial efficiency financial intermediation causes poverty 
and the results hold for all the poverty proxies. There were no causal effects between 




analysis between the financial dimensions using the pooled mean group estimation 
technique for a panel of developing countries is not covered by literature.  
 
Zhang and Naceur (2018) confirmed correlation/association between financial 
efficiency and inequality but did not further test the causality between the financial 
efficiency and inequality. Most studies that empirically tested the causality between 
finance mainly focused on the financial development aspect and tested the causality 
with poverty conditional on economic growth (the trickle down hypothesis) than the 
direct causal effects between poverty and the financial dimensions (see Honohan, 
2004), Odhiambo, 2010; Donou-Adonsou and Sylwester, 2016). The results from this 
study are different from Perez-Moreno (2011) who only tested the financial 
development aspect without analysing the financial access, financial stability and 
financial efficiency causal effects with poverty. Contrary to the finding of this study 
Perez-Moreno (2011) did not affirm causal links between the ratio of private credit to 
gross domestic product to poverty measured with the headcount ratio.  
 
An analysis of the relationship between financial intermediation and poverty through 
an investigation of the deterministic, cointegration and causality relationships is on its 
own a contribution as to the best of our knowledge there is no study that did such an 
in-depth analysis using different methodologies. The causality analysis in this study 
further enabled us to analyse the causal links between the financial variables 
themselves.  
 
Furthermore the analysis with the utilisation of the four poverty proxies is a contribution 
to literature in that how poverty is measured has an impact on how poverty relates to 
the determinants selected for this study. This allows us to check the sensitivity of the 
results to the way poverty is measured. On the deterministic relationships the results 
differ in the direction of influence either positive or negative. Additionally they differ on 
significance. For example the financial intermediation has a poverty reducing effect 
when poverty is measured poverty gap and Gini index whilst as measured with the 
headcount ratio and the gross domestic product per capita financial intermediation 
increases poverty incidences. The policy makers should carefully consider how 
poverty is measured whilst institute policy reactions to target poverty reduction. In the 




financial efficiency, financial intermediation increases poverty as measured by the Gini 
index for the panel of the developing countries in our study. On the contrary, in the 
presence of financial efficiency financial intermediation reduces poverty (headcount 
ratio and poverty gap) in the long run. In this regard policy makers might be inclined 
to reduce inequality which increased as a result financial intermediation and fail to find 
a balance in that in the same period that inequality increased poverty was reduced.  
 
7.4 Theoretical, social and policy implications of the results   
 
The effect of remittances in poverty reduction for this study was mixed and it was 
positively significant with inequality. An increase in remittances increases inequality 
by but with an insignificant reduction in poverty as measured by the headcount ratio. 
According to the World Bank (2019) remittances are proving to be a large economic 
driver in Africa since they have outpaced FDI and ODI, government should partner 
with the private sector in research and development on the business models that have 
an impact on reducing the cost of remittances. The SDGs acknowledged the cost of 
remittances in certain corridors to be very expensive for example SSA has the most 
expensive remittances corridors averaging 9.4 percent of the remitted money. In Saudi 
Arabia the central bank commissioned a pilot project with a private company (Ripple) 
that is aiding banks to improve their payment infrastructure on remittances by using 
block chain technology. This initiative has been said to be effective on how banks send 
money globally as it is fast and cost effective as compared to the traditional money 
transfer mechanism.  
 
The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets to reduce the cost of remittances 
to 3 percent so as to realise the full benefits of the impact of remittances on poverty 
reduction in the developing economies. The developing countries governments need 
to do more research on block chain solutions and partner with the banking sector to 
come up with cost effective alternatives for sending money as remittances are 
becoming a significant economic driver in reducing poverty in developing countries. 
Cost effective remittances means more money reaches the poor and it is directly used 





For this study we observed that the role of the financial sector on poverty depends on 
how poverty is measured. The study considered different poverty proxies to capture 
different aspects on poverty measurements. From the cointegration analysis, in the 
presence of financial efficiency, financial intermediation has a poverty reducing effect 
in the long run with rising inequality suggesting that increase in financial intermediation 
reduces poverty with an increase in equality in the long run. Therefore, there is need 
for policy makers to harmonise policy strategy in addressing poverty bearing in mind 
the different aspects of poverty measurements. The concept of poverty that is used is 
important for development policy to have coherent effect in the real sector (Ravallion, 
2005). This can be addressed by increasing investment in human capital as education 
and skills are critical determinants of income in most developing countries. For 
example in absolute terms inequality and poverty cannot be the same but in relative 
terms these can be similar. This puts a caution on governments on the sole reliance 
on the secondary data in addressing inequality issues in their respective countries 
Furthermore redistributive policies in Africa should be improved. So far the 
governments’ focus on reducing inequality is centred on redistributing land, 
progressing taxing and social expenditure policies. 
 
The causes of poverty and solution for poverty, at large seem not to be well understood 
by the decision makers due to the complex nature of what constitutes poverty. For the 
analysis on this study we used multiple indicators of poverty than a single indicator, 
the results showed that different poverty proxies yield different results. Policy makers 
should take note of how poverty is measured in using financial dimensions to 
addressing the challenges of poverty. Distorted understanding and definition of 
poverty will result in distorted policies which yield little or no results for the 
effectiveness of the financial sector in poverty reduction. It is imperative for the policy 
makers to understand poverty specifics and how they define it for targeted and 
effective policy. Knight (1921) and Keynes 1936 argued that an uncertain future and 
lack of coordination have led to the imperfect knowledge in decision making by policy 
makers. The SDG of ending poverty in all its forms is the acceptance of development 
policy that poverty cannot be measured by a single indicator, policy based on one 
aspect of poverty can be a wild goose chase as policies that target one poverty 





For this study access as measured by the ATMs 1000/km2 was positive and significant. 
An increase in access to finance increases the gross domestic product per capita for 
the panel of countries in our study. with the other poverty proxies the access as 
measure with ATMs 1000/km2 the results were insignificant in the cointegration 
analysis access to finance in the presence of financial intermediation are have a 
significant poverty reducing effect in the long run with the headcount ratio and the 
poverty gap. If it is profitable and sustainable for the private sector to increase outreach 
of financial products and services and reduce poverty this should be a focus of the 
private sector or public-private sector partnerships. The developing countries 
governments should consider investing the funds being used in promoting financial 
access in other welfare programmes than investing in improving access to finance by 
the poor.  
 
7.5 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research 
 
There were challenges of missing data on the reliable sources such as the World Bank 
and the IMF and this limited the number of the countries covered by this study.The 
World Bank database is widely used and regarded as reliable source of data for 
poverty measures however there is lack of comprehensive data that covers most 
developing countries. It is recommended to increase coordination between respective 
countries and the World Bank in data collection and providing up-to-date and adequate 
data on poverty measurements. Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2017) laments that the 
‘extreme poverty in data’ on poverty, requires an urgent cooperation between the 
World Bank and the governments of developing economies in providing improved data 
frequency. Furthermore new data on the measures of financial access was not 
available before the year 2004 and thus the study could not be done for the period 
prior to 2004. This has limited the number of developing countries that could be 
covered by this study. The study relied on secondary data and if there is error of 
measurement from the data sources this affects the results of this study. However the 





Behavioural finance has been a discipline not embraced in the provision of financial 
services but this has an impact on the uptake and use of financial service. The study 
did not account for the behavioural finance yet is it is an important aspect in the take 
up and use of financial services among the poor households and small firms. To date 
to the best of my knowledge there isn’t any quantitative measurements on people’s 
behaviour on financial decisions for a panel of countries. However, emerging banking 
institutions in some emerging markets such as the Discovery Bank in South Africa 
have introduced the banking services embracing the theory of behavioural finance in 
the provision of financial services (Discovery, 2018). The microeconomic decision of 
small businesses and households also have a significant impact on poverty reduction 
policies just as the macro decisions hence considerations on policies should also 
include these micro decisions which can be capture by behavioural finance. The 
success of the behavioural finance discipline in the context of developing economies 
is yet to be tried and tested empirically hence further research is needed on the 
behavioural finance whether it enhances intermediation, efficiency accessibility and 
stability of formal financial services by the poor and small businesses. 
 
Furthermore, empirical studies are needed to examine whether digital finance is a 
substitute or it complements physical access to formal financial services in Africa. 
There are reports of some banks for example South Africa’s major commercial banks 
(Absa, Standard Bank, Nedbank and First National Bank) which have opted to reduce 
the footprint of bank branches in favour of increasing the scope of digital finance 
(Citizen, 2019). In addition, the country is experiencing emergence of the banking 
institutions that have no physical branches and rely mainly on financial technology for 
the provision of financial services. The development of the quest to increase digital 
finance needs to be supported with empirical evidence whether it is beneficial to the 
larger population. In most developing countries, infrastructure that supports digital 
finance is weak in marginalised areas such as the rural areas. Furthermore, the credit 
infrastructure that is used by formal finance in credit extension decision making is 
weak or non-existent for the rural population and the low income earners. If the finance 
for all target is to be achieved, the mechanism that the finance reaches the low income 
households should be sustainable for both the individual and the service providers. In 
the African context the rural population is marginalised to technology infrastructure 




of the economy with limited digital infrastructure needs to be empirically researched 
extensively.  
The provision of financial services using digital technology is opined to be a cost-
effective and commercially sustainable service provision for the low income 
households. On the contrary, to the best of my knowledge there are no empirical 
studies that focus on whether digital finance can be effectively used as a store of value 
by the poor. Sub-Saharan Africa is thought to be a trailblazer in the use of digital 
finance in emerging market (Suri and Jack, 2016). The mobile phone is ubiquitous in 
developing countries reaching above 80 percent of the population in some economies. 
Digital financial provision is cheaper than the brick and mortar of bank branches, but 
the compatibility of this innovation broadening access to finance need to be 
ascertained. Provision of formal finance in most economies is on a top-down approach 
where financial providers make assumptions of what people want. The services that 
are made available most often do not suit the profile of poor people and small 
businesses. Most of the digital financial services are being rolled out on a software 
application which requires one to have a smartphone to be able to use the application.  
 
It is imperative therefore to have empirical studies to study how access to digital 
finance can be effectively taped so that they can be actively used by the poor 
households and small businesses for future transactions such as investment in human 
capital and venturing into new business projects. Non availability of enough 
quantitative data on mobile money for the time series dimension for the panel of 
countries for this study constrained the analysis of mobile money to be covered. A 
study on the impact of financial regulation on mobile money provider economics as 
part of the balance among multiple setting that comprises of the stability of the financial 
system, consumer interests, wider policy aims, and macroeconomic factors. In this 
study, arguments from the results suggest that nature of bank concentration can have 
an influence on the efficiency of the provision of the financial services. This suggests 
that market power of financial institutions can have a direct effect to poverty reduction. 
Most banking sectors in developing countries particularly in Africa are in an 
oligopolistic market structure, further studies are needed to determine whether the 
market structure of the banking system is a determinant of poverty. Few powerful 




studies are needed to examine the role of bank concentrating on poverty in developing 
countries. Such further studies may stand to affirm and also expand the observations, 
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According the World Bank (2017) the poverty line is at the International Poverty Line 
has a value of US$1.90 PPP and this is the value that has been adopted for this study. 
The other poverty rates that have not been used for this study are the lower middle 
income class Poverty Line has a value of US$3.20 PPP and the World Bank stated 
that the upper middle income class Poverty Line has a value of US$5.50 PPP. World 
Bank together with the PovCalNet databases was used for data on the headcount ratio 
and the poverty gap and moving averages were used to fill in the missing data. As 
much as this is not the best alternative to the gaps in the data the decision was based 
on the fact that the policy guidelines for most developing countries on poverty are 
based on the data from the World Bank. Where there was more than one entry on the 
PovCalNet database the data from the most recent survey year was used and this was 
in line with the data that was available on the World Bank database.  
 
In measuring the financial intermediation efficiency the lending deposit rate spread 
was used. In cases where the data on the lending deposit spread was not available 
the net interest margin was used. Thus net interest margin from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank was used for Ghana, Ethiopia, Morocco, 
Sudan and Tunisia, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Republic 
as the data interest rate spread for these countries was not available. Additionally the 
net interest rate was used in cases where only the either the deposit rate or the lending 
rate data was available this did not make it possible for the author to calculate the 
interest rate spread using these two data entries. Furthermore in case where the data 







Appendix 1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix   
hcr povgap gini gdpc pcredit atms cb is inst1 inst2 inst3  instQ_inde
x 
inf z rem dpd 
hcr 1.0000  
               
povgap 0.9374* 1.0000  
              
gini -0.0784 -0.0139 1.0000  





0.4071* 1.0000  





0.3402* 0.6092* 1.0000  





0.0681 0.4155* 0.6391* 1.0000  





0.0379 0.1593* 0.3492* 0.6494* 1.0000  
         
is 0.1400* 0.2458* 0.1264* 0.0735 -
0.1382* 
-0.0184 -0.0844  1.0000  










       
inst2 0.0132 -0.0284 0.2501* 0.0483 0.0763 0.0969 0.3333
* 
0.1769* 0.0549 1.0000  












     
instQ_inde
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0.2497* 1.0000  
    






-0.0592  0.3535* -0.0714 -0.0293 0.1077* -0.0293 1.0000  
















































The correlation coefficient between any pair of the variables is presented in this table. Poverty headcount(hcr), poverty gap (povgap), gini index and gross domestic product per capita are all the 
alternative proxies of poverty and are not used in the same equation for estimation. We estimated the correlation matrix at 5 percent significance.  





Appendix 2: Dynamic panel-data estimations on the Determinants of poverty 
headcount ratio (hcr) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS FE RE LSDV_K SysGMM  
L.hcr 0.975*** 0.752*** 0.962*** 0.903*** 0.872*** 
 (100.12) (13.75) (80.13) (13.06) (7.71) 
      
pcredit -0.00000265 -0.0000184 -0.0000529 0.000102 0.000206 
 (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.69) (0.57) (1.14) 
      
atms -0.0000245 -0.000307 0.0000883 0.0000338 0.000163 
 (-0.11) (-0.69) (0.78) (0.30) (0.33) 
      
is 0.000423** 0.000573** 0.000353* 0.000547 0.000584* 
 (2.65) (2.28) (1.84) (0.50) (1.74) 
      
instQ_index 0.000191 0.00784* 0.00150 0.00861 0.00918* 
 (0.11) (1.73) (0.81) (0.68) (1.79) 
      
inf -0.000308 -0.000340 -0.000379 -0.000404*** -0.000177 
 (-1.41) (-1.25) (-1.36) (-17.77) (-0.55) 
      
z 0.0000397 -0.000625 -0.000200 -0.000928 -0.000541 
 (0.19) (-0.64) (-0.68) (-1.37) (-0.50) 
      
rem -0.000477 -0.00228** -0.000635 -0.00149*** -0.00164 
 (-0.83) (-2.55) (-1.02) (-6.28) (-1.37) 
      
dpd -0.000306 -0.000125 -0.000323** -0.000147 -0.000133 
 (-1.95) (-0.61) (-2.06) (-0.57) (-0.46) 
      
_cons 0.00383 0.0994*** 0.0138   
 (0.62) (4.05) (1.82)   
N 283 283 283 283 248 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column represents a 
different regression technique.  OLS is the ordinary least Squares, FE is Fixed Effects, RE is the random Effects, LSDV_K is 
the Least Square Dummy Variable corrected for the Kiviat bias and the SysGMM is  System GMM 
Source: Authors own computations using Stata 
 
Appendix 3: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of hcr as a measure of poverty 
 Pooled OLS  FE  RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  283 283 283 283 283 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
3344.09 99.21   106.45   
0.0000 0.0000   0.000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 47.82    




     
 0.7331    






0.9888 0.9844    
 0.83769412    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -3.27 
    0.001 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    0.50 
    0.615 
Sargan test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    3.76 
    0.288 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    4.08 
    0.253 
Instruments     12 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Source: Authors own computations  
Appendix 4: Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of poverty gap 
(povgap) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS FE RE LSDV SysGMM  
L.povgap 0.937*** 0.600*** 0.937*** 0.801*** 0.859*** 
 (34.60) (6.06) (61.50) (8.65) (8.31) 
pcredit 0.0000100 0.000429 0.0000100 0.000268** -0.0000875 
 (0.12) (0.81) (0.20) (2.55) (-0.79) 
atms 0.00000918 -0.000169 0.00000918 0.00000131 0.0000867 
 (0.03) (-0.96) (0.12) (0.03) (1.02) 
is 0.000721* 0.00133 0.000721*** 0.00140 0.000917** 
 (1.83) (1.57) (4.19) (1.07) (2.08) 
instQ_index 0.000652 -0.000312 0.000652 0.00295 0.00153 
 (0.39) (-0.14) (0.60) (0.22) (0.84) 
inf -0.000300* -0.0000714 -0.000300* -0.000201*** -0.000275 
 (-1.84) (-0.26) (-1.78) (-52.75) (-1.47) 
z -0.0000975 -0.000102 -0.0000975 -0.000116 -0.000552 
 (-0.54) (-0.15) (-0.56) (-0.24) (-1.14) 
rem -0.000206 -0.00154** -0.000206 -0.000915** 0.000114 
 (-0.61) (-2.24) (-0.51) (-2.11) (0.17) 
dpd -0.0000753 0.0000705 -0.0000753 0.0000526 -0.000184 
 (-0.37) (0.22) (-0.52) (0.19) (-0.70) 
_cons 0.00452 0.0375 0.00452  0.0218 
 (0.92) (1.51) (1.03)  (1.02) 




Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column represents a 
different regression technique. 
Source: Authors own computations  
 
Appendix 5: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of povgap as a measure of poverty 
 Pooled OLS  FE RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  283 283 283 283 283 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
887.39 45.37   890.42 
0.0000 0.0000   0.000    
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 29.77    






     
 0.3270    
 0.9446    
0.9498 0.9080    
 0.77642239    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -2.08 
    0.037 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    0.57 
    0.567 
Sargan test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    3.49 
    0.479 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    5.46 
    0.244 
Instruments     12 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Source: Authors own computations  
 
Appendix 6: Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of inequality (gini) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS FE RE LSDV SysGMM  
L.gini 1.003*** 0.750*** 1.000*** 0.894*** 1.026*** 
 (422.25) (8.18) (241.89) (32.98) (97.91) 
pcredit -0.0000757 -0.00794 0.000395 -0.00265** -0.00256* 
 (-0.12) (-1.53) (0.59) (-2.02) (-1.81) 
atms -0.00174 -0.00165 -0.00215** -0.00299*** 0.000634 
 (-1.31) (-0.61) (-2.04) (-3.59) (0.31) 
is -0.00347*** 0.00332 -0.00153 0.00441 -0.00303 
 (-2.62) (1.35) (-0.66) (0.67) (-1.07) 
instQ_index 0.000858 -0.0911 -0.00234 -0.0510 -0.0453* 
 (0.04) (-1.21) (-0.10) (-0.86) (-1.87) 




 (0.92) (-0.31) (0.52) (-0.02) (0.93) 
z -0.000481 0.00646 -0.00101 0.00352 0.00591* 
 (-0.37) (1.04) (-0.48) (0.26) (1.93) 
rem 0.00575* 0.00167 0.00456 0.00254 0.0111* 
 (1.84) (0.28) (0.99) (0.11) (1.86) 
dpd -0.000372 0.00304 -0.000467 0.00208 -0.000151 
 (-0.27) (0.98) (-0.24) (1.37) (-0.13) 
_cons -0.146 11.09** -0.0441  -1.207** 
 (-1.42) (2.71) (-0.23)  (-2.59) 
N 353 353 353 353 353 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column represents a 
different regression technique. 
Source: Authors own computations 
  
Appendix 7: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of gini as a measure of poverty 
 Pooled OLS  FE  RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  353 353 353 353 353 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
54179.82 48.35 124070.59  20543.84 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 84.70    






     
 0.7661 0.7532   
 0.9976 0.9997   
0.9981 0.9956   0.9981   
 0.97849665    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -1.19 
    0.235 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    0.36 
    0.723 
Sargan test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    1.65 
    0.799 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    2.57 
    0.632 
Instruments     14 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Source: Authors own computations  
 
Appendix 8: Dynamic panel-data estimations on the determinants of gross domestic 
product per capita (gdpc) 




 Pooled OLS FE RE LSDV_K SysGMM 
L.gdpc 1.011*** 0.838*** 1.008*** 0.937*** 1.003*** 
 (128.81) (31.64) (159.13) (29.14) (49.59) 
      
pcredit 0.840 1.387 1.169 -1.331** 1.741 
 (1.13) (0.86) (0.87) (-2.52) (1.19) 
      
atms 4.857*** 10.76*** 3.292*** 5.388** 4.563*** 
 (5.66) (4.59) (5.15) (2.03) (4.18) 
      
is -0.362 -1.981 0.613 -1.265 0.0574 
 (-0.23) (-0.81) (0.35) (-0.25) (0.03) 
      
instQ_index -35.06*** -46.10* -33.48 -37.08 -42.38* 
 (-3.02) (-2.01) (-1.39) (-1.02) (-1.85) 
      
inf -0.0124 -2.003 -0.795 -2.228 0.454 
 (-0.01) (-0.95) (-0.58) (-1.11) (0.31) 
      
z 0.494 5.640 1.311 2.234 1.547 
 (0.32) (1.65) (0.73) (0.21) (0.54) 
      
rem -2.429 -2.435 -2.773 -1.811 -0.476 
 (-1.24) (-1.16) (-1.15) (-0.12) (-0.09) 
      
dpd -1.189 -1.635 -1.301 -3.004*** -0.270 
 (-0.76) (-0.97) (-0.94) (-2.64) (-0.15) 
      
_cons 43.79 805.6*** 44.96  -3.000 
 (1.75) (5.01) (1.53)  (-0.06) 
N 353 353 353 353 353 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column represents a 
different regression technique.   






Appendix 9: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of gross domestic product per capita 
as a measure of poverty 
 Pooled 
OLS  
FE RE LSDV_K  SysGMM  
Observations  353 353 353 353 353 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
12518.17 407.18 180203.51  2063.46 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 176.63    






     
 0.9378       
 0.9991    
0.9976 0.9968    




    -1.36 




    -1.36 
    0.173 
Sargan test of 
overid 
Prob>chi2 
    72.77 
    0.000 
Hansen test of 
overid 
Prob>chi2 
    6.22 
    0.183 
Instruments     14 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Source: Authors own computations  
 
Appendix 10: Summary of System GMM regression results dep vars: hcr, povgap, gini 
and gdpc using commercial banks an access measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











pcredit 0.000139 -0.0000366 -0.00208* 0.00910 
 (0.51) (-0.33) (-1.77) (0.01) 
cb -0.00108 0.0000303 0.00480* 8.585*** 
 (-0.73) (0.21) (1.94) (3.15) 



















































N 279 314 397 398 
Notes: : ***, **,* are statistical significance at the levels of significance of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; t statistics in parentheses, p values 
reported for AR(2) and the Hansen Statistic. The Hansen statistic test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 
under the null of instrument validity. hcr is the poverty headcount ratio, pcredit is the ratio of private credit to gross domestic product, cb is the 
commercial banks  per 1000, is the interest rate spread, instQ_index  in the institutional quality index, inf is inflation z is the bank z-score, rem is 
remittance inflows and the dpd is the domestic public debt. Each column represents a different poverty proxy using the System GMM estimation 
technique. The variation in the sample size is due to missing data.  
Source: Authors own computations  
 
Appendix 11: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of hcr as a measure of poverty with 
commercial banks as a measure of financial access  
 Pooled OLS  FE RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  314 314 314  279 
Groups  35 35 35  35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
3891.61 405.41   204.49 
0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 41.01    






     
 0.7348    0.7234   
 0.9922   0.9985   
 0.9811   0.9877   
 0.79499555      
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -3.25   
    0.001 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    0.53 
    0.595 




Prob>chi2     0.203 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    5.84 
    0.120 
Instruments     12 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Appendix 12: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of povgap as a measure of poverty 
with commercial banks as a measure of financial access 
 Pooled OLS  FE RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  314 314 314 314 314 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
915.36 85.35   1880.30 
0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
     






     
 0.4849      
 0.9793    
0.9552 0.9408    
 0.58143663    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -2.18 
    0.029 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    1.06   
    0.291 
Sargan test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    3.92   
    0.416 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    6.61   
    0.158 
Instruments     14 





Appendix 13 : Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of gini as a measure of poverty with 
commercial banks as a measure of financial access 
 Pooled OLS  FE RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  397 397 397 397 397 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
54111.08 85.95   19106.67 
0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 65.09    






     
 0.8155    
 0.9992    
0.9980 0.9975    
 0.96859174    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -1.21   
    0.228 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    0.92   
    0.360 
Sargan test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    1.65   
    0.799 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    3.39   
    0.494 
Instruments     14 
Note: t statistics in parenthesis. * t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Appendix 14: Diagnostic statistics- Determinants of gdpc as a measure of 
poverty with commercial banks as a measure of financial access  
 Pooled OLS  FE RE LSDV  SysGMM  
Observations  398 398 398 398 398 
Groups  35 35 35 35 35 
F Stats  
Prob˃F 
12245.09 989.94   5957.25 
0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 
Hausman Test 
Prob>chi2 
 84.81    






     
 0.9016    
 0.9989    
0.9979 0.9970    
 0.16941244    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) 
Prob>z 
    -1.37 
    0.171 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
Prob>z 
    0.53 
    0.164 
Sargan test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    78.77   
    0.000 
Hansen test of overid 
Prob>chi2 
    5.96 
    0.202 
Instruments     14 




Appendix 15: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty 
(headcount ratio), financial intermediation and financial efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆HCR  PMG MG DFE 
Long run    
pcredit -0.0000591* -0.00491 -0.00111 
 (-2.51) (-0.74) (-0.76) 
    
is 0.0108*** -0.0462 0.00291 
 (125.30) (-1.29) (1.32) 
    
ECT -0.437*** -0.570 -0.209*** 
 (-6.43) (-1.54) (-6.76) 
Short run     
∆.pcredit -0.00179 0.00309 -0.000365 
 (-1.11) (1.11) (-0.65) 
    
∆.is -0.00523 -0.0654 -0.00105 
 (-1.14) (-1.48) (-1.44) 
    
_cons 0.107*** 0.0493 0.0762*** 








Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. HCR is poverty headcount ratio, pcredit is 
financial intermediation and is represents the interest rate spread measuring bank efficiency.  
 
Appendix 16: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty (poverty 
gap), financial intermediation and financial efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.povgap PMG  MG DFE 
Long run     
pcredit -0.00163*** -0.0113 0.00152 
 (-19.62) (-1.52) (1.09) 
    
is 0.00193*** -0.0147* 0.00461** 
 (8.11) (-1.66) (2.23) 
    
ECT -0.493*** 0.0277 -0.231*** 
 (-4.64) (0.03) (-5.08) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.pcredit -0.00152 0.000615 -0.00130** 
 (-1.18) (0.37) (-2.34) 
    
∆.is -0.00433 -0.0189* 0.000413 




    
_cons 0.0870*** 0.0565 0.0155 
 (4.23) (0.52) (1.24) 




Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, poverty gap as a poverty measure), pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures the interest rate spread measuring bank efficiency.  
 
Appendix 17: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty (gini 
index), financial intermediation and financial efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.gini PMG MG DFE 
Long Run  
 
   
pcredit 0.00733*** -0.0145 -0.0340*** 
 (2.75) (-0.58) (-3.24) 
    
is     0.0198*** 0.851 0.0181 
 (8.03) (1.42) (1.10) 
    
ECT -0.208*** -0.417*** -0.206*** 




   
∆.pcredit -0.000871 -0.00391 0.000961 
 (-0.23) (-0.49) (0.24) 
    
∆.is 0.000679 0.0444 0.00532 
 (0.02) (0.83) (1.18) 
    
_cons 9.223*** 17.21*** 9.109*** 
 (5.60) (6.36) (9.26) 
N 411 411 
Hausman test p value: 0.6176 
411 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. gini index (income inequality as a poverty measure), pcredit 





Appendix 18: Cointegration,  error correction and causality financial intermediation, 
poverty (headcount ratio and financial efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit PMG MG DFE 
ECT    
hcr -34.93*** -1235.1 -28.43 
 (-53.87) (-1.52) (-1.40) 
    
is 2.940*** 26.55 -0.180 
 (21.72) (1.44) (-0.61) 
    
ECT -0.200*** -0.493** -0.165*** 
 (-3.10) (-2.10) (-5.25) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.hcr 22.90 54.71 -1.874 
 (0.71) (0.46) (-0.32) 
    
∆.is -0.0363 -11.42 -0.106 
 (-0.03) (-0.90) (-1.38) 
    
_cons 7.635** -55.15 7.310*** 
 (2.13) (-0.51) (4.03) 




Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01headcount ratio as a poverty measure), pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures the interest rate spread measuring bank efficiency.  
 
Appendix 19: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation, poverty (gini index) and financial efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
gini 0.805 79.94 -4.625*** 
 (1.15) (1.06) (-2.88) 
    
is -0.477*** 21.92 -0.364 
 (-5.32) (0.75) (-1.51) 
    
ECT -0.227*** -0.514*** -0.181*** 
 (-4.47) (-7.12) (-6.30) 
    
∆.gini 1.514 2.638 -0.168 
 (0.48) (0.93) (-0.28) 
    




 (1.12) (1.29) (-0.53) 
    
_cons 0.959 66.66 43.05*** 
 (0.35) (0.68) (3.09) 
N 411 411 
 Hausman test     
pvalue: 0.7284 
411 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Gini index as a poverty measure), pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures the interest rate spread measuring bank efficiency. 
 
Appendix 20: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
efficiency, poverty (headcount ratio) and financial intermediation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.is  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
hcr 7.778*** 25.16 -5.566 
 (18.33) (0.40) (-0.43) 
    
pcredit 0.180*** -1.051 0.111 
 (17.39) (-0.91) (0.88) 
    
ECT -0.495*** -0.758*** -0.207*** 
 (-4.98) (-4.52) (-5.92) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.hcr 12.42 20.50 -1.681 
 (1.32) (1.80) (-0.37) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.0416 0.160 -0.102** 
 (-0.30) (0.89) (-2.27) 
    
_cons 0.548 8.659 1.535 
 (0.73) (1.21) (1.06) 
N 315 315 
Hausman test 
pvalue: 0.7050  
315 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. hcr as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation 





Appendix 21: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation, poverty (poverty gap) and financial efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
povgap -76.70*** -3245.1 -42.08 
 (-16.01) (-0.84) (-1.28) 
    
is 4.941*** 3.536 -0.825** 
 (16.37) (0.34) (-1.97) 
    
ECT -0.192** -1.277 -0.205*** 
 (-2.27) (-1.72) (-5.41) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.povgap 170.6 875.2 -0.670 
 (1.21) (1.12) (-0.08) 
    
∆.is 1.269 -30.69 -0.0159 
 (0.84) (-1.43) (-0.15) 
    
_cons 7.674 -267.5 8.495*** 
 (1.64) (-1.13) (4.83) 





Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Poverty gap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures bank efficiency 
 
Appendix 22: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
efficiency, (poverty gap) and financial intermediation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.is  PMG MG DFE  
Longrun     
povgap 14.37*** 971.0 24.51 
 (15.76) (1.06) (1.42) 
    
pcredit 0.187*** -1.409 0.118 
 (19.83) (-1.29) (1.02) 
    
ECT -0.481*** -0.801*** -0.220*** 
 (-4.93) (-5.23) (-6.34) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.povgap 53.99** 54.67** 4.014 
 (2.08) (2.07) (0.77) 




∆.pcredit -0.0101 0.225 -0.0909** 
 (-0.08) (1.34) (-2.03) 
    
_cons 0.839 2.965 0.290 
 (1.15) (0.60) (0.28) 
N 315 315 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.4884 
315 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Poverty gap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and is measures financial efficiency.  
 
Appendix 23: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
efficiency, poverty (Gini index) and financial intermediation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.is PMG  MG DFE 
Long run     
gini -0.206** -18.75 -0.519 
 (-2.27) (-1.06) (-0.75) 
    
pcredit 0.0977*** -0.425* 0.0509 
 (9.06) (-1.72) (0.76) 
    
ECT -0.443*** -0.739*** -0.348*** 
 (-8.26) (-13.68) (-12.67) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.gini 3.211** 1.568 1.013** 
 (2.23) (0.89) (2.23) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.131 0.0300 -0.0712* 
 (-1.49) (0.40) (-1.84) 
    
_cons 5.392*** 189.1 9.996 
 (7.44) (0.95) (0.93) 
N 399 399 
Hausman test p 
value: 0.1755 
399 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. gini is the gini index as a measure of poverty; pcredit is 





Appendix 24: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty 
(headcount ratio), financial intermediation and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Hcr PMG MG  DFE 
Long run     
pcredit 0.00131*** 0.00424 -0.00129 
 (3.18) (0.50) (-0.92) 
    
z 0.0103*** -0.0603 -0.00557 
 (11.82) (-1.05) (-1.15) 
    
ECT -0.258*** -0.652*** -0.218*** 
 (-4.17) (-2.35) (-7.04) 
Short Run     
∆.pcredit -0.000321 -0.00512 -0.000210 
 (-0.16) (-1.37) (-0.37) 
    
∆.z -0.00140 0.0214 0.00106 
 (-0.90) (0.97) (1.12) 
    
_cons 0.0501*** 0.316*** 0.100*** 
 (2.99) (3.43) (4.54) 
N 324 324 




Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hcr is the headcount ratio as a measure of poverty; pcredit is 





Appendix 25: Cointegration, error correction and causality between poverty (povgap), 
financial intermediation and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (5) 
∆.povgap PMG MG DFE 
ECT    
pcredit 0.000406** 0.00279 0.00152 
 (2.76) (0.77) (1.06) 
    
z 0.00412*** -0.00702 -0.00148 
 (10.89) (-1.29) (-0.32) 
    
ECT -0.433*** -0.556 -0.227*** 
 (-5.16) (-1.30) (-5.04) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.pcredit -0.000353 -0.00325 -0.00135** 
 (-0.26) (-1.28) (-2.44) 
    
∆.z -0.00218* 0.00202 0.000347 
 (-1.86) (0.56) (0.37) 
    
_cons 0.0312*** 0.107 0.0271 
 (3.49) (1.38) (1.50) 




Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Poverty gap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 





Appendix 26: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty (gini 
index), financial intermediation and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Gini  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
pcredit 0.00134 -0.211 -0.0352** 
 (0.65) (-1.21) (-3.24) 
    
z -0.00333 -0.393 0.0114 
 (-0.73) (-0.89) (0.32) 
    
ECT -0.272*** -0.467*** -0.197*** 
 (-6.21) (-5.57) (-8.83) 
Short run  
 
   
∆.pcredit 0.00478 -0.00679 0.0000300 
 (0.48) (-0.50) (0.01) 
    
∆.z 0.0119 0.0139 0.00356 
 (1.18) (1.18) (0.48) 
    
_cons 11.79*** 20.74*** 8.726*** 
 (6.23) (5.72) (8.77) 
N 411 411 
Hausman test p 
value: 0.7068  
411 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Gini as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation 
and z measures the bank z score measuring bank stability  
 
Appendix 27: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation, poverty (hcr) and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (4) 
∆.pcredit PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
hcr 19.47*** 3589.0 -29.89 
 (3.44) (1.25) (-1.55) 
    
z 1.842*** 0.653 -0.333 
 (20.47) (0.09) (-0.52) 
    
ECT -0.155** -0.786*** -0.171*** 
 (-2.35) (-5.94) (-5.47) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.hcr -2.651 76.80 -0.162 
 (-0.09) (1.45) (-0.03) 
    




 (-1.67) (-0.70) (0.48) 
    
_cons 3.139 44.18** 8.067*** 
 (0.79) (2.23) (3.49) 
N 324 324 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.3421  
324 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Poverty gap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and z measures the bank z score measuring bank stability  
 
Appendix 28: Cointegration,  error correction and causality financial stability, poverty 
(hcr) and financial intermediation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.z  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
hcr 0.905*** 33.91 0.0869 
 (7.70) (1.05) (0.72) 
    
pcredit -0.00765*** 0.106 -0.00136 
 (-11.38) (0.45) (-1.18) 
    
ECT -0.381*** -2.582 -0.706*** 
 (-4.35) (-1.56) (-12.68) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.hcr -1.244 -20.33 -0.00608 
 (-0.81) (-0.99) (-0.04) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.00309 -0.00181 0.000447 
 (-1.37) (-0.23) (0.31) 
    
_cons 0.308*** 0.0560 0.725*** 
 (3.07) (0.04) (9.52) 




Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 hcr as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation 




Appendix 29: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation poverty (povgap) and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆. pcredit PMG  MG DFE 
Long run     
povgap 36.66*** 2799.9 -53.33 
 (3.90) (0.50) (-1.55) 
    
z 1.884*** -1.916 -0.432 
           (21.52) (-1.03) (-0.70) 
    
ECT -0.225*** -1.169** -0.193*** 
 (-2.83) (-2.53) (-5.38) 
    
∆.povgap 94.01 588.6 -1.742 
 (0.71) (1.19) (-0.21) 
    
∆.z -0.668*** 0.195 0.0488 
            (-2.78) (0.43) (0.46) 
    
_cons 4.805 142.3 8.172*** 
 (0.95) (1.27) (3.75) 
N 253 253 
Hausman test p 
value: 0.3332 
253 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Poverty gap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and z measures the bank z score measuring bank stability  
 
Appendix 30: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial stability, 
povgap and financial intermediation  
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.z PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
povgap 15.56*** 1197.1 2.662 
 (6.01) (1.18) (0.40) 
    
pcredit -0.0748*** -0.469 -0.0445 
 (-3.75) (-0.82) (-1.21) 
    
ECT -0.673*** -0.717*** -0.640*** 
 (-5.84) (-3.06) (-10.38) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.povgap 315.9 527.8 -1.711 
 (1.27) (0.79) (-0.33) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.0470 0.293 0.0150 




    
_cons 7.705*** 49.62** 8.207*** 
 (4.22) (2.53) (6.37) 
N 253 253 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.8575 
253 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Poverty gap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and z measures the bank z score measuring bank stability  
 
Appendix 31: Cointegration,  error correction and causality financial intermediation, 
poverty (gini index) and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit  PMG MG DFE 
Log run     
gini 2.871*** 4.878 -5.186*** 
 (3.73) (0.75) (-3.46) 
    
z 1.523*** 1.473 0.260 
 (9.86) (0.64) (0.55) 
    
ECT -0.198*** -0.511*** -0.188*** 
 (-3.52) (-7.05) (-6.51) 
 
Short run     
∆.gini 2.836 4.431 -0.155 
 (0.64) (0.68) (-0.26) 
    
∆.z -0.211 0.0508 -0.0563 
 (-1.66) (0.29) (-0.59) 
    
_cons -22.74*** -67.81 48.07*** 
 (-3.05) (-0.73) (3.49) 
N 411 411 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.9760 
411 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Gini as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 




Appendix 32: Cointegration,  error correction and causality financial stability, poverty 
(Gini index) and financial intermediation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.z PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
gini -0.340 -0.902 0.341 
 (-1.80) (-0.51) (0.93) 
pcredit 0.0751*** 0.356* 0.0399 
 (5.48) (1.87) (1.12) 
    
ECT -0.504*** -0.851*** -0.446*** 
 (-8.10) (-12.55) (-10.87) 
 
Short run  
   
∆.gini 1.052 3.461* 0.110 
 (0.71) (1.76) (0.35) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.0889* -0.136*** -0.0199 
 (-2.04) (-2.80) (-0.74) 
    
_cons 12.07*** 45.69 -1.465 
 (8.01) (0.68) (-0.20) 
N 411 411 
Hausman test                 
pvalue: 0.5622 
411 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Gini  as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and z measures the bank z score measuring bank stability  
 
Appendix 33: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty (hcr), 
financial intermediation and financial access  
 (1) (2) (3) 
hcr PMG MG DFE 
Long Run     
pcredit 0.000316*** -0.00104 -0.00178 
 (4.02) (-0.09) (-1.20) 
    
cb -0.0536*** -0.372 -0.00344 
 (-41.33) (-1.48) (-0.68) 
    
ECT -0.454*** -0.954*** -0.289*** 
 (-5.12) (-7.91) (-7.35) 
 
Short  run 
   
∆.pcredit -0.000706 0.00288 -0.000274 
 (-0.41) (1.03) (-0.45) 
    
∆.cb -0.0618 0.138 0.00176 




    
_cons 0.210*** 0.462*** 0.116*** 
 (4.38) (4.16) (5.20) 





t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Headcount ratio as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and cb 
measures financial access as proxied by the number of commercial bank branches/ 1000km2 
 
Appendix 34: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty (povgap), 
financial intermediation and financial access 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.povgap  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
pcredit -0.00107*** 0.00355 0.000307 
 (-6.54) (0.46) (0.22) 
    
cb -0.00804*** -0.244 -0.000944 
 (-4.67) (-1.27) (-0.21) 
    
ECT -0.579*** 0.137 -0.325*** 
 (-5.57) (0.13) (-4.86) 
 
Short run     
∆.pcredit -0.000609 -0.000432 -0.00142* 
 (-0.31) (-0.15) (-2.24) 
    
∆.cb -0.112 -0.0764 0.00504 
 (-1.10) (-0.51) (0.81) 
    
_cons 0.111*** 0.214** 0.0419* 
 (4.95) (2.90) (2.37) 
N 271 271 
Hausman test 
pvalue:  0.9232 
271 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01povgap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and cb measures 







Appendix 35: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between poverty (gini), 
financial intermediation and financial access 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.gini  PMG MG DFE 
Long Run     
pcredit -0.106*** 0.0589 -0.0254* 
 (-15.92) (1.26) (-1.65) 
    
cb 0.0910 -3.267* 0.0374 
 (1.53) (-1.71) (0.57) 
    
ECT -0.144*** -0.482*** -0.204*** 
 (-2.87) (-4.92) (-8.03) 
    
∆.pcredit 0.0226 -0.0119 0.00231 
 (0.86) (-0.76) (0.44) 
    
∆.cb -0.208 0.853 0.0113 
 (-0.27) (1.22) (0.16) 
    
_cons 6.303** 21.66*** 9.073*** 
 (2.79) (4.97) (7.87) 





t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Gini  as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and cb measures 
financial access as proxied by the number of commercial bank branches/ 1000km2 
 
Appendix 36: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation (dep variable), poverty (hcr) and financial access 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit PMG MG DFE 
cb -2.003*** 114.4* -0.630 
 (-6.90) (1.90) (-1.22) 
    
hcr -22.53*** 609.4 -36.33** 
 (-10.41) (1.62) (-2.56) 
    
ECT -0.401*** -0.789*** -0.297*** 
 (-5.06) (-6.97) (-7.53) 
 
Short run     
∆.cb 27.56 -25.83 0.572 
 (0.83) (-1.17) (0.96) 
    




 (0.68) (0.63) (0.49) 
    
_cons 18.85*** 60.77** 13.21*** 
 (3.97) (2.20) (6.04) 
N 271 271 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.8605 
271 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Headcount ratio as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and cb 
measures financial access as proxied by the number of commercial banks/1000km2  
 
Appendix 37: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial access 
(dep variable), poverty (HCR) and financial intermediation  
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆. cb PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
hcr -0.0760 -25.03** 64.16 
 (-0.67) (-2.03) (0.19) 
    
pcredit 0.0419*** -0.134 0.143 
 (20.20) (-0.72) (0.10) 
    
ECT -0.261*** -0.665*** 0.00389 
 (-4.20) (-4.73) (0.23) 
 
Short run     
∆.hcr 2.186 6.935 0.349 
 (0.66) (1.47) (0.50) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.00436 -0.0386** 0.00560 
 (-0.44) (-2.30) (0.81) 
    
_cons 0.360 2.602 0.277 
 (1.89) (0.72) (1.03) 
N 271 271 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.7831 
271 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Headcount ratio as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and cb 





Appendix 38: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation, poverty (povgap) and financial access 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
povgap -31.56*** 82.15 -55.66* 
 (-8.45) (0.13) (-2.40) 
    
cb -0.109*** 27.02 -0.380 
 (-3.69) (0.94) (-0.74) 
    
ECT -0.423*** -0.773*** -0.285*** 
 (-5.43) (-6.08) (-7.26) 
 
Short run 
   
∆.povgap -3.476 -95.71 3.791 
 (-0.03) (-0.29) (0.49) 
    
∆.cb 21.12 -30.82 0.603 
 (0.74) (-1.58) (1.02) 
    
_cons 16.80*** 32.49 10.92*** 
 (3.61) (1.72) (7.03) 
N 271 271 
Hausman test 
   pvalue:0.9651 
271 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Povgap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation 
and cb measures financial access as proxied by the number of commercial banks/1000km2  
Appendix 39: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial access, 
financial intermediation, poverty (povgap) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.cb  PMG MG DFE 
ECT    
povgap -1.216*** -99.43 -41.29 
 (-9.30) (-1.60) (-0.29) 
    
pcredit 0.0000190 -0.329 -0.0452 
 (0.03) (-1.01) (-0.06) 
SR    
ECT -0.202*** -0.672*** 0.00694 
 (-2.68) (-4.15) (0.42) 
    
∆.pcredit -0.0000474 -0.0283* 0.00619 
 (-0.00) (-1.76) (0.88) 
    
∆.povgap 16.38 37.89 0.282 




    
_cons 0.712** 2.575 0.111 
 (2.45) (1.47) (0.57) 
N 271 271 
Hausman test 
  pvalue: 0.5381 
271 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Povgap as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation 
and cb measures financial access as proxied by the number of commercial banks/1000km2  
 
Appendix 40: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial 
intermediation, poverty (gini), and financial access 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit  PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
cb 1.134* 82.75 -0.777 
 (1.93) (1.59) (-1.05) 
    
gini 1.956* -2.215 -2.908* 
 (1.82) (-0.38) (-2.20) 
    
ECT -0.175*** -0.790*** -0.218*** 
 (-2.83) (-8.58) (-6.26) 
 
Short run     
∆.cb -1.516 -32.43 1.523** 
 (-0.15) (-1.21) (1.98) 
    
∆.gini 2.620 3.962 0.280 
 (0.93) (1.11) (0.47) 
    
_cons -7.818* 43.33 34.88** 
 (-1.82) (0.22) (2.49) 




t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Gini as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and 







Appendix 41: Cointegration,  error correction and causality between financial access, 
financial intermediation and poverty (gini) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.cb PMG MG DFE 
Long run     
pcredit 0.0279*** -0.110 -0.0216 
 (19.84) (-0.78) (-0.63) 
    
gini -0.0969*** -0.361 -0.186 
 (-11.96) (-0.50) (-0.65) 
    
ECT -0.139*** -0.364*** 0.0948*** 
 (-3.23) (-2.71) (8.15) 
 
Short run    
∆.pcredit 0.000326 -0.00233 0.00788 
 (0.07) (-0.18) (1.59) 
    
∆.gini 0.0492 -0.0497 -0.000470 
 (0.40) (-0.23) (-0.01) 
    
_cons 0.701*** -12.06 -0.915 
 (2.97) (-0.54) (-0.75) 
N 313 313 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.9281 
313 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Headcount ratio as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial 
intermediation and cb measures financial access as proxied by the number of commercial banks/1000km2  
 
Appendix 42: Cointegration,  error correction and causality financial intermediation, 
poverty (gini index) and financial stability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆.pcredit  PMG MG DFE 
Log run     
gini 2.871*** 4.878 -5.186*** 
 (3.73) (0.75) (-3.46) 
    
z 1.523*** 1.473 0.260 
 (9.86) (0.64) (0.55) 
    
ECT -0.198*** -0.511*** -0.188*** 
 (-3.52) (-7.05) (-6.51) 
 
Short run     
∆.gini 2.836 4.431 -0.155 
 (0.64) (0.68) (-0.26) 
    




 (-1.66) (0.29) (-0.59) 
    
_cons -22.74*** -67.81 48.07*** 
 (-3.05) (-0.73) (3.49) 
N 411 411 
Hausman test pvalue: 
0.9760 
411 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01Gini as a measure of poverty; pcredit is financial intermediation and z 
stability proxied by the z score  
 
For all the tables presented in the appendices the source is the authors’ own 





Appendix 43: Variable definition and data source  
 
Variables  Definition / Measure Source 
Poverty headcount 
ratio  
Poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the population living below the 
national poverty lines. In this study we used the  World Banks measure of the 
national poverty line  at US$1,90 per day 
World Bank, PovcalNet 
Poverty gap  Poverty Gap Index, measures the average income shortfall of the poor individual 
from the poverty line ($1.90 a day). 
World Bank, PovcalNet 
Gini index / 
coefficient  
 
Measures income inequality or income distribution in a country, where 0 
resembles perfectly equal society, while, 100 percent mirrors a very unequal 
condition. 
Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID), 
(Solt, 2016). 
Inflation  General increase in the price level measured by the consumer prices index 
(annual percent) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI)  
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) World Bank, International 
Comparison Program Database. 
Efficiency (Lending 
deposit spread) 
The interest rate spread (higher value  mean higher inefficiency) World Bank, Global Financial 
Development Database 
(henceforth GFDD) 
Financial access  degree to which individuals can and do use formal financial services ATMs per 
1000km
2
 and commercial banks per 1000km
2
 
International Financial Statistics  
Financial stability  Z score was adopted as a measure of financial stability  Bankscope, World Bank  
Remittances 
received  
Remittance inflows to GDP (%) World Bank  
Institutional Quality   Index developed using PCA from law and order, democratic accountability and 
bureaucracy in governments 
IRCG  






Appendix 44: List of Countries used for the study  
 
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Congo Republic., Cote d'Ivoire,  Egypt Arab Rep., Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India , Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
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